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The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the changes that have occurred in the economy of Cape 
Town, South Africa over the last half of the 20th century and what the possible effects of this change 
have been on social inequality. Literature on economic restructuring in cities all over the world 
provided the framework of ideas within which this analysis was conducted. These works focused on 
how in many cities. progressive deindustrialisation has led to the loss of middle-income jobs, while 
growth in the service sector has resulted in greater numbers of high- and low-skill and income jobs. 
Others argued that most cities economies' were becoming increasingly organised around 
professional, managerial and technical skills only, and that increased polarisation occurred solely in 
those cities that were subject to large-scale immigration. The overriding question that emerged from 
this body of work then was whether the occupational distribution of employment in cities was 
becoming increasingly polarised or professionalised. Careful examination of population census data 
on sectoral and occupational changes in the economy of Cape Town showed that the city's working 
population was becoming increasingly professionalised, and not more polarised. Survey data were 
also used to dispute the contention that a large unskilled migrant population was a sufficient 
condition for social polarisation. 
Theories about the impacts of deindustrialisation and the decline in blue-collar work on unskilled 
ethnic urban minority groups were also discussed. Again, using population census data, it was 
shown that the Coloured population had dominated manufacturing employment. Therefore, it was 
concluded that the decline in manufacturing employment would most likely have the greatest 
negative impact on Coloured employment levels. This would most likely affect Coloured men most 
though, as Coloured women were gaining more employment in all the other types of occupations 
that were growing while blue-collar employment, on which men seemed to rely that much more, 
was declining. 
The argument was also made that service sector growth, while leading to increased feminisation of 
the workforce, also causes women to be segregated into low-skill, low-pay service jobs. However, 
the data for Cape Town concurred with other author's data that showed that the occupational 










Some authors argued that the decline in manufacturing jobs and growth in low-skill service sector 
work favours unskilled women over unskilled men, as the manufacturing sector tended to hire more 
men and the service sector tends to employ more women. This was shown to be true in the case of 












Table of Contents 
Abstract 1-11 ........................................................................................................................................ 
Table of Contents 111 
Tables and Figures ..................................................................................................................... IV-V 
Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................ ........... y i 
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 1-3 
Chapter 1: Literature review ................................................................................................... 4-12 
Chapter 2: Defining the concepts ............................................................................................ 13-22 
Chapter 3: Methodology ........................................................................................................... 23-34 
Chapter 4: Economic restructuring and the occupational 
distribution in Cape Town ................................................................................... 35-46 
Chapter 5: The impacts of the decline in manufacturing on 
employment ............................................................................................................ 47-62 
Chapter 6: The impact of the growth of services on racial and 
gender inequality. .................................................................................................. 63-74 
Chapter 7: Migrants and employment .................................................................................. .75-80 
Chapter 8: Summary and conclusions .................................................................................... 81-85 
References ................................................................................................................................... 86-91 
Appendices: 
Appendix A: Coloureds: A Race Apart.. ................................................................... 92-95 
Appendix B: Coloured and African Labour in Cape Town .................................. 96-1 04 
Appendix C: A Brief History of Cape Town ........................................................ ..! 05-111 
Appendix D: Migration to Cape Town ................................................................. ..! 12-1 18 
This work has not been submitted previously, in whole or in part, for the award of any degree. It 
is my own work. Each significant contribution and quotation in this dissertation from the 
work(s) of others has been attributed, cited and referenced. 










Tables and Figures 
Tables 
Table 2.1: Occupation categories 
Table 2.2: Occupations by Income, Cape Town. 200 I. 
Table 2.3: Occupations according to skills categories. 




manufacturing employment. Cape TO\\ n. 1970-1996 26 
Table 4.1: Frequency distribution of employmcnt b) ~ectur. Cape Town, 1946-200 I.. . 36 
Table 4.2: Percentage distribution of employment by sector. Cape Town, 1946-2001 36 
Table 4.3: Percentage distribution of occupations by main sectors, Cape Town, 200 I . 39 
Table 4.4: Change in the percentage distribution 01' occupations by main sectors 
between 1980 and 200 I. Cape Tc)\\ n .... ........ .................. 42 
Table 4.5: Occupational distribution. Cape '1'0\\ 11. 19S0 and 2001 ....................... . 43 
Table 4.6: Change in the frequency distribution or occupations by main sectors 
between 1980 and 200 I, Cape Town ........................................ 44 
Table 4.7: Percentage distribution of occupations by main sectors, Cape Town, 1980. 45 
Table 5.1: Frequency distribution of manu facturing employment by race, Cape Town, 
1946-2001 
Table 5.2: Percentage distribution ofll1anut~lcturing cmployment by race. Cape Town. 
1946-200 I 
Table 5.3: Frequency distribution of Colour cd employ ment by sector, Cape Town, 
1946-200 I 
Table 5.4: Percentage distribution of Colour cd cmplo) mcnt by sector, Cape Town, 
1946-200 I 
Table 5.5: Percentage distribution of A friciln cmploymcnt by sector, Cape Town, 
1946-200 I 
Table 5.6: Frequency distribution ofmanuf~lcturing employment by race and gender. 
Cape Town. 1946-2001 
Table 5.7: Percentage distribution of manufacturing employment by race and gender, 
Cape Town. 1946-200 I ......... . 
Table 5.8: Percentage distribution of Coloured milnul~\Cturing occupations by gender. 
Cape Town, 1980 and 200 I 
Table 5.9: Frequency distribution ofll1anul~lcturing uccupations by race and gender. 
Cape Town. 1980 
Table 5.10: Frequency distribution of manu 1~lcturing occupations by race and gender. 
Cape Town. 200 I ... 
Table 5.11: Percentage distribution ofmanuLlcturing uccupations by race and gender. 
Cape Town. 1980 






















Cape Town, 2001 60 
Table 5.13: Percentage distribution of male manufacturing occupations by race, 
Cape Town, 1980 and 200 1 _____________________________________________________________________ _ 61 
Table 5.14: Percentage distribution of female manufacturing occupations by race, 
Cape Town, 1980 and 2001 __ _ 61 
Table 6.1: Percentage distribution of occupations by gender, Cape Town, 
1980 and 200 1 _______________________________________________________________________________________________ _ 63 
Table 6.2: Change in the frequency distribution of occupations by main sectors 
and gender between 1980 and 2001, Cape Town ___________________________________ _ 64 
Table 6.3: Occupational distribution of women, Cape Town, 1980 and 200 '- ____________________ 65 
Table 6.4: Occupational distribution of men, Cape Town, 1980 and 2001 _______________________ 65 
Table 6.5: Frequency distribution of occupations by race and gender, Cape Town, 1980 67 
Table 6.6: Frequency distribution of occupations by race and gender, Cape Town, 2001 ____ 67 
Table 6.7: Frequency distribution of FIRE occupations by race and gender, Cape Town, 
1980 67 
Table 6.8: Frequency distribution of FIRE occupations by race and gender, Cape Town, 
2001 68 
Table 6.9: Percentage distribution of occupations by race and gender, Cape Town, 
1980 68 
Table 6.10: Percentage distribution of occupations by race and gender, Cape Town, 
2001 68 
Table 6.1 1: Percentage distribution of male occupations. Cape Town, 1980 and 2001 ________ 68 
Table 6.12: Percentage distribution offemale occupations, Cape Town, 1980 and 2001 69 
Table 6.13: Frequency distribution of community and personal services occupations 
by race and gender, Cape Town, 1980________________________________________________________ 73 
Table 6.14: Frequency distribution of community and personal services occupations 
by race and gender, Cape Town, 200 1 __________________________________________________________________ 73 
Table 6.15: Percentage distribution of African occupations by gender, Cape Town, 
1980 and 2001 74 
Table 7.1: Distribution of highly skilled occupations, Cape Town, 1980 and 2001 79 
Figures 
Figure 2.1: Occupations by Income Groups, Cape Town, 2001 _________________ ______________ 16 
Figure 4.1: Employment by main sectors. Cape Town, 1946-200 I 36 
Figure 5.1: Manufacturing employment by race, Cape Town, 1946-2001___________________ 48 
Figure 5.2: Coloured employment by sector. Cape Town, 1946-2001__ 50 
Figure 5.3: African migration to Cape Town, 1970-1998 ______________________________________________________ 53 
Figure 5.4: African and Coloured migration to Cape Town, 1940-2000 ________________________________ 53 













I would like to thank my supervisors, Professor Susan Parnell of the Department of 
Environmental and Geographical Science, and Professor Owen Crankshaw of the Department of 
Sociology, University of Cape Town. A special thank you goes to Professor Crankshaw for 
making so much time to meet with me and discuss my work. 
From the Centre for Social Science Research Unit's Data First Resource Unit (University of 
Cape Town), I would like to thank Lynn Woolfrey, Resource Manager, and Matthew Welch, 
Deputy Director, for all their help with the data sets. Thanks also go to Dudley Horner, Deputy 
Director of the Centre for Social Sience Research Unit's Southern African Labour and 
Development Research Unit. for his help with the Khayelitsha/Mitchell's Plain Survey 2000. 
Thank you to Piet Albert of Statistics South Africa, and Dr. Andrew Boulle of the School of 
Public Health, University of Cape Town, respectively, for their help in acquiring and 
reformatting the 1980 population census record unit data. 
Thanks also go to the University of Cape Town for the University Research Scholarship I 
received. Particular thanks go to the Social Studies Research Unit of the Centre for Social 
Science Research Unit for the generous scholarship, especially the director of the SSU, Professor 
Jeremy Seekings. 
Finally, I would like to thank all the librarians at the University of Cape Town. Without your 
help, the mammoth task of research would be that much harder. 
This dissertation is dedicated to my parents. Thank you for your support over the years, in other 










In their 1982 paper "World City formation", John Friedmann and Goetz Wolff proposed "a new 
look at cities from the perspective of the world economic system-in-formation" (Freidmann and 
Wolff, 1982:309). They believed that one of the most important issues facing emerging world 
cities would be the impact that changing employment structures would have on both their 
economies and social organisation. Certain sectors of the economy were growing at the expense 
of others in these cities. The most growth was occurring in the business services where workers 
are mostly professionals and clerical personnel. However, this was occurring at the expense of 
growth in manufacturing employment. With the rapidly increasing automation of many jobs, the 
authors stated that: .. the future of manufacturing employment in the world city is not bright" 
(Friedmann and Wolff, 1982:320). 
Friedmann and Wolff (1982) were unequivocal in their assertion that the biggest social impact of 
world city development is the polarisation of its social classes. They painted a picture of a city 
where, as the traditional blue-collar working class shrank, the soaring numbers of the 
professional class became dominant. This "ruling class" would enjoy stable jobs and permanent 
income, while at least a third of the population, many of whom would be newcomers to the city, 
would "queue for jobs on the edges of the formal economy" and many would end up "providing 
personal services to the ruling class, doing the dirty work of the city" (Friedmann and Wolff, 
1982:322). 
This was one of the first papers linking economic restructuring and social polarisation. 
Subsequently, other academics have seized upon the idea that when a city's economic base 
changes from manufacturing to services, the occupational structure changes from one with many 
blue-collar, middle-income jobs to one with predominantly high- and low-pay jobs. This shift is 
thought to lead to an even greater gap between the rich and the poor and therefore, increased 
social polarisation. 
Saskia Sassen (1994) is a major proponent of this theory and has applied it to quite a range of 
cities from New York and Los Angeles in the United States (U.S.) to Tokyo, Japan and London, 
England. Edward Soja (1991) talks of New York and Los Angeles changing from consisting of 
"the proletariat and industrial bourgeoisie" to being dominated by "the executive-professiona1-
managerial 'overseers' and the predominantly minority and immigrant 'underclass'" (1991 :365). 










in cities that did not even have a traditional post-industrial city manufacturing-based economy, 
such as Miami. This theory has even been applied to other non-Western cities, such as Beijing 
(Gu and Liu, 2002), and cities in what are generally regarded as Third World countries, such as 
Rio de Janeiro (Ribiero and Telles, 2000) and Johannesburg (Crankshaw and Parnell, 2004). 
2 
Not everyone agrees on the merits of the polarisation hypothesis though. Chris Hamnett (1994a, 
1994b) is a long time critic of Saskia Sassen and argues that her theory of increasing social 
polarisation in global cities is flawed, as it is formulated around cities like New York and Los 
Angeles that have the very large immigrant populations necessary to support an expanded low-
wage service sector. He not only completely disagrees with Sassen about London, but also 
offers the example of the Randstad as a counter to the idea of increasing social polarisation and 
in support of the growth of professional isation, which he contends is the process occurring in 
most Western cities (Hamnett, 1994a). 
As Feinstein, Gordon and Harloe pointed out (1992: 13): 
"The images of a dual or polarised city are seductive, they promise to encapsulate the 
outcome of a wide variety of complex processes in a single, neat, and easily 
comprehensible phrase. Yet the hard evidence for such a sweeping and general conclusion 
regarding the outcome of economic restructuring and urban change is, at best, patchy and 
ambiguous. [fthe concept of the 'dual' or 'polarising' city is of any real utility, it can 
serve only as a hypothesis, the prelude to empirical analysis, rather than as a conclusion 
which takes the existence of confirmatory evidence for granted." 
This is what [ have attempted to do in this thesis, namely, apply the hypothesis of economic 
restructuring leading to increasing social polarisation to a city, Cape Town, South Africa, and 
test it against the evidence. Population census data were used to show that there has been a 
decrease in manufacturing employment and growing service sector employment in Cape Town 
since the mid-1980·s. It was then hypothesized what effect this would have on the occupational 
structure. Again, this was tested using population census data. Without pre-empting the 
findings, [ will say that the results were quite surprising. However, as the reader will discover, 
these results make sense when one examines the evidence more closely. 
Questions related to the decl ine of manufacturing employment were then considered. Here, [ 











from goods to service production on unskilled, inner-city minorities, specifically African 
Americans, in the large cities of the northern U.S.A. Wilson (1996) ascribes the "misfortune" of 
low-skilled men to the decline of mass production and concomitant rise in service sector jobs for 
workers with little education and experience, which tend to hire relatively more women. It is to 
the loss of manufacturing industries in these cities over the last few decades that he attributes 
rising unemployment amongst unskilled African American men. This raises the question: who 
has been most negatively affected by the loss of manufacturing employment in Cape Town? 
By the same token, who has been most positively affected by the rise in service employment in 
Cape Town? Has the workforce in general become increasingly feminized as a result of the 
growth in service sector employment? Have women replaced men in unskilled jobs as a result of 
the dom inance of service sector jobs? 
Closely tied to these matters is that of the migration of unskilled workers to the cities. During 
the period under study, most migrants to Cape Town were poor, unskilled Africans who left their 
rural homes to find work in the city. How has the decline in manufacturing, which tended to 
have entry level jobs for unskilled workers as well as the chance for upward occupational 
mobility, affected these migrants' employment prospects? Finally, Hamnett's (1994a) 
contention that an expanded low-wage service sector exists solely due to the presence of a large 













Research has shown substantial increases in socio-economic and spatial inequality in first world 
cities (Sassen, 1994). Many authors have argued that this is not simply an increase in the extent of 
social inequality but is due to economic restructuring and the emergence of new social forms (Beall, 
Crankshaw and Parnell, 2002; Crankshaw and Parnell, 2004; Friedmann and Wolff, 1982; Gu and 
Liu, 2002; Nijman, 1996; Ribeiro and Telles, 2000; Sassen, 1994; Soja, 1991; Wilson, 1987 and 
1996). The core of this argument is focused around the declining centrality of mass production with 
a concomitant shift to services, and how this in turn has led to increased inequality in cities. 
Historically, the type of economic growth experienced in post World War II America facilitated and 
encouraged the growth of a large middle-class while limiting inequality (Sassen, 1994). The core of 
the American economy of the time was capital intensive, standardized, mass production and 
consumption. The importance of this type of manufacturing in the economy also led to greater 
levels of unionisation and worker empowerment, resulting in regulations that protected worker 
interests. Thus, some authors argue, the number of poor decreased in the U.S.A. and other highly 
developed countries. However, the socio-economic system and functioning of the urban labour 
market began to change from the mid-1970's. Because manufacturing was such a core industry in 
the economies of the 1950's and 1960's, certain benefits of it, for example, market stability and 
increased productivity, were transferred to a set of secondary firms (e.g. suppliers and 
subcontractors) and even less directly related industries. In addition to this, due to its high levels of 
unionisation, manufacturing also had great wage-setting power. The decline in mass production and 
the increase in service industries caused manufacturing industries to lose much of this influence by 
the early 1980's (Sassen, 1994).1 
Due to the competitive and highly unstable markets in which they operate today, employers in major 
cities in many different important industries, from manufacturing to financial and private consumer 
services, tend to employ on a shorter-term basis (Sassen, 1994). High unemployment throughout the 
1 Please note that if a body of ideas or data are gleaned from one author, that author is referenced at the beginning and 
end of that discussion, e.g. if the ideas discussed in a single paragraph were gleamed from one author in particular, 











1980's and early 1990's in large cities seriously decreased employees bargaining power, especially 
that of the marginalized and disadvantaged, resulting in workers accepting increasingly unattractive 
jobs. The high turn-over rates in these kinds of unstable activities are also attractive to immigrants, 
especially minorities who experience greater difficulty breaking into more established or closed 
sectors of the economy, or who are young and single, and therefore do not need a high degree of job 
security. But this ready supply of migrant labour has serious implications for the wages at the lower 
end of the job market. the competitiveness of local activities, opportunities for advancement for 
indigenous workers, and spatial segregation in cities (Sassen, 1994). 
The organisation of manufacturing itself has also changed dramatically, with a decrease in mass 
production and increased small-batch, small-scale, highly differentiated production, with rapid 
changes in output (Sassen, 1994). These changes have resulted in increased subcontracting and 
flexible organisation of production. Consequently, there have been significant changes in the labour 
demands and employment conditions of the manufacturing industry, namely, a decline in unions, 
loss of protective measures and increased involuntary, part-time and temporary work, as well as 
informalisation (with the growth of sweatshops and industrial homework serving as extreme 
examples of informalisation in the downgrading of manufacturing). Thus, the same industries that 
used to have large organised factories with many well-paid employees have very different forms of 
production and organisation today, like piecework and industrial homework. Research shows that 
earnings in manufacturing have decreased, many of these jobs now pay low wages, and the numbers 
of sweatshops and homework are on the rise (Sassen, 1994). 
Eniployment growth in manufacturing has also been surpassed by that in other sectors in many cities 
(Friedmann and Wolff, 1982). Most employment growth has occurred in business services such as 
management, banking, finance, legal services, accounting, technical consulting, 
telecommunications, computers, international transportation, research and higher education. 
Workers in these industries are mostly professional and clerical personnel. Jobs in real estate, 
construction. hotel services. restaurants, luxury shopping, entertainment, tourism, private police and 
domestic services have also increased rapidly. Most of these jobs are stable and fairly well paying, 
though not alL e.g. domestic servants are some of the worst paid workers. Depending on the city, 
potentially the most employment growth is in the informal economy. including anything from the 
casual services of day labourers to fruit vendors and modest ariisans. While these types of activities 











household economy, remuneration is low and unstable, working hours long and security absent. For 
many newcomers to the city, this is usually the first place they can find work, while many stay in 
these jobs as it is the only way they are able to survive (Friedmann and Wolff, 1982). 
The argument therefore is that the income structure has changed and earnings are distributed 
differently as a result of the shift from manufacturing to services as the city's core industry (Sassen, 
1994). The downgrading of the once dominant manufacturing sector has resulted in lower wages in 
general, while the growing service industries have created a greater share of both low- and high-
paying jobs than manufacturing (Sassen, 1994). Thus, the traditional blue-collar working class has 
shrunk (Friedmann and Wolff, 1982). This has left the professionals in power in the city, in stark 
contrast to the unskilled service class, which constitutes approximately a third of the population 
(Friedmann and Wolff, 1982). While the professionals enjoy stable jobs and permanent income, the 
unskilled workers queue for jobs on the edges of the formal economy and many end up providing 
personal services to this middle-class and doing the "undesirable" work of the city (Friedmann and 
Wolff, 1982). Generally, the unskilled service-class come from a different race and ethnic group to 
the middle-class in the city too, or speak a different language, and are usually physically separated 
from them in their own residential ghetto (Friedmann and Wolff, 1982). 
This increasingly widening gap between the rich and the poor can be seen in many different cities. 
The populations of New York and Los Angeles, which used to consist mostly of the proletariat and 
industrial bourgeoisie, are dominated by executives, managers and professionals at one end of the 
social spectrum and an ethnic minority, unskilled service-class at the other (Soja, 1991). While New 
York and Los Angeles are subject to different conditions, a similar process has occurred in both. 
These cities have deindustrialised while taking on specific functions in the global market as a result 
of the world-wide decentralising of business and the need for a network of cities to provide the 
specialised services needed to operate and sustain expanding transnational corporations. As a result, 
the deindustrialised core of the city is experiencing rapid growth of finance, insurance, real estate 
(FIRE) and related sectors, while industrialisation takes place on the periphery. Modern labour 
demands are the same though whether a business is involved in producing goods or providing 
services i.e. for workers either in the top or bottom brackets of income earners and much less in the 
middle. New York and Los Angeles have also experienced massive influxes of foreign capital and 
labour, both of which have become vital to the growth and survival of their economies. The inner 











overcrowding and homelessness are common. These areas also tend to be poor and are "hotbeds" of 
crime and gang activity (Soja, 1991). 
Therefore, in many cities, the post-industrial period has been characterised by not only a shift from 
manufacturing to services, but also the in-migration of unskilled migrants of a different racial and 
ethnic character to the native urbanites. This has led to an association between race/ethnicity and 
employment in the unskilled service class. 
Even cities that did not originally fit the profile of the traditional post-industrial city with a 
manufacturing-based economy have undergone substantial economic and social change - so much 
so, in fact, that they now share key characteristics with cities like New York. Miami has never had 
the traditional urban industrial base of a post-industrial city (Nijman, 1996). Instead, the city has 
always had a large service sector, and relied heavily on trade and tourism in the past. However, a 
distinct shift has occurred from tourism to other service industries. The producer services, which 
typically include the finance, insurance and legal services sectors, as well as a variety of 
management services to control production, have grown the most. These types of services are 
linked to the wider global economy, and their growth has contributed to the fast paced 
internationalisation of Miami's economy. This rapid internationalisation of the city is tied to the 
influx of immigrants, as the large workforce of reasonably skilled and educated bilingual Latinos 
created by this process made Miami an attractive location for corporations with business dealings in 
South America. Therefore, while socio-economic polarisation in Miami is complicated by massive 
immigration, the most significant change has been the growth in service industries, which is 
"accompanied by a widening of the income gap between various industries, occupations and social 
groups" (Nijman, 1996:283). 
African Americans have suffered most from this shift from manufacturing to services, which has 
arguably played a part in climbing rates of unemployment, poverty and infant mortality amongst 
them in areas like South Central Los Angeles (Soja, 1991). Vulnerable urban minorities are 
particularly affected by these changes in the urban economy, as they tend to seriously disadvantage 
unskilled workers (Wilson, 1987). The decline in the manufacturing sector has led to increased 
unemployment among unskilled African Americans, as a large proportion of high-wage, blue-collar 
jobs were once in manufacturing (Wilson, 1996; Kasarda, 1993). The loss of work and lowering of 











though (which provided many jobs for blue-collar workers with little education and where, for 
example, high rates of unionisation ensured relatively high wages) (Wilson, 1996). Lower-skilled 
women have benefited at the expense of lower-skilled men as the demand for workers with little 
education and experience has been increasing in the service sector, where relatively more women 
are hired. The shift from goods to information processing has also resulted in the numbers of jobs 
decreasing most in industries with lower educational requirements while employment has grown in 
industries requiring higher levels of education (Wilson, 1987; Kasarda, 1993). The new global 
economy, with its increased reliance on technology, requires workers with more training and 
education (Wilson, 1996). This shift in labour demand for better-educated workers has had an even 
greater impact on low-skilled workers who tend to be marginalized. For example, low-skilled 
African Americans have always been "at the end of the employment queue" (Wilson, 1996:29). 
They tend to live in areas of high unemployment and low job growth, and have little access to areas 
where employment and employment growth are higher. So, even though the numbers of lower-
skilled jobs have increased, this has not occurred in the inner-cities but rather on the periphery, in 
the suburbs and non-metropolitan areas, making them inaccessible to poor urban minorities through 
time and money constraints (Wilson, 1987; Kasarda, 1993). The influx oflow-educated immigrants 
in the 1980's into U.S. cities also acted to lower wages for low-skilled work (Wilson, 1996). 
Even in a city like Miami, which did not have the traditional manufacturing-based economy of a 
post-industrial city, African Americans are worse off than Anglos or Hispanics (Nijman, 1996). 
Recent immigrants to the city fare better than long-time African American residents. The African 
American population of Miami, unlike the Hispanics, has been "left behind in the process of 
economic restructuring and internationalisation" (Nijman, 1996:292). While a significant number of 
Hispanics have achieved success (and the Anglos have always enjoyed relatively high status), the 
socio-economic standing of African Americans has deteriorated. This is because African Americans 
tend to be concentrated in economic sectors and industries not articulated to the wider global 
economy, as most of the Hispanics are. African Americans are disproportionately represented in 
informal economic activity, which is generally disconnected from the internationalisation process, 
and are underrepresented in the producer services of the city (Nijman, 1996). 
This process of simultaneous deindustrialisation and service sector growth leading to increased 










processes are occurring in other countries around the world (Beall, Crankshaw and Parnell, 2002; 
Crankshaw and ParnelL 2004; Gu and Liu, 2002; Ribeiro and Telles, 2000; Sassen, 1994). 
9 
Beijing is an example of a city where social polarisation is a relatively new urban phenomenon (Gu 
and Liu. 2002). This is argued to have appeared only after economic reforms were implemented in 
1978; but was further exacerbated by the introduction of urban reforms in 1984. which led to 
increasing numbers of rural migrants moving to the cities after migration controls were relaxed. 
Economic internationalisation and unbalanced distribution of foreign direct investments (FDI) 
caused rapid growth in certain service and high-tech industries while traditional manufacturing areas 
in Beijing decayed. This growth in service and high-tech industries resulted in a growing 
difTerential between high- and low-paid jobs (i.e. the simultaneous growth of high-skilled, well-paid 
jobs and unskilled. irregular. low-paid jobs). At the same time, Beijing received a massive influx of 
migrants from rural areas as a result of the introduction of market mechanisms and the flow of FDI. 
These migrants tend to be employed in unstable, casual, insecure, temporary, unskilled jobs that pay 
very little. replacing Beijing natives in the jobs with some of the worst working conditions. They do 
not enjoy the same rights and advantages as Beijing natives though. such as, guaranteed education 
for children. low-cost housing and health services and equal opportunity employment in either state 
owned or international companies. Thus these processes have led to the emergence of two new 
social groups in Beijing: one is the class of unskilled low-wage earners and the other consists of 
highly skilled business people and professionals, earning high incomes working for transnational 
corporations or joint ventures (Gu and Liu, 2002). 
Similar changes are also taking place in Rio de Janeiro as it becomes further incorporated into the 
global economy (Ribeiro and Telles, 2000). Between 1945 and 1980, the city experienced rapid 
industrialisation and economic growth, which allowed wide-scale social inclusion and occupational 
mobility. However, in the late 1970's, key industrial sectors in Rio like steel and shipbuilding began 
to go into decline. Rio had always been more dependent on tertiary sector activities though, 
including a small amount of finance, computers and commerce. and a large personal services sector. 
During this period, Rio' s traditional service sectors and the modern service sector grew. Another 
consequence of deindustrialisation in Rio was a decrease in the proportion of salaried workers and 
public sector jobs (due to monetary adjustment policies), and the growth in the ranks of the self-
employed, the majority of whom are manual workers. During this period, the very poor, non-white 










shantytowns. areas generally favoured by people without regular incomes, because of their 
proximity to work in the centre of the city, especially irregular personal services jobs (Ribeiro and 
Telles. 2000). 
10 
This approach of considering the role of deindustrialisation in increasing social and racial 
polarisation is even being used in the case of South Africa. While the racially discriminatory 
policies of the Apartheid government of South Africa were mainly responsible for the inter-racial 
inequality of the past, they do not explain the rise in intra-racial inequality (Crankshaw and Parnell, 
2004). Some have argued that the shift in Johannesburg's economy from the manufacturing sector, 
with its relatively high. stable wages and upward occupational mobility, to the tertiary sector, with 
its highly polarised occupational structure, has exacerbated social polarisation and inequality 
amongst Africans in Johannesburg. Manufacturing employment in Johannesburg increased 
dramatically until the early 1970's, but fell off sharply in the 1980's. In contrast, employment 
increased in the tertiary sector from 1980; especially in the financial sector between 1991 and 1996. 
Thus. during the early Apartheid period, unskilled and semi-skilled workers were in high demand in 
mining and manufacturing. whereas the late Apartheid era saw a greater demand for skilled white-
collar employees and professionals in the commercial and financial sectors (Crankshaw and Parnell, 
2004). 
Only a certain segment of the population was adequately prepared to take advantage of this 
changing labour demand though. In the pre- and early Apartheid period, high labour demand in 
factories and mines for unskilled manual workers attracted rural migrants with little education 
(Crankshaw and ParnelL 2004). Although the government kept strict controls over African 
urbanisation. a large number of Africans were granted permanent urban status. Many rural-born 
Africans were not allowed to stay in Johannesburg, and government policies continued to draw a 
deep division between them and urbanised Africans in the decades to follow. Then the labour 
market changed in the late Apartheid era. The number of jobs for semi-skilled and unskilled manual 
labourers declined, and the demand for white-collar workers grew. Reforms to state education and 
employment policy meant that Africans who had urbanised during the early Apartheid period were 
well positioned between the 1980's and 1990's to fill these "more skilled" positions. However, the 
poorly educated. unskilled rural migrants became subject to growing unemployment. Thus, 










sector, high-skill, high-pay and low-skill, low-pay jobs could be contributing to increased 
polarisation (Crankshaw and Parnell, 2004). 
II 
Deindustrialisation in Johannesburg has also altered inequality in terms of the gender composition of 
the workforce (BealL Crankshaw and Parnell, 2002). As employment levels have fallen in 
traditionally male dominated industries, so women have formed an increasing proportion of 
workers. Employment has dropped in mining and manufacturing, which tend to employ more men, 
and risen in the tertiary sector, which includes community, personal and social services, which 
employ relatively more women. Besides this affect though, the proportion of women in sectors 
where their numbers had been fairly low have steadily increased. While women are being 
increasingly drawn into employment and men are increasingly becoming unemployed, the types of 
positions women hold in the service sector tend to pay the least and receive the least protection, 
thereby creating a gender division in this sector (Beall, Crankshaw and Parnell, 2002). 
Some authors, however. do not agree with the polarisation hypothesis and are highly critical of it. 
One of the arguments levelled against the idea that absolute polarisation is occurring throughout the 
world's cities is the fact that the numbers of semi- and unskilled jobs in most Western capitalist 
countries have been dropping steadily over the last 20-30 years (Hamnett 1994a, 1994b). Another 
criticism of proponents of the polarisation theory is that they have ignored literature on the growth 
of professionalisation and the "new middle class". This theory states that the shift in Western 
societies from industrialism to post-industrialism involved a change from producing goods to 
producing services, and becoming increasingly organised around professional, managerial and 
technical skills. There is also a body of research that supports this theory of the expansion of 
professional jobs and the new middle-class in large cities with a solid producer/financial services 
base. In terms of the growth at the bottom end of the occupational and income distributions in 
certain cities. the argument has been made that it is the presence of a large, ever-growing pool of 
ethnic immigrants in cities like Los Angeles and New York that enables a large-scale, low-wage 
service sector to flourish and a down-graded manufacturing sector to exist; rather than the opposite 
situation of the escalation in numbers of such jobs causing increased immigration. The suggestion 
here is not that other cities do not have large immigrant populations concentrated in low-wage 
occupations; but rather that recent migration into these cities is not as great as in the case of Los 
Angeles or New York, i.e. thereby making these cities poor examples of the argument for increased 










The case of the Randstad in the Netherlands serves as an example of a major city where one could 
argue professionalisation. rather than increased social polarisation, has been the dominant process 
(Hamnett 1994a). While there has been deindustrialisation and growth of the service sector here, it 
is the types of jobs available, and the changed income and occupational structure, that is of primary 
impo11ance. The numbers of specialists and managers has increased substantially in the 
Netherlands. While a limited amount of polarisation could have occurred in this time (if the 
increased service sector jobs represent low-skilled and middle occupational groups), the 
predominant trend has been one of professionalisation. Another point to note is that this has not 
resulted in women becoming increasingly segregated into low-skilled jobs. In fact, not only did the 
number of women in administrative and commercial positions rise faster than men, the proportional 
increases were much greater for women than men. That the educational composition of the 
Netherlands has shifted upwards is also viewed as evidence of increasing professionalisation, 
especially amongst women. It could also be argued that there is no clear-cut social segregation in 
Dutch cities. While the more wealthy tend to occupy houses in the suburbs outside the cities, social 
support, housing subsidies and a large social housing stock mean that low-income households often 
live in housing of the same quality as that of high-income earners. Thus, there is no clear 
relationship between changes in the income and occupational structure, and housing and social 
segregation. While there has been a large influx of immigrants into the country in the last 30 years, 
and they do tend to be concentrated in certain areas in the major cities, there do not seem to be 












Defining the concepts 
The debate addressed here revolves around the growth of the service sector and decline in 
manufacturing. The basic argument of service sector jobs being predominantly either high-skill and 
high-pay, or low-skill and low-pay, versus the predominantly middle-skill and middle-income 
manufacturing jobs "of old", hinges on how one defines these levels of skill and pay. The 
""traditional" manufacturing sector referred to in the literature is the standardised mass production of 
the post-war economies of industrialised countries (Sassen, 1994; Soja, 1991). Many authors argue 
that due to this large, Fordist industry and its high levels of union is at ion, manufacturing workers 
were relatively well-paid, and enjoyed various other contractual benefits (Sassen, 1994; Soja, 1991). 
However, few authors define exactly what kinds of jobs these "relatively well-paid" workers had. 
Some authors refer to blue-collar industry (Soja, 1991) and the blue-collar working class 
(Friedmann and Wolff, 1982). Only a few adequately describe or specifically name these 
occupations, such as "semi-skilled machine operative employment" (Crankshaw and Parnell, 
2004:363) and "operative and assembler jobs" (Wilson, 1996:30). 
While these "middle ranks of. .. relatively well-paid manufacturing workers" (Soja, 1991 :369) are 
poorly defined, the types of jobs considered high- and low-wage vary from one author to the next. 
As was discussed previously, these high- and low-wage jobs are argued to be more prevalent in the 
service sector. This sector encompass quite a few different, although often times related, services. 
The area showing the most growth in many cities is that of the producer services (Nijman, 1996; 
Soja, 1991). These include so-called corporate services or high-level business services, as well as 
other professional and specialised services, for example, finance, insurance and real estate (FIRE), 
legal and advertising services (Gu and Liu, 2002; Nijman, 1996; Sassen, 1994; Soja, 1991). 
Included in this are also various management services needed to run production (Nijman, 1996). In 
other cities, high-tech industries have flourished (Gu and Liu, 2002; Sassen, 1994; Soja, 1991). 
Other services that have grown dramatically include the retail industry, wholesaling and commerce, 










Sassen, 1994; Soja, 1991). Social services (health, education, welfare services) and personal 
services have also grown (Sassen, 1994; Wilson, 1996V 
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Certain jobs in the service sector are generally classed as high-skill and high-pay. Cities where these 
services have grown have experienced burgeoning numbers of highly skilled, well-paid executives, 
managers and professional workers like bankers, stockbrokers, securities analysts, corporate lawyers 
and advertising executives (Crankshaw and ParnelL 2004; Sassen, 1994; Soja, 1991; Gu and Liu, 
2002). Even in manufacturing, the numbers of scientists, mathematicians, engineers, computer 
specialists, and weapons experts have grown in cities where high-tech industries have become the 
major economic sector (Soja, 1991). Greater use of computer-orientated machine tools has resulted 
in a need for highly skilled designers, engineers and operators (Wilson, 1996). While the authors 
cited have all classed these types of occupations as high-income, some would still add further jobs to 
this list. 
F or example, in the course of making the argument that less-educated women have benefited from 
the growth in social services, Wilson states that "the fraction of men who have moved into so-called 
pink-collar jobs like practical nursing or clerical work remains negligible" (Wilson, 1996:27). The 
problem with this statement is the implication that nursing and clerical work are low-skill, low-wage 
jobs. Other authors argue that the most skilled and best-paid occupations in the expanding service 
sector include schoolteachers, nurses and technicians (Beall, Crankshaw and Parnell, 2002). 
According to the South African Standard Classification of Occupations (SASCO) (Statistics South 
Africa, c.1996a), nurses are classed either as professionals or associate professionals, and therefore 
have a skill rating around 3 or 4 (Table 2.1). If one also considers the earnings of various 
occupation groups as reported in the 2001 national population census of South Africa, it would 
appear that more professionals and associate professionals earn amongst the higher salaries Gudged 
by the two adjacent income categories that combined constitute at least 50% of those in the 
occupation group, Table 2.2). 
It is perhaps worth mentioning here that growth in the services is not only market driven, as is often argued. A great 
number of the increasing service sector jobs, like those in health and education for example, are in fact government or 











Table 2.1: Occupation categories 
Occupation category Reference in skill/eve/ 
Legislators, senior officials & managers Reference in skill level not made 
Professionals 4 
Technicians & associate professionals 3 
Clerks 2 
Service workers, shop & market sales workers 2 
Skilled agricultural & fishery workers 2 
Craft & related trades workers 2 
Plant & machinery operators/assemblers 2 
Elementary occupations 1 
.. 
Source: Statistics South Afnca (c.1996a). 
Table 2.2: Occupations by Income, Cape Town, 2001 
--- ------ -- -- ---- - - - -------- ----- ------ ------- ---- ----------- - - ---
Associate Sales/ Skilled 
Craft! 
Operator/ 
Monthly Income Manager Professional Clerk related Unskilled Total 
professional service agriculture trades 
Assembler 
I R1-R400 1% 1% 2% 2% 5% 10% 4% 4% 11% 5% I 
!R401-R800 2% 2% 3% 5% 10% 18% 10% 9% 25% 10% 
R801-R 1,600 7% 5% 11% 17% 31% 32% 33% 40% 43% 26% 
R1,601-R3,200 15% 12% 22% 33% 25% 21% 30% 34% 16% 23% 
R3,201-R6,400 25% 25% 33% 32% 17% 11% 15% 11% 3% 19% 
I 
: R6,401-R 12,800 25% 28% 20% 9% 8% 5% 6% 2% 1% 11% I 
; R 12,801-R25,600 17% 18% 6% 2% 3% 2% 1% 1% 0% 5% i 
R25,601-R51,200 6% 6% 2% 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% I I 
i R51 ,201-R1 02,400 1% 2% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% I 
! R1 02,401-R204,800 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
! R204,801 or more 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
"-._------- - - -- --- - ---------------- ------~- ----------- -- --------------- ---- ~ , 









































R12,801- R25,601- R51,201- R102,401- R204,801 
R800 R25,600 R51,200 R102,400 R204,800 or more 
--e- Managers 
• Clerks 
--+ --Craft/related trades workers 
Income categories 
~ Professionals 
o Sales/service workers 
--* --Operators/Assemblers 
Source: Author's analysis of South African population censuses 
~Associate professionals 
- - X - - Skilled agricultural workers 











While clerks are not considered professionals or semi-professionals, they arguably should not be 
classed as low-skilL low-pay workers. Sassen, in describing finance and other advanced industries, 
mentions that these fields consist of mostly "good, white-collar jobs", but also "a significant share of 
low-paying jobs, from cleaners to stock clerks" (1994: 1 05). She also groups secretaries together 
with maintenance workers and cleaners as the kinds of low-wage workers not often considered part 
of high-leveL specialised finance and business services, but who are in fact key to the service 
economy (Sassen, 1994). Again according to the SASCO system, secretaries fall under the 
occupation group of clerks, versus cleaners who fall under unskilled/elementary workers, and have a 
lower skill rating (Table 2.1 above). And again, the majority of clerks fall into higher pay categories 
than elementary workers (Table 2.2 and Figure 2.1 above). 
It is not only the definitions of occupation skill and pay levels provided by proponents of the 
polarisation theory that are problematic. In refuting the polarisation theory in favour of 
professionalisation, Hamett refers to the Labour Force Survey data he employs as "very ambiguous 
and unsatisfactory for the purpose of occupational class analysis" (l994a:409). Of the evidence 
provided by income data, he says that it is "far less sanguine than that from occupational data and, in 
some respects, it is quite contradictory" (Hamnett, 1994a:417). Thus, even those critical of the 
proof of the polarisation theory find it hard to counter the claims with better evidence, as the data 
tend to be ill-suited to these purposes. 
Thus, the evidence for either the polarisation or professionalisation theory seems to be thin on the 
ground or, in many cases, non-existent. Even when data are presented, they are quite often 
imprecise. I do not consider the data presented here to be infallible or ideally suited to these 
purposes. However, I have taken great pains to be as precise as possible with regard to occupation 
categories. 
I have based my occupation and industrial categories on the South African classifications for these 
groups, and also used income data from the 2001 South African population census to support these 
groupings. However, these South African classification systems are based on international 
classifications. The level of skills needed and remuneration received for the various types of work 










The following are examples of the types of jobs and positions included in each of the occupation 
categories of the SASCO (Statistics South Africa, c.1996a): 
Legislators, senior officials & managers: Government minister, administrator and councillor, 
officers of various ranks in the armed forces, director-general, secretary-general, chief-executive, 
managing-director and various levels of manager (e.g. department manager, production manager, 
general manager, etc.), producer (e.g. film and radio), shopkeeper, retailer, restaurant owner, 
working proprietor of a restaurant, hoteL etc. 
Professionals: PhysicaL mathematical and engineering science professional (from geologists to 
statistician to engineer), life science and health professional (e.g. doctor, nurse), teaching 
professionaL business professional (e.g. accountant, economist) various types of consultant, legal 
professional (e.g. lawyer, judge), computer programmer, sociologist, historian, reporter, editor, 
critic, commentator, painter, actor, musician, conductor, director, priest, rabbi. 
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Technicians & associate professionals: Natural and engineering science associate professional, life 
science and health associate professional, technician (in a range of fields e.g. agriculture, 
metallurgy. sound effects), assistant (e.g. computer. technical, medical), teaching associate 
professional, photographer. operator (technical equipment e.g. camera, radio), pilot (ship, 
aeroplane), inspector (from safety and health to quality control), agent (e.g. sales, shipping, sport), 
buyer, assessor. broker, executive secretary, certain clerks (e.g. legal), officer (tax, customs, 
immigration). detective, designer, decorator, nightclub/street musician/dancer, sportsman/woman, 
trainer, lay preacher. 
Clerks: clerk (from auditing to data entry to wages), typist, secretary, bookkeeper, dispatcher, 
controller, postman/woman, cashier, bookmaker, receptionist. 
Service workers, shop & market sales workers: conductor, steward, guide, cook, waiter/waitress, 
nanny, aid (nursing. dentaL veterinary), attendant (schoolchildren, hospital, canteen), beautician and 
make-up artist, hairdresser, valet, mortician, fire-fighter, police officer (sergeant to superintendent), 
soldier, security guard, model, working proprietor of wholesale/retail business and import/export 










Skilled agricultural & fishery workers: farmer/groweriraiser/breeder, skilled farm labourer, 
skilled gardener and groundsman, zookeeper, lumbeljack and related (i.e. marker, cutter, feller, 
logger, trimmer), diver, fishermanlfisherwoman, hunter. 
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Craft & related trades workers: miner, quarryman, blaster, stonemason and stone workers 
(including e.g. grinder. cutter, polisher), builder and related (including bricklayer, carpenter, roofer, 
plasterer. tile layer. insulation worker), repairer (clocks to electronics) fitter (from pipes to machines 
to electronics), plumber. electrician, painter, welder, moulder. brazier, rigger, tool maker, setter-
operator (of various different types of machine), sharpener (tools), polisher, mechanic, blacksmith, 
instrument maker and tuner. jewellery maker and worker (goldsmith, diamond polisher, jewel setter, 
etc.), handicraft worker, print worker (from metal die engraver to typesetter), photograph developer 
and printer. meatlfish worker (cutter, butcher, curer), baker, taster, tobacco worker, weaver, tailor, 
footwear maker. 
Plant & machinery operators/assemblers: Note: many of the occupations here are similar to those 
under craft and related trades workers. In this group however, the production process usually 
happens on a much larger scale and therefore involves industrial machinery. These occupations can 
be practiced in several different industries e.g. a machine-operator can operate equipment involved 
in anything from wood boring to glaze-mixing to noodle-making. Other occupations include 
furnace-operator, kiln-operator, assembler and driver (from a taxi to a train). 
Elementary occupations: vendor, telephone salesperson, babysitter, char, cook in private 
household, cleaner (domestic office, aircraft), hand launderer and dry-cleaner, caretaker, janitor, 
messenger. night watchman, attendant (fun-fair, lavatory), collector (of anything from tolls to 
garbage), scavenger, labourer (in a wide variety of activities), ranch hand, packer, labeller, loader, 
animal driver. porter. 
I have decided to further consolidate these occupation groups into larger groupings (Table 2.3 











Table 2.3: Occupations according to skills categories 
Occupation category Occupation skill level 
Legislators, senior officials & managers 
Professionals Highly skilled 
Technicians & associate professionals 
Clerks Semi-skilled: White-collar Service workers, shop & market sales workers 
Skilled agricultural & fishery workers 
Craft & related trades workers Semi-skilled: Blue-collar 
Plant & machinery operators/assemblers 
Elementary occupations Unskilled 
.. 
Source: Author's adaptation of SASCO (Statistics South Afnca, c.1996a). 
The legislators/senior officials/managers group and professional group not only have an almost 
identical income distribution but as was discussed above. managerial and executive positions are 
generally considered. along with professionals to be high-skilL high-income occupations. I have 
decided to include associate professionals/technicians in the highly skilled occupation group. as 
most of these occupations are quite skilled (their skill rating of3 is higher than that of the main body 
of occupations) and require tertiary education. Also. although the income distribution of associate 
professionals/technicians is not as similar to that of professionals and managers as they are to each 
other, it still resembles these distributions more closely than any others. 
In the SASCO system. clerks, sales/service workers. skilled agriculturists, craft workers and 
operators/assemblers all have the same skill rating of 2 (Table 2.1 above). This seems to be fair, as 
the jobs in these categories all require a certain level of skilL but not an inordinate amount of 
specialised education or training as in the case in many professional type occupations. The income 
distribution for each of these categories is also remarkably similar (even though clerks do seem to 
earn on average slightly more than the other three groups), and the bulk of workers with these kinds 
of occupations are in lower income categories than the highly skilled workers. Also. over half of the 
workers in these occupation groups fall into the two income categories that constitute over 50% of 
all workers (see Total column of Table 2.2). Thus, I have referred to all of these occupation 
categories as semi-skilled. The only division I have made within this larger grouping is to separate 
the office orientated and retail or service-type occupations from the more manual type jobs. Thus, 
clerks. sales and service workers have been designated white-collar workers. while craft/related 











The final occupation group is that of the elementary workers. These jobs have a skill rating of only 
I, and most of these workers fall into the two lowest income categories. These are the unskilled 
occupations. 
I have also used population census data in order to assess if there has been a change in the dominant 
economic sector in Cape Town. The four sectors accounting for 82% of jobs in Cape Town in 2001 
(Statistics South Africa. c.1996b) are: 3 
• Community and personal services: The "community, social and personal services" sector as it 
is called in the population censuses includes government bureaucracies at the national, provincial 
and municipal leveL both public and private health and education services, sanitation, welfare, 
the activities of trade unions, professional associations and religious organisations, sporting, 
recreational and cultural activities, libraries, museums, botanical and zoological gardens, all 
entertainment activities, news agency activities, as well as private services like laundries, 
hairdressing and funereal services. According to Statistics South Africa (c. 1996b), domestic 
services fall into a residual category including those employed in private households, 
exterritorial organisations and those representing foreign governments. For the purposes of this 
analysis. this residual category will be included in community and personal services. 
• Commerce: This includes all wholesale and retail trade, catering and accommodation services, 
from the sale of various materials and products, to motor vehicle and appliance repairs, to the 
activities of hotels and restaurants. 
• Manufacturing: All manufacturing activities fall under this category, from the processing and 
manufacture of chemical products, basic metals, machinery, electrical equipment and appliances 
to wood products, furniture. textiles, clothing, jewellery, beverages and food products; as well as 
printing and publishing activities. 
• FIRE: This acronym refers to all financial, insurance, real estate and business services and also 
includes legal and accounting services, the renting of machinery and equipment, hardware and 
software consultancy and supply, data processing activities, advertising, research and 
development in the natural and social sciences, as well as architectural and engineering 
Note that the four sectors providing the bulk of employment in Cape Town are referred to as the main sectors from 











activities. There are also a host of '"miscellaneous" activities that fall into this category. These 
include disparate services like labour recruiting, photographic activities, building cleaning, 













The polarisation hypothesis 
Before commencing with the discussion of my methodology, I would like to address more of a 
conceptual issue concerning the polarisation hypothesis. This idea was originally conceived as a 
result of changes in the socio-economic situation of so-called "world cities". Thus, some might 
question the validity of applying this theory to Cape Town. However, many of the authors referred 
to in this thesis have used the polarisation theory as a framework in which to examine economic 
restructuring and its impacts on the labour markets of a range of cities throughout the world, without 
entering into a debate as to whether or not their subjects can be classed as world cities (Crankshaw 
and Parnell, 2004, Gu and Liu, 2002, Nijman, 1996, Ribeiro and Telles, 2000, Wilson, 1996). As 
Crankshaw and Parnell state (2004:350): 
"We have chosen to reflect on the world city literature to extract analytical tools for 
reinterpreting urban change. Our specific attention falls on the utility of linking global 
economic ... shifts to the changing patterns of employment inequality within the city." 
Thus, I believe that testing the polarisation hypothesis in the context Cape Town is both a valid and 
relevant exercise. 
Consolidating Population Census Boundaries 
I originally wanted to collect population census data according to the current metropolitan boundary 
of Cape Town. However, prior to the 1996 and 2001 censuses, the population census data on 
sectors and occupations are published by Magisterial District only." Therefore, as the data used in 
this study include all the censuses from the 1940's through to 2001, the data had to be collated by 
Magisterial District. The Magisterial Districts chosen were those that best approximated the current 
4 The only exception is the 1946 Population Census, which does not use Magisterial District boundaries but simply 

















• Mitchell's Plain 
• Simonstown 
• Somerset West 
• Strand 
• Wynberg 
Collating the data by magisterial district arguably gives the most accurate coverage of Cape Town, 
both in the past and present. However, one potentially significant shortcoming of this approach is 
that the part of the Blaauwberg Municipality of Cape Town that includes Atlantis, a predominantly 
industrial area. is excluded. In population censuses prior to 1996. Atlantis falls under the 
Malmesbury Magisterial District. This district is quite vast though, and includes much that cannot 
be considered part of Cape Town, even today. Therefore. including the Malmesbury Magisterial 
District for earlier censuses simply for the sake of capturing Atlantis would lead to greater 
inaccuracy. This would also be a rather fruitless exercise, as Atlantis was only established in the 
1970's. Instead. it was possible to ascertain how many respondents in Atlantis were employed in 
manufacturing in 2001. to counter any possible assertions that the data showed a decrease in the 
numbers of Coloured manufacturing employees in Cape Town due to these jobs moving out of the 
area in question. 
Atlantis was originally touted as ""a new, self-contained city for 500,000 people, 45km from Cape 
Town ... a new gro\\1h point backed by the central government" (South Africa Board for the 
Decentralisation of Industry. 1975: 1). To this end, the government offered concessions to 
5 Please note that many of these Magisterial Districts only came into existence "later", i.e. they developed as Cape 
Town grew. For example. the only districts of those above that existed in 1960 are the Cape and Somerset West. By 
1970 though, the Strand had been established as a separate Magisterial District. and was therefore included. 
Mitchell's Plain is another Magisterial District that was demarcated much later, although these residents would have 











decentralise industries, especially new endeavours and industries moving from certain other areas in 
South Africa to selected points like Atlantis. In truth, the industry in Atlantis was intended to 
"provide an economic base for the decentralisation of the Coloured popUlation away from Cape 
Town" (Foundation for Contemporary Research, 1992:2). Few of the ambitious plans envisaged for 
the area came to fruition though. Only one of the 6 proposed towns was ever built and while 
between 170,000 and 200,000 jobs were to have been created, by 1992, there were only 7,100 
manufacturing and 2,500 commercial jobs (Foundation for Contemporary Research, 1992). Of these 
jobs, even fewer were available to Atlantis residents, as 3,000 skilled workers commuted in from 
Cape Town every day. Thus, by 1992, unemployment had reached a rate of around 40% in Atlantis. 
However, in 200!' there were 6,084 Coloured manufacturing workers living in Atlantis. 
One could argue that these approximately 6,000 workers form a relatively substantial share of the 
over 29,000 manufacturing jobs lost to Coloureds in Cape Town between 1985 and 2001 (20%). 
However, in trying to determine the impact of the decline in the manufacturing sector on Coloured 
employment levels, the figure I considered was the number of people who would potentially have 
had jobs if manufacturing employment had continued to grow at pre-1985 rates (see Chapter 5 
later). Had employment growth continued at pre-1985 levels, approximately 163,736 more 
Coloureds would have been employed in manufacturing in 2001 (as against the reported total of 
94,411). This even exceeds the number of unemployed Coloureds in Cape Town in 2001 (139,209). 
These numbers are much larger than the 6,000 odd manufacturing jobs held by Coloureds in 
Atlantis. Thus, it seems unlikely that the drop in manufacturing employment in Cape Town can be 










Manufacturing employment data 
Another issue surrounding the use of population census data is that of the accuracy of the 
manufacturing employment figures. Some authors have questioned the disparity in numbers of 
manufacturing workers between the population census and other surveys (Wittenberg, 2004). 
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Below is a comparison of the population census figures used in this thesis and manufacturing census 
figures. The manufacturing census figures were collected for the same years as the popUlation 
census figures and the same Magisterial Districts in Cape Town. No obvious trend of difference 
between the population and manufacturing census figures is noticeable though, i.e. the population 
census does not appear to have consistently undercounted the number of manufacturing workers 
(Table 3.1). The most these manufacturing census data point to is that the drop in employment 
could have occurred at a later date than shown in the population census data. In other words, 
according to the manufacturing census data, manufacturing employment started to decline after 1991 
and not after 1985. If anything though, the manufacturing census data shows an even greater drop in 
employment than does the population census data. The decrease in the number of manufacturing 
workers in the popUlation censuses between 1985 and 1996 is only 2,980 people. The decrease 
between 1991 and 1996 in the manufacturing censuses is 7,770 people. As a percentage of 1991 
manufacturing jobs, this loss represents a drop of 4.1 % of manufacturing employment. The decline 
in manufacturing jobs in the population censuses represents a drop of only 1. 7% of manufacturing 
jobs in 1985. Thus, whether using the manufacturing or population census figures, by 1996 at the 
latest, manufacturing employment was in decline. 
Table 3.1: A comparison of manufacturing and population census data for manufacturing 
employment, Cape Town, 1970-1996 
Census 1970 1979* 1985 1991 1996 
Manufacturing census 136,971 154,077 171,353 189,903 182,133 
Population census 129,082 163,658 172,292 170,134 169,312 
Manufacturing - Population census = Difference 7,889 -9,581 -939 19,769 12,821 
Difference as a percentage of the population census 
6.10% -5.90% -0.50% 11.60% 7.60% 
figures 
, 
Source: Author s analYSIS of South A fncan population and manufactUring censuses. 
* As no manufacturing census was available for 1980, the manufacturing census of 1979 was used; however, the 












The employment figures by sector for each of the relevant Magisterial Districts were taken from the 
population census reports on industries for the years 1946, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1985, 1996 and 2001.6 
The sectors themselves were defined quite uniformly from one census to the next and did not require 
much reworking. The categories were also quite consistent with those of the South African 
Standard Classification of Industries (SASCI) (Statistics South Africa, c.1996b). Therefore, 
employment figures were collected quite easily for each of the population census years listed above 
for the following sectors (the shortened name used in the tables and graphs appears in parentheses): 
• Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing (Agriculture) 
• Mining and Quarrying (Mining) 
• Manufacturing 
• Electricity, gas and water supply (Utilities) 
• Construction 
• Wholesale and retail trade (Commerce) 
• Transport storage and communication (Transport) 
• Financial intermediation, insurance, real estate and business services (FIRE) 
• Community, social and personal services (Community and personal)7 
Occupational data 
Unfortunately, the definitions of occupations from one census to the next were not uniform. In 
several of the earlier population census reports, occupational classifications are mixed with sectoral 
classifications. For example, in the 1960 population census (amongst others), skilled tradesmen, 
semi-skilled and unskilled production workers are all combined in one category. Police officials and 
domestic workers also appear in one group. Thus, these categories are not at all consistent with the 
SASCO system, and it was not possible, given the level of detail in the census reports, to separate 
(, The 1950 census was excluded as the reports provided data at the provincial level only, making it impossible to 
isolate the relevant data for Cape Town. 
As was mentioned earlier (see Chapter 2: Defining the Concepts), those working in private households, e.g. domestic 











occupations with disparate skill requirements and earnings levels from each other and regroup them 
appropriately.s 
This is not the only problem with the occupational data in the population census reports. In certain 
of the earlier census reports, the unemployed may have been included in the occupational data, 
while in other censuses they have not. However, the fact of whether or not they are employed is not 
indicated in the reports. This was not the case with the sectoral data. The instruction to interviewers 
in most of these censuses was to record the sector "in which the person is working". Therefore, a 
respondent was viewed as not belonging to any specific sector ifhe/she was not actually employed 
in a sector at the time of the census. With regard to the occupational data however, in certain 
population censuses (1946, 1980, 1985, 1991), respondents were asked to give their previous 
occupation if they were unemployed at the time but seeking work, and this was supposed to be 
included in the data. As there are greater numbers in the occupational categories than in the sectors 
in these reports, I suspect at least some of the unemployed may be included in the occupation 
figures. It was therefore impossible to extract the unemployed from the employed in the 
occupational data. 
Therefore, because of the combining of occupations of different skill levels, as well as the potential 
inclusion of at least some of the unemployed, it was not possible to use census reports prior to 1996 
to study changes in the occupational distribution over time. From 1996 onwards, the question 
regarding occupation was asked of the employed only. Also, the occupations were classified in a 
manner consistent with the SASCO system. Thus, the occupational data from the latest census, i.e. 
2001, could be used in its published form. For an earlier census however, the unit record data had to 
be purchased directly and analysed.'! The 1980 census was selected, as this was around the time of 
the height of manufacturing employment. III 
The set of data from the 1980 population census was, in some respects, too detailed for the purposes 
of this study, and I had to complete much recoding and reclassifying before I could analyse the data. 
For example, the 20 population group categories had to be reduced to four races (African, Coloured, 
8 See Chapter 2: Defining the Concepts for the discussion of occupation skill and income levels. 
9 Many thanks go to Piet Albert of Statistics South Africa and Dr. Andrew Boulle of the School of Public Health, 
University of Cape Town, respectively, for their help in acquiring and reformatting these record unit data. 
III One might have expected the 1985 population census to be used, as the figures indicate that this is when the most 












Indian and White). The sectoral data consisted of 224 separate categories. There were no fewer 
than 284 occupational categories, each of which included several different occupations (anywhere 
from three to 40 different occupations per category). I had to re-group these into the 9 occupational 
groups of the SASCO system. Unfortunately, even with this level of detail, occupations requiring 
different skill levels were still being combined in the same groups. For example, a category like 
"medicaL dental and related workers not elsewhere classified" became a kind of catch-all, including 
both professionals and associate professionals. This merging of occupation groups in the 1980 
population census was another reason it was necessary to further reduce the occupational categories 
from the 9 of the SASCO system to the 4 skill groups (highly skilled, semi-skilled white- and blue-
collar and unskilled). Thus, in the case of the example given above, I combined professionals and 
associate professionals in the same group in the final analysis anyway, i.e. highly skilled. In general 
though, there was not significant mixing of the manager, professional and associate professional 
occupational groups in the 1980 census occupational classification (i.e. these three separate 
occupation groups could still be discerned from each other quite easily). 
Unfortunately, the same cannot be said of crafts and related tradesmen, and machine operators and 
assemblers. These two separate groups of occupations (as set out in the SASCO system) were often 
combined in the same occupational categories in the 1980 census. It is impossible to accurately 
separate them in the 1980 population census data. Again, this is not too great a problem in the final 
analysis though, as combined, they constitute the semi-skilled, blue-collar worker category. 
There were several occupational categories in the 1980 population census where unskilled workers 
were grouped together with more qualified workers. Therefore, the number of unskilled workers in 
the 1980 census data is probably an undercount. However, I do not think this effect was too great, 
as there were certain dedicated occupational categories for unskilled labourers in the 1980 census, 
and in the categories where they were included with better-skilled workers, they were generally the 
minority (e.g. in an occupational category like mineral and stone treaters, only four of the 40 










A verage Annual Employment Growth Rates 
The average annual employment growth rates for the sectors were calculated, using the available 
census data, according to the following formula: II 
Where: 
T I = Total number of people employed in the first year 
T2 = Total number of people employed in the second year 
Y I = First year 
Y 2 = Second year 
For example, the average annual employment growth rate of Coloureds in manufacturing between 
1946 and 1985 is: 
{[(123,800/20,778)(1/(1985-1946))]_1} * 100 = 4.70/0 
Thus, the number of Coloureds employed in the manufacturing sector grew on average 
approximately 4.7% per annum between 1946 and 1985. 
The KhayelitshaiMitchell's Plain Survey 2000 (KMPS-2000) 
30 
This survey was designed with a special focus on labour market issues (SALDRU, 2003). The 
magisterial district of Mitchell's Plain was chosen as it contained almost 30% of the population in 
the Cape Metropolitan Council area. housing nearly 74% of the African and over 20% of the 
Coloured population. This was not intended to be a representative sample of Cape Town, but rather 
of the working class population of the city (Nattrass, 2002).12 
II Mohr. P .. van der Merwe. C .. Both. Z. and Inggs. 1. 1988. The Practical Guide to South African Economic Indicators. 
Johannesburg: Lexicon Publishers. 
12 Please note that in both the survey report (SALDRU, 2003) and the working paper by Professor Nicoli Nattrass 











For the purposes of this thesis, I used the KMPS-2000 to provide data on African migrants to Cape 
Town and their employment prospects. While much work had already been done on the raw data, I 
found a certain amount of recoding was required. There were a few minor recodes. such as those for 
race. e.g. I recoded respondents who had called themselves "Malay" or "Muslim", and had 
originally been coded as "other", as Coloured. Also. I grouped the responses to the question 
regarding the highest level of education achieved into the categories preparatory, primary and high 
school. 
When migrants arrived in Cape Town 
One question that was of particular importance to me was: "In what year did you first move to stay 
in Cape Town?" (Question 86).1:1 However, there were 187 missing answers to this question out of 
the 1,835 African respondents in the survey sample though. I found that at least 46 of these missing 
responses came from emergency questionnaires. which were severely truncated versions of the adult 
questionnaire. where several sections were omitted, one of them being that on migration. In order to 
fill in as many of the rest of these missing values as possible, I had to cross-check a respondent's 
answers to other questions dealing with migration history and where they had spent most of their 
childhood.l~ For example. in one case where the respondent had not indicated when he/she had 
arrived in Cape Town. I had to use the answers to 3 other questions in order to determine the date. 
Because the year they had first moved to a township was the same as the year in which they had 
moved to live in their current dwelling in Gugulethu (a formal township in Cape Town), one could 
assume that this was the year they had first moved to stay in Cape Town. 
As many respondents left out quite a few answers to the questions in the migration section of the 
questionnaire. it was often necessary to consult the answers to different combinations of questions, 
as in the case of the example above, to determine their year of arrival in Cape Town, or if they were 
born in the city. In quite a few cases, the interviewers seem to have simply failed to fill in the year 
in which the respondent first moved to Cape Town if they were born here, instead of using the 
documents). This is incorrect, however, as Langa was not one of the areas surveyed. This is an important point, as 
Langa is home to more middle-class African residents than other townships in Cape Town. Thus, the KMPS-2000 
does capture mostly the working class population of Cape Town. 
13 Section B (Migration) of the KMPS-2000 adult questionnaire. 












default code of '0' as per the instructions. These cases were quite obvious, as their answer to the 
question about the name of the place had last stayed before moving to their current dwelling was 
"not applicable: born in this dwelling", i.e. they were born in Cape Town. This was the case with no 
fewer than 35 of the African respondents missing an answer to question B6. 
One flaw of this question is that it does not deal well with those respondents who were born in Cape 
Town, moved away and came back to the city later in their lives. This would not be a problem if all 
the other questions in the section were answered properly. This was rarely the case when a 
respondent's answers to question B6 were missing though. To simply answer the default of "not 
applicable: born in Cape Town" is not particularly helpful if they did not grow up in Cape Town. 
For the purpose for which I was using this survey, i.e. to study migrants and their employment 
opportunities in Cape Town, it is crucial to know where the respondent spent most of his/her life. 
Whether a respondent has been raised in a rural or urban setting greatly influences his/her chances 
of finding work in the city through mechanisms such as differences in quality of education, social 
support and contact networks. In one case, while the respondent was born in Cape Town, he/she 
only moved to his/her current dwelling in 1983. However, this person was only 20 years old at the 
time of the survey (2000). Therefore. even if he/she had moved away from Cape Town for the first 
three years of his/her life, this person's formative, teenage and young adult years were spent in Cape 
Town. I therefore classed this kind of respondent as having been born in Cape Town. Note that I 
also classified those who migrated to Cape Town within the first 6 years of their lives as "born in 
Cape Town". as they too would have grown up in the city. 
This cross-checking of questions was originally only done in cases where the answer to question B6 
was missing. However. I eventually checked all the answers to question B6, as in certain cases, the 
year given was the same year in which the respondent was born. In other words. these respondents 
were born in Cape Town and not migrants at all. This applied to at least 21 respondents. 15 
Thus, every attempt was made to ensure that there were as many responses to the question regarding 
the year of arrival in Cape Town as possible. and that these were accurate. 
15 This closer inspection of answers revealed several cases where respondents seemed to have given contradictory 
information, or where their answers to question 86 were inconsistent with their other answers. However, as there was 












Respondents were asked about all income-earning activities across several sections of the KMPS-
2000, and therefore, not allocated to specific labour market categories during the interviewing 
process (SALDRU, 2003). Nicoli Nattrass, Director of the Centre for Social Science Research Unit 
and Professor in the School of Economics at the University of Cape Town, designed a recoding 
system to process the information gleaned from these many questions. It is beyond the scope of this 
study to detail exactly how the coding was structured. 16 However, one issue regarding the 
classification of the unemployed needs to be addressed. Under this system, three types of 
unemployed respondents were defined: 
1. Active-searching unemployed: respondent wants a job, is available to work, and actively 
searched for work during the week prior to the interview 
2. Exclusively network-searching unemployed: respondent wants a job, is available to work 
and relies on household members/friends/friends in other households to tell him/her about 
work or get him/her ajob. 
3. Marginalized unemployed: respondent wants a job and is available to work, but does not fall 
into either of the first two categories. 
However, such meticulous differentiation of the unemployed was not required for my study. 
Therefore, I combined the three categories to create one class of unemployed. 
Occupation 
While the respondents' answers to questions about the sector and occupation in which they were 
working at the time of the survey were coded using the SASCO system, there seemed to be some 
inconsistency. For example, in some cases respondents who reported that they were delivery 
persons were coded as unskilled workers and in other cases, as machine operators, which they would 
be if they were delivering by vehicle, i.e. they drive a delivery vehicle. As no clear reason could be 
discerned from the answers as to why some respondents would be classified as unskilled workers 
16 For the full discussion see Nattrass, N. 2002. Unemployment, Employment and Labour-force participation in 











while others were classed as drivers, I coded all respondents who called themselves delivery persons 
as drivers (i.e. semi-skilled blue-collar, as opposed to unskilled workers). 
There were cases where respondents gave their occupation as "delivery assistant", but were coded as 
drivers. Arguably though, delivery assistants do not drive the delivery vehicles, but are unskilled 
subordinates. Assistants in many other types of work also tend to be unskilled, e.g. assistant 
builders or assistant mechanics. To be sure of this, I checked the respondent's answer to the 
question regarding the highest level of education achieved. If a respondent described his/her work 
as an assistant mechanic, for example, but had no formal training in motor mechanics, I recoded 
him/her as an unskilled worker. 17 
In addition, if a respondent described a certain craft/trade, but only in a very general sense, and 
he/she had no formal training in this work, I also classed him/her as unskilled. For example, if a 
respondent indicated that his/her work was "fixing taps and sinks", technically, this activity would 
make the respondent a plumber, and therefore, a craftsman. However, if the respondent did not 
actually call him/herself "a plumber" and also did not have a trade certificate or some kind of 
qualification, it seemed more prudent to categorize him/her as an unskilled worker. In a case like 
this, it is likely that the respondent does not work alone or unsupervised, but has not indicated that 
he/she is an assistant or only allowed to do very simple repairs, for example. 
A list of 20 coded activities was drawn up for the section on self-employment. 18 This list still had to 
be recoded to make it consistent with the SASCO system. However, there were still several 
"inadequately defined" responses in the final data set. On closer inspection, I found that many of 
the descriptions given were of unskilled work, and I recoded them accordingly. 
17 While all occupations were checked and several changes made to the original coding. I have only mentioned the kinds 
of changes made in terms of unskilled occupations. as these are the only figures I use in the discussion on migrants 
(Chapter 7: Migrants and employment). 












Economic restructuring and the occupational distribution in Cape Town 
In this chapter, population census data on employment are used to determine whether or not 
deindustrialisation and the growth of the service sector have occurred in Cape Town. It is then 
hypothesized what the possible implications of this have been on the distribution of occupations. 
Using population census data again, it is then shown whether this has resulted in professionalisation 
or polarization of the occupational structure. 
Changes in the sectoral distribution of employment 
Many authors argue that the change in the core of the city's economy from the manufacturing 
industry to the service industry, especially financial and business services, has resulted in greater 
social polarisation (BealL Crankshaw and Parnell, 2002: Crankshaw and Parnell, 2002; Friedmann 
and Wolff, 1982: Gu and Liu, 2002; Nijman, 1996; Ribiero and Telles, 2000; Sassen, 1994; Soja, 
1991; Wilson. 1987 and 1996). To test this theory with regard to Cape Town, it was first necessary 
to determine what role manufacturing had played in the economy of the city, and what had happened 
to it relative to the service sector over time. 
Although Cape Town's economy was originally dominated by trade, agriculture and fishing, small-
scale industries also emerged in the 19th century (Wilkinson, 2000). Johannesburg, with its urban-
industrial economy. became South Africa's largest city during the 1920's, while Cape Town became 
an important administrative. cultural and service centre. Manufacturing played a significant role in 
Cape Town's economy during the First World War though, especially in the clothing, textile, paper 
and printing, food, beverages, and light engineering sectors (Wilkinson, 2000). In addition to its 
growth during the First World War and the inter-war years, the Western Cape's manufacturing 
industry also developed during the Second World War. mainly because of the protection afforded it 
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Table 4.1: Frequency distribution of employment by sector, Cape Town, 1946-2001 
---- -- ------ -------- -- --- -- -- ---- - --- -- --- - -------- -~--- -1996--'---2001- 1 Sector 1946 1960 1970 1980 1985 1991 
,Community and personal 53,946 94,843 114,039 170,646 186,781 236,886 235,736 237,708 1 
'Commerce 32,187 50,605 78,068 93,038 106,886 151,273 134,713 166,481 
Manufacturing 43,720 82,199 129,082 163,658 172,292 170,133 169,312 147,488; 
FIRE 6,429 14,734 28,170 41,636 48,438 75,626 105,113 125,1921 
Construction 12,066 23,697 52,025 47,530 65,816 65,570 65,853 66,772 
Transport 22,702 26,501 39,915 47,848 46,181 56,647 51,880 49,793j 
. Ag ricu Itu re 4,381 12,722 12,055 15,572 16,913 17,802 15,687 21,314 
'Utilities 0 3,397 3,935 6,034 6,941 6,733 7,313 4,589 
Mining 265 980 1,390 2,917 2,538 2,759 1,757 2,113 
Total 175,696 309,678 458,679 588,879 652,786 783,429 787,364 821,450 
- - -- -- -- -- -------- - ~ ~ - ---~-
Source: Author's analysis of South African population censuses. 
Table 4.2: Percentage distribution of employment by sector, Cape Town, 1946-2001 
I -- - Secto,--- - 1946 1960 1 1970- -I 1980 I 1985 [- -1991 , 1996 J- 2661 
Community-an~s-onal ' -- 31%[ :h%1 -- 2507oT--z9olo1 29%~ 30olo;--300/~L -~-29%1 
~~~u~:;~~r~ng - -~-- ~~~i --~~~r---~~r~~~ --{:~n J~~-- ~~~j- - 1~~}----~-~~: 
FIRE 4%1 5%~ 6%1 ~~-- 7%- ~~~-7°loT 10o/;----fjolot---M 
~~nnS:~~~ion 1;~ ~~! 1~~ . ~~i 1~~!~Jl~r::::~~ 
Agric-LJlfure 2% 4%t 3% 3%~- 3% 2%2%1- 3%; 
Utilities 0%, 1%' 1%~ 1%· 1%j 1% 16fo
l 
1% 
Mining 0%: 0% 0% 0%: 0%, O%i 0%1 0% 
Total-- 100% 100%1 100%, 100%r 100%; 100%: 100%t 100% 











The manufacturing sector continued to grow, so much so that by 1960 it formed the largest share of 
Cape Town's GGP and constituted just under a third of the Cape metropolitan region's GGP 
(Dewar, Watson and Howes, 1990). Between 1946 and 1980, the manufacturing sector provided a 
sizeable share of all employment in the city: between 25% and 28%.19 
Manufacturing employment had enjoyed steady growth up until 1970, with an average annual 
employment growth rate of 4.6%."° This growth was not sustained, however. The rate of job growth 
slowed from 2.4% between 1970 and 1980 to 1.0% between 1980 and 1985. By 1983, only 23% of 
the city's GGP came from manufacturing (Dewar, Watson and Howes, 1990). Also, Cape Town's 
manufacturing sector accounted for 15% of South Africa's total manufacturing in 1960, but only 
contributed 11 % to the national total in 1978 (Dewar, Watson and Howes, 1990). 
After 1985, the growth trend in manufacturing was completely reversed (Tables 4.1 and 4.2, and 
Figure 4.1 above). Between 1985 and 2001, the sector shed 24,804 jobs, and the average growth 
rate of manufacturing employment was -1.0% per annum. While certain manufacturing sub-sectors 
experienced above-average growth from 1996 to 2000 (e.g. beverages and tobacco; wood and 
furniture; paper, printing and publishing; rubber and plastics; electronic and electrical; and transport 
equipment), major industries like food, textiles and clothing and chemicals and petroleum performed 
badly, thereby lowering the overall growth of the manufacturing sector considerably (Economic and 
Social Development Directorate, 2001). The heavy steel industries (i.e. metal, steel and machinery 
industries), although growing strongly from 1996 to 1998, also declined between 1998 and 2000. 
Therefore, despite growth in real output in Cape Town's overall economy between 1980 and 2000, 
employment growth slowed. Whereas 1 % growth in output implied 1 % growth in employment in 
1980, a 1 % increase in output in the 1990's resulted in only a 0.7% increase in employment on 
average. This can be attributed to capital intensification in most sectors (including manufacturing) 
as a result of factors like technological advances in production techniques as well as factors that 
alter the real and potential cost ratio between capital and labour, like labour legislation and trade 
union pressure for higher wages (Economic and Social Development Directorate, 2001). In addition 
19 These data are contained in Tables 4.1 and 4.2, and Figure 4.1. Totals in the tables may not add up to 100% 
precisely, as the figures have been rounded off for presentation purposes. Please note that in all tables and 
calculations involving economic sectors, employment data for sectors reported as 'unknown' or 'inadequately 
defined' were not included. This is the same for tables and calculations involving occupations See Methodology for 
further details of how these census data were collated, and the list of primary sources in the References for the census 
reports. 











to this. the exposure to international competition in the 1990's (especially in clothing and textiles) 
also led to fewer jobs being available in Cape Town's formal economy than there would have been 
otherwise (Wilkinson, 2000). 
The service industry continued to grow in the period 1985-2001 though (Tables 4.1 and 4.2, and 
Figure 4.1 above). As was mentioned earlier, Cape Town has always been an important 
administrative, cultural and service centre. This is demonstrated by the fact that the community and 
personal services provided a similar number of jobs to manufacturing between 1946 and 1980. 
However, employment in these two sectors diverged in 1980. Between 1985 and 2001, the period in 
which the manufacturing sector shed jobs. the community and personal services sector gained 
50,927 workers (Tables 4.1 and 4.2 above). Employment in the community and personal services 
sector continued to grow at an average annual rate of 1.5% between 1985 and 2001. Thus. while 
manufacturing and community and personal services both accounted for about 28% of employment 
in 1980, manufacturing's relative employment share had dropped to 18% by 2001 while community 
and personal services still accounted for 29% of employment in Cape Town. 
The commerce and FIRE sectors also experienced continued employment growth since 1946; so 
much so, that commerce provided more jobs than manufacturing in 2001 (Tables 4.1 and 4.2, and 
Figure 4.1 above). While employment growth in manufacturing stagnated and declined between 
1980 and 2001. commerce and FIRE gained 73,443 and 83,556 employees respectively. These 
gains represent an annual average growth rate of2.8% in commerce and 5.4% in FIRE for that 
period. Though historically providing fewer jobs, commerce overtook manufacturing in 2001, 
contributing 166,481 jobs to Cape Town's economy versus manufacturing's 147,488. 
The sector that experienced the most rapid growth is the FIRE sector. Between 1946 and 2001, 
FIRE gained 118,763 jobs versus 183,762 in community and personal services and 134,294 in 
commerce (Tables 4.1 and 4.2, and Figure 4.1 above). However, the annual average employment 
growth rate of the FIRE sector between 1946 and 2001 was 5.5%. This is much higher than the 
2.7% average annual growth rate in community and personal services or 3.0% growth rate in 
commerce in the same period. FIRE was also the only sector besides commerce to actually increase 
its relative share of employment. While FIRE contributed only 4% to the total number of jobs in 











It is therefore clear that the economy of Cape Town underwent similar processes experienced in 
other cities throughout the world: namely, the growth of the service industry and the decline of 
manufacturing, at least in terms of employment. Employment growth in the manufacturing sector 
had been stagnating since 1985, while all service sub-sectors continued to employ increasing 
numbers of people. But did these sectoral changes result in a more polarised occupational structure? 
The possible effects of sectoral change on the occupational structure 21 
In the context of the debate outlined earlier, the main concern around the decline in manufacturing 
and the growth of services is that these sectors have different job distributions. Manufacturing tends 
to offer more middle-income, "medium-skilled", blue-collar jobs, with less high- and low-skilled 
work. Service industry jobs on the other hand tend to be concentrated at either end of the 
occupational distribution, i.e. more high- and low-skilled jobs, and fewer blue-collar worker jobs. 
Therefore. with the decline in manufacturing and the increase in service jobs, one could expect to 
see greater polarisation in the occupational structure of a city. i.e. more professionals, managers and 
technicians (high-skilled jobs) and unskilled. elementary workers (low-skilled jobs). with a 
shrinking semi-skilled. blue-collar working class (machine operators and craftsmen). 
Cape Town's manufacturing sector comprised mainly semi-skilled workers. Only 20% of 
manufacturing jobs in 2001 were highly skilled, and even fewer, 16%, were unskilled (Table 4.3). 
Thus the bulk of manufacturing work, 64%, was semi-skilled. Furthermore, most of these jobs were 
blue-collar work. Close to half of all manufacturing work, 46%, was semi-skilled blue-collar work. 
Table 4.3: Percentage distribution of occupations by main sectors, Cape Town, 2001 
Occupation skill level Manufacturing Commerce FIRE 
Community 
& personal 
Highly skilled 20% 23% 45% 38% 
Semi-skilled: White collar 18% 42% 41% 23% 
Semi-skilled: Blue collar 46% 18% 6% 5% 
Unskilled 16% 17% 9% 34% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: Author's analYSIS of South AfrIcan population censuses. 
21 Note that using census data to track changing sectoral employment trends and comparing the occupational 
distribution of the growing service sectors to that of manufacturing is modelled on the approach used by Crankshaw 











All three of Cape Town's growing service industries had more polarised occupational structures 
than the declining manufacturing sector in 2001 (Table 4.3 above). None of the three growing 
service industries had as great a proportion of semi-skilled workers, least of all blue-collar workers, 
as the manufacturing sector. The community and personal services, the sector that had outstripped 
manufacturing in terms of employment growth since the mid-1980's, had a far more polarised 
occupational distribution than manufacturing. In the community and personal services sector, high-
and low-skilled work comprised 72% of all jobs (38% and 34% respectively) in 2001, leaving only 
28% of jobs in this sector to semi-skilled workers. And only 5% of jobs in this sector were semi-
skilled blue-collar jobs. Considering how much of the total employment these two sectors provided 
in the 1980's, one might have expected that the considerable increase in community and personal 
services employment and concomitant decrease in manufacturing employment would have lead to 
far fewer semi-skilled workers and a greater proportion of high- and low-skilled workers in Cape 
Town in 2001, i.e. a more polarised workforce. 
The community and personal services was just one sub-sector of the service industry that 
experienced employment growth while manufacturing shed jobs. As was mentioned earlier, FIRE 
experienced the fastest growth of the four main sectors in Cape Town. Over half of the jobs in the 
FIRE sector were either high- or low-skill though: 45% and 9% respectively (Table 4.3 above). 
Thus 54% of FIRE jobs fell into these two categories versus only 36% of manufacturing jobs. 
Therefore, only 46% of FIRE employment was in semi-skilled work, compared to 64% in 
manufacturing. Again only 6% of jobs in FIRE were blue-collar jobs. Therefore, increasing FIRE 
employment coupled with the decline in the manufacturing sector could also lead one to expect 
proportionately fewer semi-skilled jobs and more high- and low-skilled work in 2001 in comparison 
to the 1980's. 
The continued growth of commerce employment could also have contributed to a drop in the 
number of blue-collar workers. Commerce, which overtook manufacturing in terms of number of 
jobs provided in 2001, was only slightly more polarised in terms of occupations than the 
manufacturing sector (Table 4.3 above). Only a slightly higher proportion of jobs in commerce fell 
into the categories high- or low-skilled. Therefore, commerce had a mere 3% more highly skilled 
workers, and only 1 % more unskilled workers than manufacturing in 2001. This still left 60% of 
work in the commerce sector to semi-skilled workers. However, in contrast to manufacturing, the 










blue-collar jobs. A massive 42% of commerce jobs were white-collar, while only 18% were blue-
collar. Thus, the simultaneous increase in commerce jobs and drop in manufacturing employment 
could also have lead to a shrinking blue-collar working class. 
Evidence of increasing occupational polarisation 
Many authors have argued that besides the effects on the occupational structure of the changes in 
cities' economies from a reliance on manufacturing to services, modern labour demands are the 
same whether a business is involved in producing goods or providing services, i.e. the new global 
economy, with its increased reliance on technology, requires workers with more training and 
education and, therefore, workers are either in the top or bottom brackets of income earners and 
much less in the middle (Soja, 1991; Wilson, 1996). 
41 
Besides the possible effects of sectoral changes on the occupational structure, it would appear that 
the occupational structure in Cape Town became increasingly polarised in general between 1980 and 
2001. In all four of the main sectors, the proportion of professional, managerial and technical 
workers was higher in 2001 than 1980 (Table 4.4)."" In both commerce and the community and 
personal services, 6%-7% more workers were highly skilled in 2001 than in 1980. Even 
manufacturing comprised 9% more highly skilled workers in 2001 than 1980. The greatest relative 
increase in highly skilled workers over this period was in FIRE, where there was a 10% leap in these 
jobs. As the professional complement of these sectors grew, so did their ranks of low-skilled 
workers though. The relative share of elementary workers increased by 3% in FIRE, 4% in 
commerce and 6% in manufacturing between 1980 and 2001. Only the community and personal 
services sector experienced a decline in the proportion of elementary workers (down by 3% in 
2001). Generally speaking though, most sectors experienced growth in the relative numbers of 
high- and low-skilled workers between 1980 and 2001. 
n Percentage difference here and elsewhere in this thesis is calculated as the percentage in one year minus the 
percentage in another, e.g. the percentage of highly skilled jobs in manufacturing in 2001 (Table 4.3) minus the 











Table 4.4: Change in the percentage distribution of occupations by main sectors between 1980 
and 2001, Cape Town 
Occupation skill level Manufacturing Commerce 
I Highly skilled +9% +6% 
ISemi-skilled: White collar +3% -8% 
[Semi-skilled: Blue collar -19% -2% 
!Unskilled___ _ ______ _ +6% +4% 













Relati ve growth in the top and bottom ends of the occupational spectrum meant that the middle 
shrank. Across all four of the main economic sectors in Cape Town, the employment of semi-
skilled workers dropped relative to the other occupational groups between 1980 and 2001 (Table 
4.4). While the employment of semi-skilled workers decreased by approximately only 4% in the 
community and personal services group, this proportion of workers declined by much more in the 
other three sectors. Commerce employed 10% fewer semi-skilled workers in 2001 than in 1980. 
The biggest decreases in semi-skilled workers occurred in FIRE and manufacturing. with relative 
losses of 14%-15% each. Note though that the biggest decreases for FIRE and commerce occurred 
amongst white-collar workers. while only semi-skilled blue-collar workers lost ground to the other 
occupations in manufacturing. 
A process of professionalisation rather than polarisation? 
As was also discussed previously. not all authors agree with the polarisation hypothesis. Some 
proponents of this theory are criticised for alternating between arguments based on occupational 
distribution and income structure. and for being unclear about whether polarisation is increasing in 
absolute or relative terms (Hamnett. 1994a). The argument of increasing polarisation has been 
countered with that of increasing professionalisation, i.e. that the shift from goods to service 
production has led not to an increase in both high- and low-skill jobs but rather to an increased 
reliance on professional, managerial and technical skills. Thus it is argued that the complement of 
highly skilled workers has increased in most Western capitalist countries, while semi-skilled and 
unskilled work has been in decline for several decades. Only those cities, such as L.A. and New 
York, with large immigrant populations, and, therefore, large and increasingly expanding cheap, 
unskilled labour forces, have experienced an increase in the numbers of low-skilled workers too. 











Given that occupationally less polarised industries (manufacturing) declined, while sectors that are 
traditionally more polarised (FIRE, community and personal services) experienced employment 
growth: and given that all the main sectors seemed to become relatively more polarised, one would 
expect the overall distribution of occupations in Cape Town to be more polarised in 2001 than in 
1980. But was this the case'? 
In absolute terms. approximately 18,289 fewer people were employed as semi-skilled, blue-collar 
workers in Cape Town in 2001 than 1980 (Table 4.5). In addition, more people were employed in 
highly skilled and unskilled work in 2001 than 1980. However, the increase in numbers of highly 
skilled workers was far greater than the increase in the number of unskilled workers. In 1980, 
approximately 115,529 people were employed in highly skilled occupations. A similar number of 
people were employed in unskilled work that year, 117,603. By 2001, the number of highly skilled 
workers had expanded to 247,545 while the number of unskilled workers had grown to only 
182,289. 
Table 4.5: Occupational distribution, Cape Town, 1980 and 2001 
- --
Difference Occupation skill level 1980 2001 
(2001-1980= -.J 
'Highly skilled 115,529 19% 247,545 29% +132,016 
Semi-skilled: White collar 160,229 27% 233,180 27% + 72,951 
I Semi-skilled: Blue collar 204,760 34% 186,471 22% - 18,289 




lIo~ __________ 598,121 100% __ _ 850,Q84 __ ~_100% __ + 251,963 ! 
~--
_____________________ -.J 
- - -- - - - - ------- -
Source: Author's analysis of South African population censuses. 
As the proportion of all work consisting of highly skilled jobs rose from 19% in 1980 to 29% in 
200 L it would appear that there was both an absolute and relative increase in highly skilled 
employment in Cape Town (Table 4.5 above). While there was an absolute increase in the numbers 
of elementary workers in this same time period, the relative increase was negligible (from 20% to 
22%).23 Thus the occupational structure of Cape Town arguably better matched the pattern of 
increased professionalisation than increased polarisation in 2001. 
This conclusion might come as a surprise, given the sectoral changes discussed thus far. However, 
the very same sectoral changes that might have predicted an increase in occupational polarisation 
n I say "negligible" increase as the 1980 Population Census data probably underestimate the number of elementary 












could help explain why this does not seem to be the process that has occurred in Cape Town. FIRE, 
which grew to such an extent since 1980 that it provided almost the same proportion of overall 
employment in 2001 as manufacturing (15% and 18% respectively, Table 4.2 above), was not so 
much highly polarised as it was heavily skewed towards the professional ranks of workers: 45% of 
workers in this sector were professionals, managers or technicians, while only 9% were elementary 
workers in 2001 (Table 4.3 above). Table 4.6 shows that over half of the jobs gained in FIRE 
between 1980 and 2001 were in highly skilled occupations (39,751 out of 79,348), while this sector 
added the second lowest number of unskilled occupations (8,340) of all four main sectors (second 
only to manufacturing, in which total employment actually declined between 1980 and 2001). Thus, 
the contribution FIRE made to overall employment growth was one of many highly skilled jobs and 
very few low-skilled ones. 
Table 4.6: Change in the frequency distribution of occupations by main sectors between 1980 
and 2001, Cape Town 
- ----- ------ ------ - - - - - - -
fotal 
Occupation skill level Manufacturing Commerce FIRE 
Community 
& personal Absolute Percentage 
! Highly skilled +11,243 +21,569 +39,751 +35,974 +108,537 +10% 
Semi-skilled: White collar + 2,119 +22,514 +25,492 +10,176 + 60,301 0% 
Semi-skilled: Blue collar -37,932 +10,424 + 5,765 + 342 - 21,401 -12% 
Unskilled + 7,144 +15,623 + 8,340 +16,777 + 47,884 + 1% 
Total -17,426 +70,130 + 79,348 +63,269 +195,321 0% 
--- -- - -- - --
Source: Author's analysis of South African population censuses. 
The overall proportion oflow-skilled jobs did not change because of the similar and higher 
proportions of elementary workers in the other growing service industries in comparison to the 
declining manufacturing sector. For example, the community and personal services sector, by far 
the largest employer in 2001, had a much higher proportion of elementary workers than 
manufacturing or FIRE (Table 4.3 above). This sector alone added 16,777 unskilled jobs between 
1980 and 2001 (Table 4.6 above). Thus, by 2001, the growth in and increasing dominance of this 
sector in terms of employment helped to counteract the very low number of elementary workers in 
FIRE, to give an overall proportion of elementary workers similar to that in 1980. Commerce, 
which overtook manufacturing in 2001 as the second largest employer, also had approximately the 
same proportion of elementary workers as manufacturing, and added 15,623 unskilled jobs between 













In addition, even though the numbers and proportions of both highly skilled and unskilled jobs in 
these four main sectors increased between 1980 and 2001 (with the exception of community and 
personal services), the overall relative increase in highly skilled occupations was greater than that in 
unskilled work. Except for the community and personal services, in all other main sectors, the 
proportion of highly skilled jobs was greater than that of unskilled jobs in 1980 (Table 4.7). In all 
sectors, without exception, the increase in the number of highly skilled jobs was greater than the 
increase in numbers of unskilled jobs between 1980 and 2001 (Table 4.6 above). The differences in 
increases ranged from a relatively small number of only 4,099 more highly skilled than unskilled 
jobs added in manufacturing, to a difference of 19,197 jobs in favour of highly skilled work in 
community and personal services, to an even greater 31,411 more highly skilled than unskilled jobs 
added in FIRE in 2001 (Table 4.6 above). Therefore, each sector showed a minimum increase of 
6% in the number of highly skilled workers, reaching as high as 10%; while two sectors showed an 
increase of unskilled workers of only 3% and 4%, with only one reaching even 6% (Table 4.4 
above). And the numbers of unskilled workers in community and personal services in 2001 was 
actually 3% lower relative to 1980. Thus it is clear that in these main sectors, the number of highly 
skilled jobs increased far more than the numbers of unskilled jobs (108,537 versus only 47,884, 
Table 4.6 above) and that the trend was therefore more one of professionalisation than polarisation. 
Table 4.7: Percentage distribution of occupations by main sectors, Cape Town, 1980 
-- -- ~ I -
Occupation skill level Manufacturing Commerce FIRE 
Community 
& personal 
i Highly skilled 11% 17% 34% 31% 
:Semi-skilled: White collar 15% 50% 56% 25% 
:Semi-skilled: Blue collar 65% 20% 4% 7% 
!Unskilled 9% 12% 5% 37% 
iTotal 100% 100% 100% 100% 
- ~- --- -
Source: Author's analysis of South African population censuses. 
Far more significant than the overall decline in manufacturing employment though, is the fact that 
the actual decline in jobs in this sector was confined to one set of occupations: semi-skilled blue 
collar jobs. The numbers of jobs in all other occupations in manufacturing grew between 1980 and 
2001 (Table 4.6 above). However, there was a dramatic loss of semi-skilled, blue-collar workers in 
manufacturing over this time period. The number of blue-collar jobs lost rivalled even the number 
of highly skilled jobs gained in the rapidly growing FIRE sector in this period (37,932 versus 
















services (35,974). Therefore, while manufacturing employment declined, this occurred exclusively 
among blue-collar workers. which did not affect the numbers in other occupations in the sector. 
Even though there was a relative decrease in most semi-skilled work in all main sectors (Table 4.4 
above), the overall relative share of semi-skilled white-collar jobs remained virtually unchanged 
between 1980 and 2001 (between 26% and 27%, Table 4.5). While this result may seem counter 
intuitive. the relative losses in semi-skilled, white-collar work must be viewed in the context of the 
far greater absolute loss of over 18,000 semi-skilled. blue-collar jobs (Table 4.5 above). It is in 
regard to this decline in semi-skilled blue-collar work that the drop in manufacturing employment 
played a vital role. All three of the other main sectors gained blue-collar jobs between 1980 and 
2001 (l0,424 in commerce, 5,765 in FIRE and 342 in community and personal services): over 
16,500 combined (Table 4.6 above). However, the huge loss of blue-collar work in the 












The impacts of the decline in manufacturing on employment 
How has the decline in manufacturing in Cape Town affected workers and work seekers? While 
many scholars argue that Black men have been most affected by the decline in manufacturing in the 
U.S.A.. the same cannot be said of Cape Town. Taking the differing urbanization patterns of 
Africans and Coloureds into consideration. it is shown, using population census and survey data, 
that Coloured employment probably suffered most from the decline in the number of manufacturing 
jobs. It is argued, after close scrutinisation of the population census data on employment, that the 
drop in manufacturing employment, and specifically semi-skilled, blue-collar jobs, had the greatest 
negative impact on Coloured male employment. 
Employment 
One of the arguments around the decline in the manufacturing sector is that this process has had the 
most severe consequences for Black, unskilled men in the inner city in the U.S.A. (Wilson, 1996). 
Large-scale Black migration from the South of the U.S.A. to the cities of the North started in the 
early 20th century and continued for several decades (Wilson, 1987). This led to a disproportionate 
concentration of low-income Blacks in these cities. These large metropolises experienced the most 
rapid growth during the industrial era though, when they became centres of goods production and 
distribution. Therefore, low-skilled, poorly-educated migrant Blacks could readily find work in 
blue-collar positions in the growing manufacturing sector (Wilson, 1996). Towards the last quarter 
of the 20th century, the manufacturing industries began relocating out of these central cities, which 
then also proceeded to become centres of higher-order service provision (Wilson, 1987). Thus, 
unskilled Black men, whose fathers previously found relatively well-paid employment in the 
manufacturing sector. where they even experienced upward occupational mobility. tend to work 
increasingly in low-pay. dead-end service sector jobs and face rising levels of unemployment 
(Wilson, 1996). 











Figure 5.1: Manufacturing employment by race, Cape Town, 1946-2001 
1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 
~ VVhites __ (). _ Coloureds _()- Africans 
Source: Author's analysis of South African population censuses. 
Year 
Table 5.1: Frequency distribution of manufacturing employment by race, Cape Town, 1946-
2001 
Table 5.2: Percentage distribution of manufacturing employment by race, Cape Town, 1946-
2001 
48 
Race 1946 1960 l' 1970 L 1980 I 1985 i 1991 1996 20-011 
~Coloureds 48%~ 54% 64%1 _ 62-72-~+0+-_-- _7~29~or ~~_-_-_61_89~0'11 _ - 6179~00 ----62-40-~0 
1\,l\l~~t~s____J __ ~42%i 31~/of- _23%~- _ 11- ~<ll 1(. I( %l 
'r:.ln-fd~ICaan-ns-~ 101:400~:,' ~05~00',1 120~0°t-,'" _ 1~oJ ~o~ ___ 12_0/1- 13% ___ ~!,oJ 
I( Ie I( 1 % i 1 % i 1 % I 1 % 1 %! 
'Total __ . .. L 100% 100% [ 10004 100% t 1000,;; - 1000/~ 100% '1 OOci/~ 











In this case, it is perhaps not African migrants to the city who lost the most as manufacturing 
employment declined, but Coloureds. Coloureds occupy a similar position in the socio-economic 
structure of Cape Town to that of African Americans in the large cities of the U.S. They have 
dominated manufacturing employment in Cape Town since 1946 (Tables 5.1 and 5.2, and Figure 
5.1). After 1960, manufacturing increasingly became the largest employer of Coloured people in 
Cape Town. The increased share of Coloured employment in manufacturing in the 1960's is 
indicative of the upward mobility of the Coloured working class at the time (Goldin. 1987). Prior to 
the early 1900's, semi-skilled Coloured artisans had dominated certain trades. However, White 
European immigrants arriving around the 1900's started forming closed, White trade unions, 
seeking to exclude Coloured craftsmen from certain jobs in certain industries, such as 
manufacturing. Several laws passed in the 1920's further restricted Coloured's from entering 
apprenticeships and skilled work, and forced them out of the crafts, even those they had previously 
dominated. In spite of this, the labour demands of the post-war economy and the increased 
mechanisation of industry necessitated state-supported skills training of Coloureds. as the semi-
skilled White workforce was too small (Cilliers, 1971; Evans, 1985). Even though Whites were 
protected by the Department of Labour and continued to have the upper hand in the labour market, 
the Coloured Labour Preference Policy (CLPP) improved the employment opportunities of Coloured 
semi-skilled workers and artisans in relation to Africans. As Africans were generally kept out of 
training and apprenticeships, Coloureds were protected from competition with Africans for semi-
skilled, operative and artisan work (Goldin, 1987). 
The number of Coloured employees in the manufacturing sector grew by 103,022 between 1946 and 
1985 (Table 5.1 above) at an annual average growth rate of 5.7%. By 1985, Coloureds held 72% of 
all jobs in the manufacturing sector (Table 5.2 above), and manufacturing constituted 36% of all 
Coloured employment (Table 5.4). The number of Coloured employees in this sector began to 
decline after 1985 though. By 2001, 29,389 fewer Coloureds were employed in the manufacturing 
sector than in 1985 (Table 5.3) and the average annual employment growth rate for Coloureds for 
this period was -1.7%. Just how significant a drop-off in numbers of Coloured workers this is 
becomes clear when one considers that due to African gains in employment in this sector of over 
7,000 jobs, manufacturing employment only dropped by 24,804 jobs between 1985 and 2001. Thus 
the loss to Coloured employment outweighed total job decline in the manufacturing sector. By 
2001, the community and personal services had overtaken manufacturing as the biggest employer of 
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Table 5.3: Frequency distribution of Coloured employment by sector, Cape Town, 1946-2001 
-- -- --- -------- ----- ----- - - - - - - ------ ----- . - -- 199K- -20tH-Sector 1946 1960 1970 1980 1985 1991 
Community and personal 24,692 46,193 57,216 79,199 85,913 104,034 100,703 100,086 
i Manufacturing 20,778 44,330 83,111 109,492 123,800 115,915 108,989 94,411 
Commerce 8,856 17,345 33,261 43,499 54,716 69,691 62,365 79,809 
FIRE 406 2,134 4,185 8,019 12,029 21,671 33,764 43,919 l 
! Construction 5,818 12,590 28,335 25,714 35,989 29,222 28,510 30,862 
Transport 5,110 8,205 11,088 17,124 18,553 20,276 23,081 22,525 
IAgriculture 2,131 6,918 6,339 8,551 9,779 9,174 7,821 9,695 
Utilities 0 1,888 1,613 2,925 3,384 2,760 3,216 2,343 
Mining 32 54 379 886 969 929 674 708 
Total 67,823 139,657 225,527 295,409 345,132 373,672 369,123 384,358 1 
-- - - - - . - --- -- ~___ __ J 
Source: Author's analYSIS of South Afncan populatIon censuses. 
Table 5.4: Percentage distribution of Coloured employment by sector, Cape Town, 1946-2001 
Sector 1946 1960 1970 1980 1985 1991 1996 2001 
Community and personal 36% 33% 25% 27% 25% 28% 27% 26% 
Manufacturing 31% 32% 37% 37% 36% 31% 30% 25% 
Commerce 13% 12% 15% 15% 16% 19% 17% 21% 
FIRE 1% 2% 2% 3% 3% 6% 9% 11% 
Construction 9% 9% 13% 9% 10% 8% 8% 8% 
Transport 8% 6% 5% 6% 5% 5% 6% 6% 
Agriculture 3% 5% 3% 3% 3% 2% 2% 3% 
Utilities 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 
Mining 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
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In contrast. Africans have always held fewer jobs in manufacturing than Coloureds and Whites, and 
at their most. only occupied 22,188 positions in the manufacturing sector, just over a quarter of the 
number of jobs held by Coloureds (Table 5.1 above). In 2001, manufacturing employment 
accounted for only 11 % of jobs held by Africans in Cape Town (Table 5.5), versus 25% of Coloured 
employment (Table 5.4 above). 
Table 5.5: Percentage distribution of African employment by sector, Cape Town, 1946-2001 
- - - -- ----- --
2001-1 Sector 1946 1960 1970 1980 1985 1991 1996 
,Community and personal 36% 29% 21% 31% 35% 36% 38% 36%j 
!Commerce 19% 12% 12% 15% 16% 20% 16% 20% 
I Construction 10% 12% 24% 16% 21% 16% 16% 13%1 
I Manufacturing 20% 27% 23% 22% 15% 13% 13% 11%( 
;FIRE 0% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 7% 11% 
!Transport 10% 8% 12% 7% 5% 9% 5% 5% 
Agriculture 4% 8% 6% 5% 4% 3% 3% 4%: 
;Utilities 0% 1% 1% 1% 0% 1% 1% O%! 
IMining 0% 2% 1% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0%1 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%! 
- -- - --- --
Source: Author's analysis of South African population censuses. 
Some explanation of why Coloureds have dominated this industry is necessary. 24 Cape Town has 
historically been populated mainly by Coloured people. By the time the National Party 
Government's Population Registration Act (No. 30 of 1950) was passed in 1950, Cape Town had a 
population of 742,400, consisting of 361 ,000 Coloureds, 307,000 Whites and 74,100 Africans 
(Centre for Intergroup Studies, 1983; Wilkinson, 2000). Or, as Cross, Bekker and Eva put it in their 
report of their survey of migration into the Cape Metropolitan Area (CMA), "the Coloured 
population is ... the CMA's demographic anchor" (1999: 15). In addition to the influx control 
measures enacted earlier to limit the numbers of African migrants to the Cape, the state embarked on 
"an ambitious and ruthless programme of social engineering" in the 1960's that deprived most South 
Africans of their citizenship and led to the forced removal of over 3,5 million people from newly 
created White areas to the ethnic "homelands" (Posel, 1991). 
Africans urbanised much later than Coloureds in Cape Town, due in no small part to the policies of 
the CLPP and other influx control measures. A survey conducted in June 1988 in the African shack 
areas of Khayelitsha reported that only 11 % of the respondents were born in the Western Cape 
24 See Appendices A and B (Coloureds: A Race Apart and Coloured and African Labour in Cape Town) for a more 











(Seekings. Graaf and Joubert. 1990). The later survey of the CMA conducted in 1998 found that 
85% of the African respondents originally came from outside the area. in comparison to the 80% of 
the Coloured sample in the survey who were either born in the city or who had migrated there before 
1970 (Cross. Bekker and Eva. 1999). These results are consistent with those from the 
KhayelitshalMitchell's Plain survey conducted in 2000 (KMPS-2000) that show that only 13% of 
the sample of Africans interviewed were born in Cape Town. versus 72% of Coloureds.25 Thus, 
Coloureds were urbanised long before Africans in Cape Town. 
In addition to the fact that so many Africans are migrants. another point to consider is exactly when 
they arrived in Cape Town. The CMA survey showed that. with respect to Africans. "recent 
migration has exploded since the end of the Coloured labour preference restrictions and the threat of 
clearances" (Cross, Bekker and Eva, 1999: 15). In this survey, over 80% of the rural-born African 
migrant sample arrived in the CMA after 1985 (Figure 5.3). Again, using the KMPS-2000 results it 
is clear that any Coloureds who weren't born in Cape Town but who migrated here did so mostly 
before the downturn in manufacturing employment, i.e. before 1985 (this includes about 80% of 
Coloured migrants in the sample). Most of the African sample. over 57%, migrated to Cape Town 
after 1985 (Figure 5.4 shows absolute numbers). However, of the total number of African migrants, 
over 70% migrated here after 1985, i.e. during the period of manufacturing employment decline. 
Therefore, besides any legislative measures such as the CLPP favouring Coloured employment and 
the fact that Coloureds urbanised before Africans, many Africans arrived in Cape Town after the 
boom in manufacturing employment was over. Thus it is not surprising that manufacturing 
employment has been dominated by Coloureds and not Africans. 
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Figure 5.4: African and Coloured migration to Cape Town, 1940-2000 
1940- 1946- 1951- 1956- 1961- 1966- 1971- 1976- 1981- 1986- 1991- 1996-
1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 
ElAfricans • Coloureds Year of arrival 
Source: Author's analysis of KMPS-2000 unit record data. 












Even though manufacturing has played a vital role in providing employment for Coloured people in 
Cape Town. it is perhaps not the case that the stagnation and decline injob growth in this sector has 
affected them most. In order to determine what the possible effect of the decline in manufacturing 
employment was on Coloured employment. it is necessary to consider what would have happened if 
employment growth had continued at the pre-decline levels. So. for example. had manufacturing 
employment continued to grow post-1985 at the rate at which it had during the period 1946-1985 for 
Coloureds (i.e. at a rate of 5.7% per annum). 258.147 Coloured people would have held 
manufacturing jobs in 2001. As it is. the population census for that year put the figure at only 
94,411 (Table 5.3 above). This difference of 163.736 jobs between the real and projected figures is 
more than the total number of unemployed Coloured people in Cape Town in 2001. 139,209. 
Therefore, it could be argued that the decline in manufacturing employment was a leading cause of 
increased unemployment amongst Coloureds in Cape Town in 2001. 
If the same model is applied to Africans, i.e. the rate of growth of manufacturing employment 
amongst Africans between 1946 and 1980 (as the numbers actually decreased in 1985) is applied 
from 1985 to the year 2001. then a figure of 32.81 0 jobs is reached. This is not much more than the 
actual 22,188 manufacturing jobs held by Africans in 2001 (as reported in the population census), 
and the difference between the two. 10,622 jobs. would hardly make a dent in the figure of 224,398 
unemployed Africans in 2001 (also as reported in the population census). Therefore. it seems that 
the decline in manufacturing employment had a negligible impact on African employment levels. 
Perhaps one of the reasons why there is such a small difference between the number of real and 
predicted jobs for Africans is that manufacturing employment continued to grow amongst Africans 
when it was in decline for Whites and Coloureds. The number of Africans in manufacturing jobs 
grew by 5,617 between 1980 and 2001 at an annual average growth rate of 1.4% at the same time 
that the number of Whites and Coloureds was dropping (Tables 5.1 and 5.2. and Figure 5.1 above). 
Tied to this and perhaps of even greater significance is what has happened to the races' relative 
shares of manufacturing employment since 198011985. Coloureds accounted for a steadily 
increasing share of manufacturing employment from 48% in 1946 to a massive 72% in 1985. After 
1985 however. the proportion of manufacturing jobs held by Coloureds gradually decreased to 64% 
in 2001. The White population's share held steady at 19-20% during this period. Africans however 
increased their share of manufacturing employment from 10% in 1980 to 15% in 2001. Therefore, 











jobs, but also a greater relative share of manufacturing employment. But why would this occur in a 
sector where employment was decreasing for all other groups? Again, a certain amount of history is 
necessary to explain this. 
During the 1960's employers in the Western Cape had opposed CLPP out of anxiety over the 
dwindling unskilled African labour supply (Goldin, 1987). Influx controls were implemented far 
more strictly in the Western Cape than anywhere else in the country as a result of this policy, and 
soon employers were hampered in recruiting unskilled African migrants, whose cheap labour was 
viewed as vital to the survival of certain industries in the Cape. In the 1970's and early 1980's 
though, the focus had shifted to shortages of skilled and semi-skilled workers in the Western Cape. 
Employers argued that the CLPP had limited the training of Africans and given Coloured workers a 
monopoly over skilled and semi-skilled work. In the late 1970's, the upswing in the economy had 
resulted in more skilled and semi-skilled workers being required for the growing manufacturing and 
construction sectors than could be supplied by the Coloured labour force. Coloureds could, as a 
result of the demand, be more discerning about types of job and pay. Western Cape employers were 
not prepared to compete with the higher paying jobs in the Transvaal, and so, many Coloured 
workers migrated to the Witwatersrand, causing a shortage of skilled and semi-skilled labour in the 
region. Employers therefore petitioned the government to allow Africans already resident in the 
Cape to be trained and employed in skilled and semi-skilled work. The Cape Chambers of 
Commerce and Industry and the Cape Employer's Association even had the backing of large 
businesses like the Sanlam and Rembrandt corporations and others this time in pushing for a "better 
deal" for skilled Africans permanently resident in the Western Cape (e.g. they should be exempt 
from influx controls, allowed to buy/rent their own houses and compete on equal footing with 
Coloureds for the better jobs). Initially, the government barely budged on these issues. However, 
the announcement of the scrapping of the CLPP in 1984 heralded the beginning of the end of the 
government's attempts to promote Coloured interests in employment and residence at the expense of 
Africans (Goldin, 1987). 
Thus it would appear that the drop in manufacturing employment amongst Coloureds was not 
simply a case of a declining sector, but some would have actively chosen to leave, while others 
would not even have entered it in the first place, thereby opening up positions for more Africans in 
Cape Town. Considering how few Africans there were in manufacturing in 200 I, the number of 











probably quite small in comparison to the number of jobs no longer available in the sector. The 
10.622 additional jobs that Africans would have gained between 1985 and 2001 if employment had 
continued to grow at pre-I985 levels is only a fraction of the 163.736 additional manufacturing jobs 
that Coloureds could have gained theoretically between 1985 and 2001. Thus I believe it is still 
reasonable to argue that the decline in manufacturing employment played a significant role in 
overall unemployment amongst Coloureds in Cape Town. but not Africans. 
This argument assumes. of course. that those who would have worked in the manufacturing sector 
prior to 1985 did not find work in other sectors, like the growing service sectors of commerce, 
community and personal services or FIRE. This seems unlikely. These service sectors have 
undergone tremendous growth since the 1980's, and the number of Coloureds employed in each has 
grown markedly. However, Coloured unemployment increased from approximately 5% in 1980 to 
around 24% in 2001.27 One could argue that had manufacturing not gone into decline. the 
unemployment rate amongst Coloureds would have been much lower than it was in 2001. Another 
part of this argument is the nature of the kinds of jobs previously plentiful in manufacturing, but less 
prevalent in the growing service sectors, i.e. semi-skilled blue-collar jobs. This is where the changes 
in occupational distribution become particularly salient for the gender distribution of employment in 
Cape Town. 
Occupational changes and Gender in manufacturing 
While Coloureds have dominated the manufacturing sector in terms of employment. this has not 
been led by Coloured men as one might expect, but rather by Coloured men and women in tandem. 
In the early 1900·s. over 90% of Coloured women were unskilled, and 87% were domestic workers 
(Goldin. 1987). The sexual and racial division of labour in the Western Cape changed dramatically 
in the 1920's and 1930's however. The labour restructuring process that began with the Civilised 
Labour Policy intensified during the Great Depression, and increasing job fragmentation and mass-
production saw women replacing men. Both White and Coloured women were substituted for semi-
skilled Coloured men. Coloured women, however. advanced substantially during this period. In the 
greater Cape Town area in 1921. over 85% of Coloured women were employed as domestic 
27 Calculated as the percentage of the population defined as unemployed in the 1980 and 200 I censuses, i.e. the 
unemployed as a percentage of the sum of the employed and the unemployed. Note that this does not include 











workers. This proportion had fallen to 66% by 1936. with increasing numbers of Coloured women 
securing semi-skilled work (from only 4% of Coloured women in 1921 to over 19% in 1936). This 
change was mainly due to the expansion of the garment industry in South Africa. Clothing 
manufacturers in the Cape preferred Coloured women because of the low wages they could pay 
them. on the grounds that most of them lived with their parents. or that they were merely 
supplementing their husbands' income. The manufacturing sector recovered very quickly after the 
Depression, and had. by 1948. overtaken the primary and tertiary sectors in the Western Cape and 
the rest of South Africa. The growth in industrial employment resulted in the number of Coloured 
women in industry in the Western Cape increasing by a massive 132% between 1933 and 1949. 
Mechanisation and automation also led to the proliferation of differentiated job-opportunities and 
specialisation, increasing job opportunities for semi-skilled female operators in particular (Cilliers. 
1971). Coloured women increasingly moved out of domestic service and agriculture and into semi-
skilled manufacturing and sales and clerical work in the 1970's and early 1980's (Goldin, 1987). As 
Coloured semi-skilled women were paid less than Coloured men. they were even preferred for this 
kind of work (Goldin. 1987). 
Thus, the patterns of manufacturing job growth and decline after 1946 were very similar amongst 
Coloured men and women (Tables 5.6 and 5.7, and Figure 5.5). Coloured men had more jobs than 
Coloured women in 1946, but the annual average growth rate of employment was higher amongst 
Coloured women than men between 1946 and 1985 (5.4% versus 5.1 %). Coloured men still held 
6.533 or 6% more of Coloured manufacturing jobs than Coloured women in 1980 (Table 5.8). 
However. by 1985. Coloured women had 4.258 more manufacturing jobs than Coloured men (Table 
5.6). Therefore. from 1985 onwards. Coloured women held more jobs in manufacturing than 
Coloured men. Both Coloured men and women held fewer jobs in manufacturing in 2001 than 
1980, but the drop for Coloured men was greater than for Coloured women (11,247 versus 4,314. 
Tables 5.9 and 5.10). e~ Thus. even though Coloured men had occupied most manufacturing jobs in 
1980 (36% of all manufacturing work, and 53% of manufacturing jobs amongst Coloureds, Tables 
5.7 and 5.8). by 2001. Coloured women had the same relative share of this employment (32%, up 
from 31 % in 1980. and approximately 50% of Coloured manufacturing work, Tables 5.11, 5.12 and 
5.8). 
eX The numbers of employees per sector in these occupation skill level tables will be lower than earlier sectoral figures 
(e.g. Table 5.6). as these do not include respondents whose occupation was "undetermined" (it is obviously 
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Table 5.6: Frequency distribution of manufacturing employment by race and gender, Cape 
Town, 1946-2001 
58 
Race and Gender' 1946 1960 1970 I 1980 1985 1991 1996 I 2001 
:Colouredwomen 8,3291 19,920; 41,3981 51,3601 64,629t5r511~ 55,7001 47,426j 
Colo_u~e~_m~n 12,449 2149-',468~08--it 41,713i~ 58,f3:i:- 59,77f1 58,4041 53,2; 46,985 
White men 12,645 -23,12~[ 2!,2?3~_2_4,O~-3T-23:t83t: - 19~859 -19,0521 
_Afric:an men 4,191_12,02~1 14,958! 15,944 13,0561 ~~.9§1 - _ 16,649 1~,-1~ 
,Whi~~ wome~ ___ ~ __ ~,6_~6,_ 5,792l 7,165L 9~253' - 9~5~ 9,490 _1~.,9401 ___ ~521 
African women 35, 821 160i - -627~---1,299f-- 2,205 4,517 6,0621 
Jnd!~ ~e~ ___ ~_307; _ ~-_21_~- __ ~O~~ __ ~6il ___ ~~i71L_~ ___ ~~! _ --1'-3f~-_-__ -_1,.?.Q~ 
ilndian women 128] 681 157 i 302! _ 278: 408 _ 7501 _ 6781 
:!c;t~C------- _. __ 43, 729! 82,199[ 12~,082r 163,658t ~72,_292l 170,133,L- 163,129J _ 147,~8~1 
Source: Author's analysis of South African population censuses. 
Table 5.7: Percentage distribution of manufacturing employment by race and gender, Cape 
Town, 1946-2001 
Race and Gender 1946 1960 1970 1980 1985 1991 1996 2001 
Coloured women 19% 24% 32% 31% 37% 34% 34% 32%' 
Coloured men 28% 30% 32% 36% 35% 34% 33% 32%: 
White men 29% 24% 18% 17% 14% 14% 12% 13% 
• African men 10% 15% 12% 10% 8% 11% 10% 11% 
White women 13% 7% 6% 6% 5% 6% 7% 7%1 
·African women 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 3% 4%, 
Indian men 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 1% 
Indian women 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
L.- __ 
1OO%1 ~ ------- ---- ~--------~------------- - ---- _____ L_ -----~--------~----------- ~--










Table 5.8: Percentage distribution of Coloured manufacturing occupations by gender, Cape 
Town, 1980 and 2001 
1980 2001 
Occupation skill level 
Men Women Men Women 
Highly skilled 78% 22% 57% 43%1 
Semi-skilled: White collar 54% 46% 40% 60%J 
iSemi-skilled: Blue collar 51% 49% 51% 49%1 
[Unskilled 59% 41% 50% 50%1 
;Total 53% 47% 50% 50%1 
--- --- ~ - ---- - - - - ~ - -
Source: Author's analysis of South African population censuses. 
Table 5.9: Frequency distribution of manufacturing occupations by race and gender, Cape 
Town, 1980 
--- -
White Coloured African I 
Occupation skill level 
Men Women Men Women Men Women 
Total 
I 
i Highly skilled 13,478 1,930 1,916 556 52 7 18, 116 1 
:Semi-skilled: White collar 2,816 6,249 7,156 5,975 848 75 23,413 
'Semi-skilled: Blue collar 10,605 938 40,849 39,027 11,830 392 104, 197 1 
Unskilled 129 56 7,061 4,891 2,911 136 15,218j 
Total 27,028 9,173 56,98~ _ 50,449 15,64~ 610 I L~ 160 ,~4<t1 
Source: Author's analysis of South African population censuses. 
Table 5.10: Frequency distribution of manufacturing occupations by race and gender, Cape 
Town, 2001 
- - ~- - ------------ -
White 
-- - --- -- - - ~ - -~~ - --1 
Occupation skill level 
Coloured African Total 1 
Men Women Men Women Men Women 
I 
• Highly skilled 10,764 4,602 6,577 4,965 1,145 589 29,3591 
Semi-skilled: White collar 2,799 4,169 6,255 9,261 1,472 1,076 25,532: 
Semi-skilled: Blue collar 4,458 743 25,528 24,407 8,179 2,438 66,265' 
Unskilled 510 231 7,375 7,502 4,880 1,750 22,3621 
Total 18,531 9,745 ~5,73~ 46,135 15,676 5,853 143,?~8j 
- -------------- ------ --------- -- - ~ ~- ------
Source: Author's analysis of South African population censuses. 
Table 5.11: Percentage distribution of manufacturing occupations by race and gender, Cape 
Town, 1980 
59 
Occupation skill level 
White Coloured African Indian 
Total 
Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women 
Highly skilled 74% 11% 11% 3% 0% 0% 1% 0% 100%1 
Semi-skilled: White collar 12% 27% 31% 26% 4% 0% 1% 0% 100%1 
:Semi-skilled: Blue collar 10% 1% 39% 37% 11% 0% 0% 0% 100%1 
;Unskilled 1% 0% 46% 32% 19% 1% 0% 0% 100%/ 
Total 17% 6% 35% 31% 10% 0% 0% 0% ~9Qo/~ 
-~ -
Source: Author's analYSIS of South Afncan population censuses. 
29 Although employment figures for Indians are not always presented in each table, they are included in the totals in all 
tables. Employment figures for Indians have only been included for the sake of completion though, as their numbers 











Table 5.12: Percentage distribution of manufacturing occupations by race and gender, Cape 
Town, 2001 
White Coloured African Indian 
Total; Occupation skill level 
Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women 1 
! Highly skilled 37% 16% 22% 17% 4% 2% 2% 1% 100%1 
!Semi-skilled: White collar 11% 16% 24% 36% 6% 4% 1% 1% 100%~ 
,Semi-skilled: Blue collar 7% 1% 39% 37% 12% 4% 1% 0% 100% 
!Unskilled 2% 1% 33% 34% 22% 8% 0% 0% 100%1 
Total 13% 7% 32% 32% 11% 4% 1% 0% 100%' 
-
Source: Author's analysis of South African population censuses. 
How, while employment in the manufacturing sector had been declining since the 1980's, were 
Coloured women able to increase their share of manufacturing jobs and even outnumber Coloured 
men in the sector by 2001 (even though only slightly)? To answer this question, one needs to 
consider the kinds of positions Coloured men and women tend to hold in the manufacturing sector. 
Coloured men and women increased their number of highly skilled workers in this sector by a 
similar number between 1980 and 2001 (4,661 for men, and 4,409 for women, Tables 5.9 and 5.10 
above). The number of semi-skilled blue-collar jobs held by Coloured men and women also 
dropped by similar amounts between 1980 and 2001 (15,321 and 14,620 respectively). Coloured 
men held fewer semi-skilled, white-collar jobs in 2001 than 1980 (only by 901), whereas Coloured 
women increased their numbers in white-collar manufacturing positions by a substantial 3,286. Not 
only did this increase Coloured women's relative share of white-collar jobs (from 26% in 1980 to 
36% overall in 2001, Tables 5.11 and 5.12 above), they overtook Coloured men in terms of white-
collar work in 2001 (9,261 versus 6,255). In terms of unskilled work, the numbers of Coloured men 
barely grew between 1980 and 2001 (only by 314). In contrast, Coloured women gained 2,611 
unskilled manufacturing jobs between 1980 and 200 l. 
Therefore, as Coloured men and women had very similar numbers of blue-collar workers in 1980 
and 200 L one could argue that the participation of Coloured men in manufacturing dropped that 
much more than Coloured women because an increasing number of Coloured women were entering 
all the other kinds of occupations, especially white-collar work and unskilled work. While semi-
skilled. white-collar work provided a similar share of employment for Coloured men and women in 
1980 (13% and 12% respectively, Tables 5.13 and 5.14), this type of work played a much more 
significant role in the employment of Coloured women in manufacturing in 2001, when a fifth of all 
Coloured women's jobs in the manufacturing sector was in white-collar occupations. Semi-skilled, 











Coloured women also participated more in unskilled labour in manufacturing in 2001 than in 1980, 
but also more so than Coloured men, even though they lagged behind their numbers in 1980 (from 
7,061 in 1980 to 7,375 in 2001 for men, and 4,891 in 1980 to 7,502 in 2001 for women, Tables 5.9 
and 5.10). Unskilled labour constituted 10% of Coloured women's manufacturing employment and 
12% of Coloured men's employment in 1980 (Tables 5.14 and 5.13 respectively). But by 2001, 
16% of both Coloured men and Coloured women in the manufacturing sector were unskilled 
workers. Besides white-collar and unskilled work though, Coloured women also increased their 
share of highly skilled work (78% of highly skilled work held by Coloureds went to men, while only 
22% was held by women in 1980 in comparison to 57% and 43% respectively in 2001, Table 5.8). 
Therefore, it would appear that the occupations in which the most employment growth occurred in 
manufacturing were not only increasingly employing Coloured women, some even employed more 
Coloured women than men in 2001. 
Table 5.13: Percentage distribution of male manufacturing occupations by race, Cape Town, 
1980 and 2001 
- -- -------- - .... - -- - .- - -- -- -- ---1 
Occupation skill level 
White men Coloured men African men 
1980 2001 1980 2001 1980 2001 I 
Highly skilled 50% 58% 3% 14% 0% 7%! 
Semi-skilled: White collar 10% 15% 13% 14% 5% 9% 
Semi-skilled Blue collar 39% 24% 72% 56% 76% 52% 
'Unskilled 0% 3% 12% 16% 19% 31%: 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%1 
L ______________ ---- - - - - - -- -----~ 
Source: Author's analysis of South African population censuses. 
Table 5.14: Percentage distribution of female manufacturing occupations by race, Cape Town, 
1980 and 2001 
-- - - - - ----
Occupation skill level 
White women Coloured women African women 
1980 2001 1980 2001 1980 2001 
• Highly skilled 21% 47% 1% 11% 1% 10% 
Semi-skilled: White collar 68% 43% 12% 20% 12% 18% 
Semi-skilled: Blue collar 10% 8% 77% 53% 64% 42% 
:Unskilled 1% 2% 10% 16% 22% 30% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%i 
- - -











Thus it seems the decline in semi-skilled, blue-collar manufacturing jobs had the greatest negative 
impact on Coloured male employment. As the numbers of semi-skilled, white-collar jobs increased, 
semi-skilled blue-collar work declined. However, while Coloured men and women lost similar 
numbers of blue-collar jobs. only the women gained the growing white-collar manufacturing 
employment. Thus one could reasonably expect the greatest impact of manufacturing decline, 
especially considering the fact that the decline occurred exclusively in blue-collar jobs, to be on 
Coloured male employment. 
Manufacturing employment in Cape Town has stagnated and declined, while service sector 
employment has soared. Therefore, the next question to address is: how did the growth of services 












The impact of the growth of services on racial and gender inequality 
Some authors argue that as manufacturing has declined and the number of blue-collar jobs available 
to low-skilled men have decreased, so the employment prospects for low-skilled women have 
improved with the growth of the service sector, which tends to employ more women (Beall, 
Crankshaw and ParnelL 2002; Sassen, 1994; Wilson, 1996). These jobs are argued to be lower 
paying and more unstable than the jobs men used to get in the manufacturing sector. So, while there 
is increased feminisation of the workforce, the contention is that women are becoming increasingly 
segregated into low-skilled, low-pay jobs. Critics of the polarisation theory oppose this view 
though, and argue that women are becoming increasingly professionalised along with their male 
counterparts (Hamnett 1994a). 
As to the point of increased feminisation of the employed workforce: this process has definitely 
occurred in Cape Town. In 1980, only 36% of the workforce consisted of women (Table 6.1). By 
2001, this proportion had increased to 46%. While men gained an additional 82,196 jobs in Cape 
Town in this period, women gained more than double that number, 169,767. 
Table 6.1: Percentage distribution of occupations by gender, Cape Town, 1980 and 2001 
Occupation skill level 
1980 2001 
Men Women Men Women 
Highly skilled I 65% 35% 54% 46% 
Semi-skilled: White collar 51% 49% 43% 57% 
Semi-skilled: Blue collar 77% 23% 77% 23% 
Unskilled 56% 44% 46% 54% 
Total 64% 36% 54% 46% 











This feminisation process is arguably linked to the growth of service employment. Women made a 
gain in manufacturing employment between 1980 and 2001 of only 1,859 jobs (Table 6.2). 
Therefore, the vast majority of additional jobs came from the three major service sectors, i.e. 
community and personal services, commerce and FIRE (just under 138,000 jobs in total). As men 
also held fewer jobs in manufacturing in 2001 than in 1980 (over 19,000 in fact), their job gains also 
came mainly from the three service sectors. However. in two of the three major growth service sub-
sectors. the number of new jobs going to women in 2001 far outweighed that gained by men. 
Female commerce employment grew by 40,725 jobs, while men gained only 29,405: and the 
number of additional jobs going to women in community and personal services was nearly 14 times 
higher than that of men (59,031 versus only 4,238). In FIRE, men gained fewer than 3,000 more 
jobs than women (41.163 versus 38.1 85). Therefore. women were increasingly entering 
employment thanks in large part to the growth of services. 
Table 6.2: Change in the frequency distribution of occupations by main sectors and gender 
between 1980 and 2001, Cape Town Jil 
Occupation skill level 
Manufacturing Commerce 
Men Women Total Men Women Total I 
Highly skilled +3,424 +7,819 +11,243 +10,950 +10,619 +21, 569 1 
:Semi-skilled: White collar -255 +2,374 +2,119 +6,302 +16,212 +22,514~ 
ISemi-skilled: Blue collar -25,153 -12,779 -37,932 +6,540 +3,884 +10,424! 
:Unskilled +2,699 +4,445 +7,144 +5,613 +10,010 +15,623 
:Total -19,285 +1,859 -17,426 +29,405 +40,725 +70,130 L ___________ -------------- - - - - ----- - - -- - ----- -------- -- ---
Source: Author's analysis of South African population census data. 
Table 6.2 continued ... 
-
Occupation skill level 
FIRE Community and personal ! 
Men Women Total Men Women Total 
'Highly skilled +19,431 +20,320 +39,751 +12,693 +23,281 +35,974; 
'Semi-skilled: White collar +13,557 +11,935 +25,492 -5,266 +15,442 +10,176' 
:Semi-skilled: Blue collar +4,507 +1,258 +5,765 -1,051 +1,393 +342 
Unskilled +3,668 +4,672 +8,340 -2,138 +18,915 +16,777: 
,Total +41,163 +38,185 +79,348 +4,238 +59,031 +63,-2~~ 
- - -- - - -- -- ~- ----- -- -- -- - -- - -------
Source: Author's analysis of South African population census data. 
W Calculated as, e.g. the number of men employed in highly skilled manufacturing jobs in 1980 minus the number of 











Thus the trend of increased feminisation of the workforce, related to growing service sector 
employment, is relatively straightforward to illustrate. The question of whether women became 
increasingly segregated into low-pay jobs or underwent the process of professionalisation seen in the 
workforce in general is more difficult to answer. 
One way to test whether or not employed women as a group are experiencing the professionalisation 
trend shown for the whole working population of Cape Town between 1980 and 2001, is to produce 
a similar occupational distribution as in Table 4.5 (above), but to break it down into separate figures 
for men and women (Tables 6.3 and 6.4). If one compares these tables of the occupational structure 
of Cape Town's formally employed male and female workforces, one notices a similar proportional 
increase in highly skilled occupations of 9%-10% between 1980 and 2001 for both men and women. 
This is consistent with the 10% increase in highly skilled work for the entire employed working 
population of Cape Town (Table 4.5 above). There also seems to be a 1 % increase in unskilled 
work amongst women and men between 1980 and 2001, which would also be consistent with the 
results for the whole population. Thus it would appear that women, as a group, experienced 
increased professionalisation. 
Table 6.3: Occupational distribution of women, Cape Town, 1980 and 2001 
Occupation skill!eve! 1980 2001 Difference 
Highly skilled 40,856 19% 112,932 29% 72,076 
Semi-skilled: White collar 78,546 36% 133,649 34% 55,103 
Semi-skilled: Blue collar 46,195 21% 43,195 11% -3,000 
Unskilled 52,322 24% 97,910 25% 45,588 
Total 217,919 100% 387,686 100% 169,767 
, 
Source: Author s analysIs of South African populatIOn censuses. 
Table 6.4: Occupational distribution of men, Cape Town, 1980 and 2001 
Occupation skill!eve! I 1980 2001 Difference 
Highly skilled 74,673 20% 134,613 29% 59,940 
Semi-skilled: White collar 81,683 21% 99,531 22% 17,848 
Semi-skilled: Blue collar 158,565 42% 143,276 31% -15,289 
Unskilled 65,281 17% 84,978 18% 19,697 
Total 380,202 100% 462,398 100% 82,196 
, 











Although the relative increase in the percentage of women in highly skilled and unskilled work was 
consistent with the overall trend, the absolute increase in numbers was not. Referring to Table 4.5 
again, the absolute increase between 1980 and 2001 in highly skilled work for the whole employed 
population of Cape Town was double that of the increase in unskilled workers (132,016 versus 
65285). Tables 6.3 and 6.4 (above) show that the number of unskilled jobs gained by men in this 
period was only a third of the number of additional highly skilled jobs held by men in 2001 (a 
difference of 19,697 unskilled jobs as opposed to 59,940 highly skilled jobs). Thus, men seem to 
have experienced greater relative growth in the number of highly skilled jobs than the average. 
Women on the other hand experienced less relative growth in these jobs, as even though they gained 
72,076 highly skilled jobs between 1980 and 2001, the numbers of women doing unskilled work 
increased by 45,588 in this period, which represents nearly two thirds of the growth in highly skilled 
work. Also, even though highly skilled work formed a similar proportion of women and men's 
work, a greater proportion of women than men were still in unskilled work, i.e. 25% of employed 
women were unskilled workers, versus only 18% of men in 2001. As unskilled work represented a 
greater proportion of women's work in 1980 than highly skilled work, one could even argue that the 
increase in highly skilled work made the occupational distribution ofwomen'sjobs in Cape Town 
more polarised. Whatever the case, while women gained professional jobs between 1980 and 2001, 
they also gained a substantial number of unskilled jobs; and while less than a fifth of all men's work 
was unskilled in 2001, a full quarter ofwomen'sjobs in 2001 were unskilled. 
It is also important to remember that while highly skilled jobs formed approximately the same 
proportion of work amongst women and men, within the ranks of women (and men too, of course), 
there was huge disparity in terms of the distribution of these jobs across the races. While a great 
many more women held highly skilled jobs in 200 I than did previously, these jobs fell to certain 
race groups more than others. 
The evidence suggests that White women experienced a greater degree of professionalisation than 
Coloured and African women. Of the 44,084 highly skilled jobs gained by Whites between 1980 
and 2001, the majority of these, 29,638, went to White women (Tables 6.5 and 6.6). This is close to 
three times the number gained by African women (l0,808). Coloured women gained a similar 
number of additional highly skilled jobs in 2001 (29,558), but these constituted less than half of the 
total 70,702 jobs gained by Coloured women between 1980 and 2001. In the case of White women, 











additional highly skilled jobs actually outnumbered the overall increase injobs of27,141 between 
1980 and 2001. Of these highly skilled jobs, only 2,672 came from manufacturing (Tables 5.9 and 
5.20 above). The rest, of course, came from the growing community and personal services, 
commerce and FIRE sectors. Not surprisingly, the greatest number of highly skilled jobs was 
gained in the FIRE sector (13,119, Tables 6.7 and 6.8). Thus, White women, who represented only 
12% of the workforce, held 22% of all the highly skilled jobs in Cape Town in 2001 (Tables 6.9 and 
6.10). Perhaps most importantly, highly-skilled work constituted only 33% of White women's work 
in 1980, but increased by 20% to form 53% of White women's work overall in 2001 (Table 6.12). 
This was the largest percentage increase in any type of occupation for any of the three main race-
gender groups in this time (Tables 6.11 and 6.12). 
Table 6.5: Frequency distribution of occupations by race and gender, Cape Town, 1980 
- -
White Coloured 
Occupation skill level 
African 
Total i 
Men Women Men Women Men Women i 
Highly skilled 60,903 25,648 11,985 13,525 885 1,319 115,5291 
Semi-skilled: White collar 39,243 48,900 33,132 26,252 7,378 2,529 160,2291 
iSemi-skilled: Blue collar 34,331 1,789 92,890 43,239 30,401 946 204,7601 
Unskilled 2,062 931 40,843 36,758 22,152 14,513 117,603: 
iTotal 136,539 77,268 __ 1ZB,8?Q 119,774 60,816 19,307 598,121 
~- ----------- ----- -- - --- -- - -------
Source: Author's analysis of South African population censuses. 
Table 6.6: Frequency distribution of occupations by race and gender, Cape Town, 2001 
White Coloured African 
- - I 
Occupation skill level Total 
, 
I 
Men Women Men Women Men Women ! 1 
! Highly skilled 75,349 55,286 42,997 43,083 11,957 12,127 247,5451 
Semi-skilled: White collar 25,573 43,872 46,291 66,951 25,550 20,604 233,180 1 
Semi-skilled: Blue collar 17,326 2,501 82,356 34,519 42,164 5,822 186,471 i 
'Unskilled 3,869 2,750 40,877 45,923 39,661 48,832 182,8881 
,Total 122,117 104,409 ~ 2_12~5?1 _ 190,476 119,332 87,385 _8?0,Q~~ - - ---- ---- - -- - . __________ L-________ 
Source: Author's analysis of South African population censuses. 
Table 6.7: Frequency distribution of FIRE occupations by race and gender, Cape Town, 1980 
White Coloured -
- -- --- - -- - ~ 
Occupation skill level 
African 
Total 
Men Women Men Women Men Women 
,Highly skilled 10,724 2,453 986 174 51 6 14,511 
,Semi-skilled: White collar 5,601 12,621 2,660 2,036 839 69 23,997: 
Semi-skilled: Blue collar 463 52 959 147 131 5 1 ,776~ 
Unskilled 170 60 854 458 641 59 2,247 
,Total 16,958 15,186 5,459 2,815 1,662 139 42,531 ; 
-











Table 6.8: Frequency distribution of FIRE occupations by race and gender, Cape Town, 2001 
White Coloured African I 
Occupation skiJI level Total I 
Men Women Men Women Men Women 1 
! Highly skilled 21,461 15,572 7,092 5,471 2,041 1,389 54,262 
ISemi-skilled: White collar 4,947 12,138 9,471 11,620 7,983 2,517 49,489 
jSemi-skilled: Blue collar 1,108 310 3,389 889 1,485 240 7,541 
!Unskilled 388 446 2,274 2,595 2,651 2,176 10,587 
ITotal 27,904 28,466 22,226 20,575 14,160 6,322 121,879 
Source: Author's analysis of South African population censuses. 
Table 6.9: Percentage distribution of occupations by race and gender, Cape Town, 1980 
Occupation skiJI level I--
.. 
Highly skilled 
Semi-skilled: White collar 
Semi-skilled: Blue collar 
Unskilled 
Total 
~e~~l~ij1il1tn ~~~/9~~e~t~:;;_~~~J_Me~n1~o~~n' _ Tota/l 
__ 530~ __ ~?~J ____ 1ll% __ 12_0~_~u 1 ~o J n_1_O/.oL __ J.~~ ___ .9% _1 ooo~J 
24%1 31 %. 21 o~ _ 1§°0l ___ u5%i ___ 2%L1%: nl!o _ 100%1 
17%j 1% 45% 21%! 15%: 0%1 0% 0% 100%1 
2% I 1 % 35% 31°10 + -19~ _ -12°h 0% Q-% -~J 009 
23%1 13% 30% 20% 10% -3°;; 1% 0%110.9_0~ 
Source: Author's analysIs of South African population censuses. 
Table 6.10: Percentage distribution of occupations by race and gender, Cape Town, 2001 
Occupation skiJI level 
Highly skilled 
Semi-skilled: White collar 
--
Semi-skilled: Blue collar 
Unskilled 
Total 
White Coloured African Indian i 
Men Women Men _ iWom_en: _ Men ~Women~ M,im _~ women] Total 1 
__ 39%! 22%, 17°i<lL}!~-i- 5%_ 5%L_~%; 1%j 10~ 
1!'/i _190/'1 20%1 29'1'L _11%1 9%j_1%j 1% 100%. 
_~0/o+_ 1%1 44~t_1.§l!<i_ 2~0~aI ___ ~% __ 1%~ O%_~ 
_~~~~L 1~~1= ~~~~ _n ~_~~~-~~~~i --~~~l.-__ ~~t __ ~~_~~; _~_~~~~ 
Source: Author's analysIs of South African population censuses. 
Table 6.11: Percentage distribution of malc occupations, Cape Town, 1980 and 2001 
-
Occupation skill level White men Coloured men African men 
1980 2001 1980 2001 1980 2001 i 
i Highly skilled 45% 62% 7% 20% 1% 10%i 
!Semi-skilled: White collar 29% 21% 19% 22% 12% 21%1 
ISemi-skilled: Blue collar 25% 14% 52% 39% 50% 35%1 
Unskilled 2% 3% 23% 19% 36% 33%1 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%1 _______ J 











Table 6.12: Percentage distribution of female occupations, Cape Town, 1980 and 2001 
- -----
i White Women Coloured Women African Women I 
I Occupation skill level 
1980 2001 1980 2001 1980 2001 i , 
I Highly skilled 33% 53% 11% 23% 7% 14%! 
!Semi-skilled: White collar 63% 42% 22% 35% 13% 24%1 
iSemi-skilled: Blue collar 2% 2% 36% 18% 5% 7%! 
'Unskilled 1% 3% 31% 24% 75% 56%! 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%: 
- - - -
Source: Author's analysis of South African population censuses. 
Thus it is clear that White women most certainly did not become segregated into low-skill, low-pay 
service sector work. Rather, the changes in occupation distribution between 1980 and 2001 support 
the argument that White women professionalised in this period. It would also appear that White 
women underwent an exceptional amount of professionalisation in this time in comparison to the 
other two race groups of women. 
The number of Coloured women holding highly skilled jobs had already started rising before 1980. 
From the 1960's onwards, an increasing number took up professional and technical positions due to 
improved Coloured education under the CLPP and therefore their improved ability to compete in the 
white-collar job market (which was also facilitated by the CLPP) (Evans, 1985). Thus, the 
Coloured female share of highly skilled work increased substantially between 1960 and 1980, 
thanks mainly to rapid grow1h in the numbers of teaching and nursing professionals, the vast 
majority of which (80%) were employed by the government (Goldin, 1987). During this time many 
Coloureds also moved to clerical and sales positions, and Coloured women, as a result of increased 
employment in these types of occupations, had greatly increased their share of white-collar work by 
1980. 
Between 1980 and 2001, Coloured women experienced the same increase in number of highly 
skilled jobs as White women (over 29,000, Tables 6.5 and 6.6 above). Highly skilled occupations 
constituted only 11 % of Coloured female employment in Cape Town in 1980, but had reached 23% 
by 2001 (Table 6.12 above). However, this 23% was still significantly lower than the 53% of White 
women holding highly skilled jobs in 2001. The increase in highly skilled work also represented 
only part (albeit more than 40%) of Coloured women's overall job growth. 
The most growth for Coloured women in the services, as in manufacturing, occurred amongst semi-











60% (40,699) of these were semi-skilled white-collar workers (Tables 6.5 and 6.6 above). White-
collar work already constituted 22% of all Coloured women's jobs in 1980 (Table 6.12 above). By 
200}' semi-skilled white-collar work constituted the biggest share. 35%. of Coloured women's 
work. Also, Coloured women represented only 22% of the employed workforce in 2001 but held 
the highest proportion of white-collar jobs, 29% (Table 6.10 above). This stands in contrast to the 
16% of white-collar employment Coloured women held in 1980, only the fourth highest share of all 
white-collar employment in the city then (Table 6.9 above). 
Thus, while Coloured women professionalised, they did not do so as successfully as White women. 
Coloured women were also not pushed in droves to low-income unskilled work either. Instead, 
most of the employment growth for Coloured women occurred amongst occupations generally 
requiring a medium degree of skill and paying a reasonable salary, i.e. semi-skilled white-collar 
jobs. 
What of African women then? In trying to understand the situation of African women in Cape 
Town it is necessary to address several issues. First is the fact that most African women, unlike 
Coloured and White women, are migrants to the city. Surveys of African migrants to Cape Town 
have found them to be from mostly poor, rural areas in the former homelands, where they generally 
received very little education. leaving vast numbers of them functionally illiterate and unskilled 
(Cross. Bekker and Eva. 1999: Graai: Seekings and Joubert 1990). As a result of the ever-
increasing numbers of unskilled Africans competing for a limited number of unskilled jobs, high 
levels of unemployment were, and still are, common in the townships. For migrant African women 
though, unemployment rates of 48% were reported in the early 1990's in comparison to only 17% of 
men (Graai: Seekings and Joubert, 1990). African men also generally earned significantly more 
than African women (Graai: Seekings and Joubert, 1990). 
So. over and above the fact that they are migrants, which already puts them at a disadvantage 
relative to "local" Coloured and White women in terms of the education, skills, contacts and local 
knowledge necessary to find employment African women seem to be at a disadvantage to migrant 
African men too. One reason for this is the timing of African women's arrival in Cape Town. As 
was mentioned earlier. Coloureds were urbanised long before Africans in Cape Town, and the 
greatest influx of African migrants occurred only after influx control measures were relaxed in the 











their husbands. In other words, most women did not come to Cape Town of their own accord, but 
rather followed their husbands here, often with children in tow (Dewar, Rosmarin and Watson, 
1991). Surveys have shown that in cases where a married couple did not move to the Western Cape 
together, the husband came first 98% of the time (GraaL Seekings and Joubert, 1990). Therefore, a 
large number of African women urbanised even later than African men. 
Another important issue is that of the Apartheid state's campaign to keep African women out of 
Cape Town. While the struggle of Africans against the state in terms of urban land and housing 
occupation predates 1948, the most rigorous controls were imposed by the government after 1950 
(Cole, 1989). Effective int1ux control in Cape Town only became a reality at the end of 1952 with 
the implementation of the Natives (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act in the city, thereby allowing 
authorities to expel Africans who remained in their areas longer than 72 hours (Van der Horst, 1964; 
Kinkhead-Weekes, 1983). From 1953, police raids on squatter camps to find illegally resident 
Africans became weekly events, the primary goal of which was to t1ush out illegally resident 
squatters and African women (Kinkhead-Weekes, 1983; Cole, 1984). Originally, African women 
could be expelled by a local authority if they could not prove they had accommodation (Kinkhead-
Weekes, 1983). After 1946 though, African women could not join their husbands in the Western 
Cape unless they had permits from the authorities in the area to which they were travelling. In 1955, 
it was announced that the amended pass laws would also be made applicable to African women, and 
increasing numbers of illegally resident African women were "rounded up" and threatened with 
prosecution if they did not leave. The 1957 Natives (Urban Areas) Amendment Act came into effect 
in Cape Town in February 1958, thereby introducing even stricter conditions for Africans to remain 
in urban areas legally. Administrative structures were also erected that facilitated the removal of 
"surplus" Africans from the cities (Kinkhead-Weekes, 1983). From the early 1960's to the late 
1970's, the government tried to keep a tight rein on the movements of Africans in and out of the 
cities across the whole country (Cole, 1989). As the Western Cape was a Coloured preferential area 
(Coloured Labour Preference Policy of 1954), int1ux control was more rigorously applied in Cape 
Town than elsewhere in the country (Wilkinson, 2000). More than this though, African women in 
Cape Town were disproportionately victimised in order to prevent families from settling here (Van 
der Horst 1964; Ramphele, 1993). 
Thus, while African migrants have long been at a disadvantage to other race groups in Cape Town, 











mentioned here left African women with very few employment opportunities. The only real option 
left open to unskilled migrant African women was domestic service (Van der Horst 1964). As 
mentioned before. domestic service in Cape Town used to be dominated by Coloured women. As 
was also mentioned earlier though. manufacturing jobs started becoming increasingly accessible to 
Coloured women (Whisson and Weil. 1971). From 1945 onwards, Cape Town's secondary 
industry, particularly the textile industry. underwent substantial change. This, together with the 
expansion of commercial activities. meant the range of jobs available to non-white women in Cape 
Town changed dramatically. As girls also tended to be better educated than those in the past, and 
were capable of doing semi-skilled and clerical work. more women. especially Coloured women, 
started rejecting domestic work. with its very low status, poor pay and practically non-existent 
occupational mobility. African women were still far more restricted in terms of work choices 
though and were therefore more inclined to look for work as domestic servants (Whisson and Weil, 
1971). In 1970.40% of Coloured women were still domestic servants (Goldin. 1987). However, by 
1980. the number had fallen to only 29%. with the place of Coloured female domestic workers in the 
Western Cape being filled by illegally employed African women and Coloured youths. 
All of the issues discussed here form part of the explanation of why African women have tended to 
have higher levels of unemployment than African men and earn less than them. That being said, 
African women made huge strides in employment numbers since 1980. While they represented only 
3% of employed people in Cape Town in 1980. by 200 L they held 10% of all available jobs, making 
the biggest percentage gain in employment in this period (Tables 6.9 and 6.10 above). They even 
increased their numbers nearly as much as Coloured women: 68.078 versus 70.702 (Tables 6.5 and 
6.6 above). 
Still, given their history of limited work opportunities and a predominance of low-skilL low-pay 
domestic service jobs. it is no surprise that African women were doing nowhere near as well as 
Coloured and White women in terms of the types of occupations in which they worked in 2001. Of 
the 68,078 jobs African women gained between 1980 and 2001, just under 11,000 were highly 
skilled occupations in comparison to the 34,319 that were unskilled occupations (Tables 6.5 and 6.6 
above). These unskilled jobs represent more than half of the jobs gained by African women in this 
period. Even though the proportion of African women's work formed by unskilled labour dropped 
between 1980 and 2001. this kind of work still accounted for 56% of African women' s jobs in 2001, 










Table 6.13: Frequency distribution of community and personal services occupations by race 
and gender, Cape Town, 1980 
- ~-
White Coloured African 
Occupation skill level Total 
J Men Women Men Women Men Women 
73 
:Highly skilled 14,935 17,083 5,769 11,995 582 1,238 52,097J 
ISemi-skilled: White collar 15,671 12,378 8,271 4,388 1,443 395 42,716J 
iSemi-skilled: Blue collar 4,071 218 5,511 352 878 25 11,0871 
[Unskilled 782 676 14,712 27,030 5,862 12,900 62,1081 
Total 35,459 30,355 34,263 43,765 8,765 14,558 168,Og8~ 
- - - - ~- - - - ----
Source: Author's analysis of South African population censuses. 
Table 6.14: Frequency distribution of community and personal services occupations by race 
and gender, Cape Town, 2001 
- --- -- -- ----- ~ ~- --- - - - --- - ----------- ---- --------- I , 
! 
White Coloured African 
I 
Occupation skill level Total 
Men Women Men Women Men Women 
Highly skilled 16,709 22,013 11,995 22,947 4,463 7,867 88,071 : 
Semi-skilled: White collar 5,385 12,013 9,961 14,924 4,606 5,347 52,892 1 
Semi-skilled: Blue collar 1,428 438 5,085 1,100 2,840 433 11,429 
Unskilled 904 1,120 8,758 22,721 9,522 35,638 78,885 
Total 24,426 35,584 35,799 61,692 21,431 49,285 231,277, 
- - - ~~ - ----- __ ____ J 
Source: Author's analysis of South African population censuses. 
Thus it would appear that White women's increased participation in the workforce tends to be in 
higher-skilled, better paying jobs like those that dominate the FIRE sector, while a substantial share 
of Coloured women's employment gains have been in semi-skilled white-collar work. The majority 
of African women continue to be able to find work only in low-skill, low-pay occupations though. 
This brings us back to the argument that the increase in service sector work favours unskilled 
women over unskilled men. Coloured men experienced a 12% decline in their share of unskilled 
work between 1980 and 2001 (Tables 6.9 and 6.10 above). In comparison, Coloured women 
experienced only a 6% drop. African men gained a 3% share of unskilled work from 1980 to 2001. 
African women however. experienced not only the greatest percentage increase in unskilled 
employment 15%, but by 200 L they also held the largest share of unskilled work, 27%. This is 
remarkable gro\\-1h when one considers that in 1980 they held only the fourth largest share of 














This is not surprising, considering African women's history in Cape Town, the fact that many are 
migrants and the tremendous growth of employment in the community and personal services. After 
all. of the over 34,000 unskilled jobs they gained between 1980 and 200 Lover 22,000 of these came 
from the community and personal services sector (Tables 6.5, 6.6, 6.13 and 6.14 above). Most of 
these jobs were domestic and cleaning services, work traditionally dominated by unskilled African 
women. Thus, while 60% of the unskilled work done by Africans in 1980 went to African men, and 
40% went to African women. by 2001 this pattern had been reversed, and 55% was held by African 
women, while only 45% went to African men (Table 6.15). Therefore, it appears that the increase of 
service sector employment worked in the favour of unskilled women over unskilled men, at least in 
terms of the number of available jobs. 




Occupation skill level 
Men Women Men I Women 
I Highly skilled 40% 60% 50% 50%: 
ISemi-skilled: White collar 74% 26% 55% 45%1 
iSemi-skilled: Blue collar 97% 3% 88% 12%1 
iUnskilled 60% 40% 45% 55%1 
!Total 76% 24% 58% __ ~?o/~l L _________ ---- ------L- _______ --- --- - ----- - -- - ----












Migrants and employment 
One of the main criticisms Hamnett (1994a, 1994b) levels against Sassen' s (1994) rendering of the 
social polarisation hypothesis centres on immigrants. Hamnett argues that the growth at the bottom 
end of the occupational and income distributions in the cities on which Sassen has based her 
arguments is due, not to the growth of low-wage service jobs, but to massive immigration. A large-
scale low-wage service sector and downgraded manufacturing sector are only able to exist in cities 
like Los Angeles and New York because of the presence of a large, ever-growing pool of poor, 
uneducated ethnic immigrants, willing to work for low wages. Hamnett does not suggest that other 
cities do not have large immigrant populations concentrated in low-wage occupations; but rather that 
recent migration into these cities is not as great as in the case of cities such Los Angeles or New 
York. Therefore, these cities, on which Sassen has based her argument, are poor examples for 
increased social polarisation in general because of their unique situations (Hamnett 1994a, 1994b). 
In the case of Cape Town, although the changes in the city's economy are more consistent with 
increasing professionalisation (rather than growing polarisation), this process happened in the face 
of the immigration of significant numbers of unskilled workers to the city, both in the past and more 
recently. 
African people began flocking to Cape Town as early as the 1900's to take advantage of the 
burgeoning employment opportunities (Dewar, Rosmarin and Watson, 1991), with ever-increasing 
numbers migrating from the rural areas particularly during the depression years (Centre for 
Intergroup Studies,1983; Wilkinson, 2000). 31 To escape state control, many Africans chose to live 
outside of the municipal boundaries rather than in the locations, leading to the establishment of the 
first squatter camps or informal townships in Cape Town (Kinkhead-Weekes, 1983; Wilkinson, 
2000). Moreover, provision had not been made in the "model" formal township, Langa, for the 
huge influx of migrants from the Native reserves (later: homelands), leaving many with no option 
but to stay in informal settlements (Wilkinson, 2000). Despite increasingly strict legislation, during 
31 For a more detailed history of African migration to Cape Town and Cape Town's history in general, please see 











the late 1930's and early 1940's, large informal settlements grew in and around the major cities, 
largely as a result of growing African urbanisation "stimulated by the labour demands of the war-
time economy" (Wilkinson, 2000: 197; Pinnock, 1981). The growing numbers of squatter camps 
and inner-city poor led an increasingly anxious White population to vote into power the National 
Party (Pinnock, 1981; Wilkinson, 2000), which subsequently restructured and greatly intensified the 
controls over the African labour market (Posel, 1991). 
The government's forceful attempts to reduce the number of African labourers in Cape Town had 
only limited success however (Cole, 1984; Goldin, 1984). Although the number of employed 
African contract workers dropped by 37% between 1960 and 1965, there was a steady increase in 
the proportion of those employed between 1968 and 1974. There was even an estimated increase in 
numbers of migrant workers of 56% between 1970 and 1973 (Cole, 1984: Goldin. 1984). The 
Riekert Commission estimated a 69% increase in the African population in the Cape Peninsula 
between 1960 and 1970 (Fast, 1995). Despite the state's repeated attempts to limit its growth, the 
African population of Cape Town increased by an estimated 109% between 1980 and 1988 (Dewar, 
Rosmarin and Watson, 1991). Thus, there was already substantial African migration to Cape Town 
before influx control measures were scrapped in 1986. 
African migration "exploded" after Coloured labour preference and the threat of clearances was 
removed though (Cross, Bekker and Eva, 1999: 15). Despite the size and growth of their population 
being notoriously inexact with widely varying estimates (as a result of their being denied urban 
status and therefore generally 'not counted'), the most rapidly growing population group in Cape 
Town in the early 1990's was Africans (Dewar, Rosmarin and Watson, 1991). Less than a quarter 
of the African adults in the CMA survey sample (referred to earlier) was born in Cape Town or 
living there before 1970 (Cross, Bekker and Eva, 1999). Migration into Cape Town also increased 
consistently between 1997 and 2001 (Smith, 2005). In this period, Cape Town had the highest 
figures of nett migration in the whole of South Africa: 192,623 people (Smith, 2005). Over 43,000 
of these migrants arrived in 2001 alone, representing an increase of 47% on the 1997 figures (Smith, 
2005). Over 58% of the migrants to Cape Town in this period were African (Smith, 2005). 
Many of these migrants came from poorer rural areas in the Eastern Cape and former Transkei in 
search of work and a "better life" in terms of housing, health care and other services (Cross, Bekker 











they did not have the experience in the urban setting, or the information and personal networks to 
get the better, higher paying jobs available to established residents who are able to access these 
resources. Also, most of these migrants had very little education. In their study of the CMA, Cross, 
Bekker and Eva (1999) found that of the migrants who came from the former Transkei, i.e. the 
majority of African respondents, approximately 11 % of household heads had no education. 32 A 
further 42% had a standard 6-9 education, with only 6% achieving their matric qualification (final 
year of high school). More than half of the heads of African migrant households were functionally 
illiterate. The result of the growing numbers of poorly educated African migrants was of course 
increased competition for a finite number of unskilled jobs in the CMA. Not surprisingly, only 56% 
of Africans migrants from the former Transkei were employed, with a self-employment rate of 
around 11 % (Cross, Bekker and Eva, 1999). 
More recent African migrants to Cape Town share many of these same characteristics with earlier 
immigrants. They still tend to be poorly educated." For example, amongst the African migrant sub-
sample (i.e. not born here or grew up elsewhere) of the KMPS-2000, only 53% of respondents had 
high school education, and 27% had received schooling at the primary school level only.34 In total, 
less than 13% of the African migrants to Cape Town had a tertiary qualification, and over 7% of 
these had only a certificate of some sort. Less than 1 % had a university degree. Again, not 
surprisingly, the employment prospects for these migrants were bleak. Of this group, less than 31 % 
had wage employment, with a self-employment rate of just over 10%.35 In the case of those who 
had formal wage employment, just under half held jobs in unskilled work (68% of women, and 36% 
of men); and at least 35% of the self-employed were also doing unskilled work. The unemployed 
constituted a massive 45% of these respondents. 
Therefore, even though Cape Town continued receiving substantial numbers of unskilled migrants, a 
bloated low-skilled, low-paid migrant class, doing menial service sector work for an increasingly 
32 By far the main source of migrants into the CMA was the former Transkei, accounting for 77% of formal township 
residents, 68% of informal area residents and 59% of hostel residents (Cross, Bekker and Eva, 1999). 
" Several studies have shown that migrant Africans are often better educated than Africans born and raised in Cape 
Town (Cross, Bekker and Eva, 1999; Smith, 2005). The purpose in discussing education here is not to show that the 
migrants are better or worse educated than locals, but simply that they are generally not well-educated and therefore 
their presence creates more competition for unskilled jobs. 
34 A total of 14% of the African sub-sample did not answer this question. I suspect most of these respondents received 
very little or no education. However, excluding these missing respondents, 62% of the African sub-sample received 
at least some degree of high school education, and 31 % have only been schooled to a primary school level. 
35 This variable was coded by Nicoli Nattrass of the School of Economics of the University of Cape Town. See Chapter 











affluent upper-class, did not develop. As was shown earlier, although the number of unskilled jobs 
had increased since 1980, there was much more employment growth in highly skilled or 
professional and managerial work. 36 Considering that the occupational distribution in Cape Town 
became more professionalised than polarised, the contention that increased polarisation occurs in 
cities only where there are large numbers of poorly-educated migrants does not seem to hold, i.e. 
large numbers of immigrants may be a necessary but not sufficient condition for the growth of an 
expended low-wage service sector. 
Why, given that there were plenty of unskilled migrants looking for work, did the huge low-pay, 
low-skill service sector seen in many other cities throughout the world not develop in Cape Town? 
To answer this question, one might query if in fact there are enough migrants and therefore 
sufficient competition for jobs to drive down wages for unskilled work. To be fair, the numbers of 
migrants Cape Town has received is probably not on the same scale as that received by cities like 
New York or Los Angeles. Thus one might argue that Cape Town simply does not have the sheer 
numbers of unskilled migrants necessary to create enough competition to lower wages for unskilled 
work, thereby precluding the development of an expanded low-wage service sector. Considering the 
high levels of unemployment amongst Africans in Cape Town though, it seems unlikely that there is 
not enough competition for jobs and that the costs of unskilled labour are prohibitively high. Even 
if there are smaller numbers of them, unskilled workers in the service sector in Cape Town arguably 
earn less relative to the unskilled migrant workers in cities like Los Angeles and New York. 
Considering the squatter problems in the city, unskilled migrants to these affluent American cities 
probably earn more and have a better quality of life than those in Cape Town. Therefore, it seems 
unlikely that wages for unskilled workers in Cape Town are too high for an expanded service sector 
to exist. 
So, even though there are plenty of unskilled migrants seeking work, instead of the numbers of low-
paying service sector jobs ballooning, the ranks of the unemployed increased considerably.37 Herein 
3h See Chapter 4: Economic restructuring and the occupational distribution in Cape Town. 
37 Burgers (1996) contends that Hamnett's (1994a) criticisms of the polarisation theory espoused by Sassen (1994) are 
invalid because, amongst other things, he omits the unemployed from his analysis. Hamnett counters that Sassen's 
arguments do not include the unemployed and deal with changes in the occupational and income structure of the 
employed population almost exclusively. Unemployment levels are not mentioned here in an attempt to address this 
debate. Rather, the point is that Hamnett potentially puts too much emphasis on the numbers of migrants. In other 
words, if the existence of a large unskilled migrant population is so important in the establishment of an expanded 












lies the crux of the matter: while the presence of a large pool of unskilled migrants prepared to do 
menial jobs for very little pay facilitates the development of an expanded low-wage service sector, 
such a system can only exist if there is enough money to support it. There must be a sufficiently 
large middle-class to create the demand for specialised personal and commercial services on a large 
scale. Perhaps the problem in Cape Town then is that there are simply not enough people with a 
sufficient level of wealth to support such an industry. 
Considering that the distribution of occupations in Cape Town became more professionalised (i.e. 
there were more people in 2001 than ever before doing the kind of work that tends to require the 
most skill and pay the highest salaries), one might have expected that there would be more people 
with more money to spend on services. However. on closer inspection of the increase in highly 
skilled jobs between 1980 and 2001, one notices that the greatest increase occurred amongst 
associate professionals (Table 7.1). 
Table 7.1: Distribution of highly skilled occupations, Cape Town, 1980 and 2001 
-------- -~ - ---I ' Absolute I Percentag~-l 
Occupation I 1980 I 2001 I Difference i Difference 
t~anagers -------1 --ii,642l-6-3,-8-75-+1- 36,2~3L__ 3%, 
!Professionals______ __l ___ ~_~,262.L 84,8291 _ 33,567,- -10/0] 
~ssociate professionals 1 36'625~ 98,841 1 62,216 __ 60/0] 
~II other occupations_______ ~82,592 ~2,539_: __ ~ 1 ~,947"-1~0/~ 
:Total 598,121 850,084 251,963 
,_ ______ __ _ ___ ~ _ _ _____ .1 __ _ 
Source: Author's analysis of South African population censuses. 
Of the 132,016 highly skilled jobs gained between 1980 and 2001, over 62.000 were in associate 
professional positions. Referring back to the distribution of monthly incomes for each occupation 
group, it is clear that not as many associate professionals as managers and professionals earned over 
R6,000 per month in 2001.38 25% and 28% of managers and professionals respectively earned 
between R6,40 1 and R 12,800 per month, versus only 20% of associate professionals. With regards 
to the next highest income bracket (RI2,801-R25,600), 17% and 18% of managers and associate 
professionals respectively fell into this category, while only 6% of associate professionals did. 
Therefore, most of the growth in highly skilled jobs occurred amongst the sub-group of higher 
paying occupations paying the least relatively, i.e. associate professionals. This may partially 











explain why, even though the numbers and proportion of people holding "better" jobs and earning 
more has increased, there was no substantial increase in the number or proportion of unskilled jobs. 
This effect, though related, may be negligible in the face of the primary cause of why there was not 
a massive expansion of low-wage service sector work in Cape Town. Perhaps the key point is not 
that a large share of highly skilled job growth occurred amongst the lower paying jobs. Arguably, 
all-told, there simply are not enough people earning high enough salaries to support a greatly 
expanded service industry. The reality is that even those who held some of the best paying jobs in 
2001 did not actually earn all that much. Amongst managers, 75% earned less than R 12,800 per 
month. A comparable proportion of professionals, 73%, earned less than R12.800 per month as 
well, and an even greater proportion of associate professionals, 91 %, earned less than this per 
month. Thus, even though there was a substantial increase in the numbers of people earning 
relatively higher salaries, the amount they earned was probably still not enough to finance a greatly 












Summary and Conclusions 
John Friedmann and Goetz Wolff (1982), Edward Soja (1991) and Saskia Sassen (1994) argue that 
due to simultaneous deindustrialisation and the taking on of new business service functions in the 
global economy, large, post-industrial cities are subject to increased social polarisation. These 
authors contend that an economy based on a strong manufacturing sector creates a large middle-
income class by means of a predominance of relatively well-paid, stable, secure blue-collar jobs. A 
service sector-based economy, however, especially one with a dominant producer services sector, 
leads to increased social polarisation, due to the polarised nature of it's occupations, i.e. more 
professional, high-pay and low-skilL low-pay jobs, and fewer middle-income jobs. Thus, these 
authors argue, as a result of the shift in their economies from manufacturing to services. cities like 
Los Angeles, New York, London and Tokyo have become increasingly polarised. 
This same argument has been applied to many other cities throughout the world. Chaolin Gu and 
Haiyong Liu (2002) contend that Beijing is undergoing similar processes to Western cities, with the 
decay of the traditional manufacturing sector and growth of the service and high-tech industries. 
Thus the city is experiencing the relatively new urban phenomenon of social polarisation due to the 
increase in high-income professionals and a massive influx of unskilled. low-wage rural migrants. 
Luiz Ribeiro and Edward Telles (2000) attribute increased social polarisation in Rio de Janeiro to 
the decline of the city's key industrial sectors. such as shipbuilding, and growth in the service 
sectors too. Owen Crankshaw and Susan Parnell (2004) believe that the shift in Johannesburg's 
economy from the manufacturing sector, with its relatively high, stable wages and upward 
occupational mobility, to the tertiary sector, with its highly polarised occupational structure, has led 
to increased polarisation as well. Even a city like Miami, that did not have a strong manufacturing 
core to its economy, is argued to have undergone so much growth in its service industries that it now 
resembles a traditional post-industrial city such as New York in terms of social polarisation (Jan 
Nijman, 1996). 
Not all authors agree with this assessment of changes in the world's cities though. Chris Hamnett 











polarisation does not apply to all cities. He argues that Saskia Sassen has formulated her theory on 
social polarisation around the cities of Los Angeles and New York, which have very specific 
circumstances that facilitate increased polarisation. It is these cities' large unskilled immigrant 
populations that he believes enables them to have expanded low-wage service sectors in addition to 
their high-income business services sectors, and thereby predisposes them to becoming more 
polarised. Therefore, Hamnett contends that the polarisation hypothesis as posited by Saskia Sassen 
cannot be applied to most other cities. In fact, he argues that her assessment of London as a city 
undergoing increasing polarisation is incorrect. Rather, he argues, the occupational distributions of 
most cities are becoming more professionalised as their economies change from an emphasis on 
goods to service production, e.g. as in the Randstad (Hamnett, 1994a). 
Thus, I wanted to determine whether the model of an increasingly polarised or professionalised city 
better matched the situation in Cape Town. In trying to answer this question, I was mindful of the 
"seductive" nature of the polarisation hypothesis, to borrow a phrase from Feinstein, Gordon and 
Harloe (1992). This theory simply and rather neatly explains increasing polarisation in cities as a 
result of economic restructuring. However, proving a causal link between various separate 
processes is never a simple task. The authors who make the argument for increasing polarisation 
provide what seems at first to be convincing evidence. When this is examined more closely, though, 
one discovers that they are quite vague on, for example, what they define as low-skilled and high-
skilled jobs. Sassen (1994) and Wilson (1996) are both guilty, I believe, of incorrectly classifying 
certain higher skilled occupations along with lower skilled ones. One would more easily come to 
the conclusion that the numbers of low-skilled workers were increasing if these numbers were being 
artificially inflated by adding in occupations that were in fact higher skilled. The opposite could be 
said of the shrinking middle-class, i.e. that misclassifying middle-skilled, middle-income jobs as 
low-skilled, low-wage jobs would cause the numbers in the middle-class to be lower than expected. 
I found Hamnett's (l994a, 1994b) evidence for professonalisation in the Randstad and London to be 
far from flawless though, as there was also too much mixing of occupations of different skill and 
income brackets in the same groups. Thus, in my examination of the evidence, I paid close attention 
to the definitions of occupations and occupation skill groupings in order to be as precise as possible. 
It was shown, using population census data, that Cape Town's manufacturing sector had been in 
decline since the mid-1980's. This was contrasted with the tremendous growth in the community 











and service sectors were also shown to be quite different with semi-skilled. blue-collar jobs 
dominating in manufacturing, and a greater proportion of highly skilled jobs in the service sector. 
Thus it was illustrated that the number of highly skilled workers had increased substantially more 
than the number of unskilled workers across all sectors, and that both in absolute and relative terms, 
Cape Town was experiencing increasing professionalisation rather than polarisation. 
Before making the argument that Cape Town was undergoing professionalisation. I did show how 
one could have misinterpreted certain data as proof of increasing polarisation. This illustrates the 
point that while the polarisation hypothesis seems to explain certain processes quite neatly, closer 
inspection of the evidence may well prove it wrong. 
Even though Cape Town seems to be professionalising in line with Hamnetfs theories, I do not 
agree that large numbers of migrants are the main cause of increased polarisation in cities like New 
York and Los Angeles. There is a long history of migrant labour in South Africa and Cape Town is 
no exception to this. While the Apartheid state tried their utmost to keep African migrants out of 
Cape Town, they arguably did not succeed. Thus Cape Town has experienced and continues to be 
subject to the influx of large numbers of unskilled African migrants from poor rural areas of the 
Eastern Cape. Yet Cape Town does not have an expanded low-wage service sector. Instead, it has 
high levels of unemployment. Thus, it can be argued that there is simply not a suitably large pool of 
highly skilled people earning sufficiently high salaries to support such a sizeable low-wage service 
industry. Perhaps Hamnett does not consider this point because his argument is based on world 
cities. Arguably, world cities have better developed professional-managerial classes and therefore 
greater levels of wealth than a city like Cape Town. However, these results raise the question that 
large-scale immigration may be a necessary but not sufficient condition for social polarisation. 
In terms of who is most affected by the decline in manufacturing. John Kasarda (1993), Jan Nijman 
(1996). Edward Soja (1991) and William Wilson, (1987, 1996) all point to the flagging fortunes of 
African Americans in the U.S.A. These authors argue that unskilled African American men, who 
once relied heavily on the manufacturing sector for employment, are now facing increasing 
unemployment as the number of blue-collar jobs dwindle, as well as lower incomes. as the growing 











In addressing this issue, Coloureds in Cape Town were likened to inner-city African Americans, and 
it was shown that manufacturing was dominated by Coloureds (partly because of state policies to 
encourage their employment in the Western Cape, but also because they had been urbanised for 
longer). The number of Coloureds employed in manufacturing between 1980 and 2001 dropped by 
just under 30,000 - a greater number even than the total loss in manufacturing employment across 
all race groups in this period. Thus, I argued, the decline in manufacturing employment probably 
had the greatest negative effect on Coloured unemployment levels. Even though this dominance of 
manufacturing employment had been shared by Coloured men and women. Coloured women would 
arguably be less severely affected by the decline in semi-skilled blue-collar employment, as they 
were increasingly gaining semi-skilled white-collar and unskilled jobs. the numbers of which were 
steadily growing. Thus, Coloured men were probably the group worst affected by the decline in 
manufacturing. 
Wilson (1996) also makes the argument that unskilled women benefit most from the growth in the 
service sector, and at the expense of unskilled men, as the service sector tends to hire more women. 
Beall, Crankshaw and Parnell (2002) also point to increasing female employment as the service 
sector grows. They caution that these jobs tend to pay less and are more unstable than those of their 
male counterparts. Hamnett (l994a, 1994b) disagrees with the notion that women are becoming 
segregated into low-skilled work as service sector employment increases though. 
The employed workforce in Cape Town was shown to be feminising, mostly due to burgeoning 
numbers of service sector jobs. It was evident from their occupational distribution that women 
workers were subject to the same professionalisation trend seen across the whole working 
population of Cape Town though. However, it was also shown that there was less relative growth in 
the absolute numbers of highly skilled jobs amongst women than men, as well as a greater increase 
in the numbers of unskilled jobs amongst women. Thus, while they were not professionalising to 
the same extent as men, women were certainly not becoming segregated into low-skilled service 
sector jobs. 
This professionalisation amongst women was not uniform across the different race groups. White 
women's increased participation in the workforce tended to be in higher-skilled, better paying jobs, 
while Coloured women's employment gains had been in semi-skilled white-collar work mainly. 











occupations. In fact, while Coloureds had lost a substantial proportion of their relative share of 
unskilled work, African women had achieved the greatest relative share of unskilled employment of 
all the race-gender groups by 2001. In addition to this is the fact that Coloured men lost a greater 
proportion (nearly twice as much in fact) of unskilled work than Coloured women. and African men 
held a smaller proportion of unskilled work than African women in 2001. even though they had held 
a greater proportion than them in 1980. Thus, it would appear that increased service sector 














South Africa Population Census 1980 unit record data purchased directly from Statistics South 
Africa, Pretoria, now stored in the Data First Resource Centre, Centre for Social Science Research, 
University of Cape Town. 
KhayelitshaiMitchell's Plain Survey 2000 unit record data, Data First Resource Centre, Centre for 
Social Science Research Unit, University of Cape Town. 
South Africa Bureau of Census and Statistics. 1955. Population Census 7'h May, 1946, Volume v: 
Occupations and Industries of the European. Asiatic. Coloured and Native Population. Pretoria: 
Bureau of Census and Statistics. 
South Africa Bureau of Statistics. 1968. Population Census. 6lh September, 1960, Volume 7, No.2, 
Characteristics of the Population in each MaRisterial Dis/rict and Economic Region: Occupation, 
Industry and Type of Abode. Pretoria: South Afi-ica Bureau or Statistics. 
Republic of South Africa Department of Statistics. 1975. Census of Manufacturing, 1970. Principle 
Statistics on a Regional Basis. Pretoria: Republic of South Africa Department of Statistics. 
Republic of South Africa Department of Statistics. 1976. Population Census 1970, Occupation and 
Industry by District and Economic Region. Pretoria: Republic of South Africa Department of 
Statistics. 
Republic of South Africa Central Statistical Services. 1984. C'ensus of Manufacturing, J 979. 
Principle Statistics on a Regional Basis. Pretoria: Republic of South Africa Central Statistical 
Services. 
Republic of South Africa Central Statistical Services. 1985. Population Census 1980, Industry by 
Statistical Region and Districl. Pretoria: Republic of South Africa Central Statistical Services. 
Republic of South Africa Central Statistical Services. 1986. Population Census 1985. Industry by 
Development Region, Statistical Region and Districl. Pretoria: Republic of South Africa Central 
Statistical Services. 
Republic of South Africa Central Statistical Services. 1988. Census of Manufacturing, J 985. 











Republic of South Africa Central Statistical Services. 1992. Population Census 1991, Economic 
Sector by Development Region. Statistical Region and District. Pretoria: Republic of South Africa 
Central Statistical Services. 
Republic of South Africa Central Statistical Services. 1996. Census of Manufacturing. 1991. 
Principle Statistics on a Regional Basis. Pretoria: Republic of South Africa Central Statistical 
Services. 
Statistics South Africa. 1998. Population Census J 996: cOlllll1unity profile database. Pretoria: 
Statistics South Africa. 
Statistics South Africa. 2000. Census of Manu lac luring. J 996. Principle Statistics on a Regional 
Basis, Western Cape. Pretoria: Statistics South Africa. 
Statistics South Africa. 2003. Population Census 200J: community profile database. Pretoria: 
Statistics South Africa. 
Secondary sources 
Beall, 1., Crankshaw, O. and ParnelL S. 2002. Uniting a Di\'ided City: Governance and social 
exclusion in Johannesburg. London: Earthscan. 
Burgers, 1. 1996. No Polarisation in Dutch Cities? Inequality in a Corporatist Country. Urhan 
Studies. 33(1): 99-105. 
Centre for Development Studies. 1989. Western Cape Regional Report. In Regional Perspectives, 
Occassional Papers 3. Centre for Development Studies, University of the Western Cape. 
Centre for Intergroup Studies. 1983. Group Areas. Occasional Paper No.7, University of Cape 
Town. 
Cilliers, S.P. 1971. Coloured people: Educatio/1 and StutliS. Johannesburg: South African Institute 
of Race Relations. 
87 
Cole,1.G. 1984 ... When your life is hiller. you do something ahout it": Women and squalling in the 
Western Cape. Ph.D. thesis. Department of Economic History, University of Cape Town. 
Cole. 1. 1989. State Urban Policies and Urban Struggles in the 1980's: A Western Cape Perspective. 












Crankshaw, O. and ParnelL S. 2004. Johannesburg: race. inequality, and urbanization. In Gugler, J. 
(ed.) World Cities beyond the West: Glohalization. De\'e/ojJlJlent, and Inequality. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Cross, C., Bekker, S. and Eva, G. 1999. En H'({arheen nOli? Migration and Settlement in the Cape 
Metropolitan Area (CMAJ. Report to the Cape Metropolitan Council, University of Stellenbosch. 
Curry, D. 1972. A Powerless Minority. In (eds) Whisson. M.G. and van der Merwe, H.W. Coloured 
citizenship in South Africa. Report of the Second Workshop of the Abe Bailey Institute of Interrace 
Studies, University of Cape Town. 
Dewar, D., Rosmarin, T. and Watson. V. April 1991. Mo\'elJlent Patterns of the African population 
in Cape Town: Some Policy Implications. The Urban Problems Research Unit Working Paper No. 
44 (Occasional Paper No.31). University of Cape Tovvn. 
Dewar, D., Watson, V. and Howes, C. January 1990. AI1 Overview of Development Prohlems in the 
Cape Town Metropolitan Area. The Urban Problems Research Unit Working Paper No. 40 
(Occasional Paper No. 27), University of Cape Town. 
Economic and Social Development Directorate. 2001. Background Report, City of Cape Town: 
Economic Trends and Analysis, 1980-2000. City of Cape Town. 
Evans, R.J. 1985. Coloured Labour Prej"erence: A government labour policy in action. Cape Town: 
South African Institute of Race Relations. 
Fast, H. 1995. An Overviell' o/A/dcan Seltlement in the C 'upe Metropolitan Area to 1990. Urban 
Problems Research Unit Working Paper No. 53. Uni\'ersity of Cape Town. 
Feinstein, S., Gordon, I. And I-Iarloe. M. 1992. Di\'ided C'ities. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Foundation for Contemporary Research. 1992. At/al7/is Ana/ysis and Strategy Document. 
Foundation for Contemporary Research, South Africa. 
Friedmann, J. and Wolff, G. 1982. World city formation: an agenda for research and action. 
International Journal of Urban and ReKional Research. 6(3): 309-344. 
Goldin, I. 1984. Coloured prelerence policies and the makil1g of Coloured political identity in the 
Western Cape region o/South A/i'icC!, with purt iCIi/ar reference to the period 1948 to 1984. Ph.D. 










Goldin, I. 1987. Making Race: The Politics and Economics or Coloured Identity in South Ajrica. 
Cape Town: Maskew Miller Longman. 
89 
Gu. C. and Liu, H. 2002. Social Polarization and Segregation in Beijing. In Logan, J. (ed.) The New 
Chinese City: Globalization and market refimn Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 
Hamnett. C. 1994a. Social Polarisation in Global Cities: Theory and Evidence. Urban Studies. 
31(3): 401-424. 
Hamnett, C. 1994b. Socio-economic Change in London: Professionalisation, not Polarisation. Built 
Environment. 20(3): 192-203. 
Hamnett, C. 1996. Why Sassen is Wrong: A Response to Burgers. Urban Studies. 33(1): 107-110. 
Horner. D. 1983. Labour Preference, Influx Control (lnd S(j/tatters: Cape Town Entering the 1980 'so 
South African Labour and Devclopment Research Unit. Working Paper No. 50, University of Cape 
Town. 
Kane-Berman, J. 1972. Migrato/y Labollr: the Canker in South African society. Johannesburg: 
Spro-cas. 
Kasarda, J.D. 1993. Cities as Places Where People Li\c and Work: Urban Change and 
Neighborhood Distress. In (ed.) Cisncros, H.G. Inlenl'())'el1 Destinies: Cities and the Nation. New 
York: W.W. Norton and Company. 
Kinkhead-Weekes, B. 1983. Influx control and squatter cOl1lrol: the "solution" of Cape Town's 
housing crisis during the i 950 'so Papers from the Fourth Workshop on the History of Greater Cape 
Town, Cape Town, South Africa. 
Marais. F. 1984. The Coloured Lahour Preference Policy. B.A. (Hons) thesis. Department of 
Economic History, University of Cape Town. 
Mohr, P .. van der Merwe. c.. Both. Z. and Inggs. J. 1988. [he Practical Guide to South Afhcan 
Economic indicators. Johannesburg: Lexicon Publishers. 
M011er. V. 1984. Persistence and Change in the South Afi'ical1 Labour Migration System: A phase 
model. Centre for Applied Social Sciences. University or Natal. 
Musterd, S. 1994. A Rising European Underclass? Social Polarisation and Spatial Segregation in 











Nijman.1. Ethnicity. Class and the Economic Intcrnationalisation of Miami. In O'Loughlin. 1. and 
Friedrichs. 1. (eds.) Social Polarization in Post-!ndustria! . \'Ietropolises. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. 
Nattrass, N. 2002. Unemployment. Employment and Lahour~j'orce participation in 
Khayelitsha/Mitchell's Plain. Centre for Social Science Research Working Paper No. 12, University 
of Cape Town. 
Pickel. B. 1997. Coloured Ethnicity und identity: A Case S'tuc(v in the former Coloured Areas in the 
Western Cape/South Ajhca. Hamburg: LIT. 
Pinnock, D. 1981. Urban Land Acts and the Rise ojStreet ('rime. Papers from the Third Cape Town 
History Workshop. University of Cape Town. 
Platzky. L. and Walker. C. 1985. The Surplus Peop!e: Forced Removals in South A/i·icC/. 
Johannesburg: Ravan Press. 
Pose!, D. 1991. The Making o/Apartheid. i9-1/i-! 96!: Conflict and Compromise. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Ramphele, M. 1993. A Bed Called Home: Life in the Migrant Labour Hostels of Cape Town. Cape 
Town: D. Philip Athens. 
Ribeiro, L. and Telles. E. 2000. Rio de Janeiro: Emerging dualization in a historically unequal city. 
In Marcuse. P. and van Kempen. R. (cds.) G!oh(fli~ing Cities: A new spatial order? Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers. 
Satl G. 1998. Changing Cape Town: Urhan DVI1({lIlics. Policy and Planning During the Political 
Transition in SOllth Afi·ica. Maryland: University Press of America. 
SALDRU. 2003. Khayelitsha/Mitchell 's Plain ,",'uney 2()()O: survey report and baseline inj'ormation. 
Centre for Social Science Research, University of Cape Town. 
Sassen, S. 1994. Cities in a World Economy. Thousand Oaks: Pine Forge Press. 
Saunders, C. 1978. From Nd(fiJeni to Langa, /9/9-35. Cape Town History Conference, 25-27 
August. Department of History. University of Cape To\\n. 
Seekings, 1., Graaf, 1. and .Ioubert, P. 1990. Survey ojResidential and Migration Histories oj' 
Residents of the Shack Areas oj'Khayelitshu. Research Unit for Sociology of Development 











Smith, K. 2005. Cape Town 2{)25 - The Statlls of( 'ajJC' Tml'l1: Development Overview. Cape Town: 
lsandla Institute. 
Soja, E. 1991. Poles Apart: Urban restructuring in Nc\\ York and Los Angeles. In Mollenkopf, 1. 
and Castells, M. (eds.) Dual City: Restructuring A'el1' }'ork New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
South Africa Board for the Decentralisation of Industry. 1975. Atlantis. South Africa Board for the 
Decentralisation of Industry. 
Statistics South Africa.c.1996a. SOllth A/i"ican Standard Classification of Occupations (SASCO). 
Pretoria: Statistics South Africa. 
Statistics South Africa.c.1996b. SOllth A/dcan S'tandard ('/assification of Industries (SA SCI). 
Pretoria: Statistics South Africa. 
Van der Horst, S.T. 1964. A/i"ican Workers in TOll'/? A Sim/)' olLabour in Cape Town. Cape Town: 
Oxford University Press. 
Whisson, M.G. and Weil. W. 1971. Domestic 5;er\'{/l1ts . .'1 microcosm of "the race problem ". 
Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations. 
Wilkinson, P. 2000. City Profile: Cape Town. Cities. 17(3): 195-205. 
Wilson, W. 1987. The Truly Disadvantaged: The inner cit)', the underclass and public policy. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Wilson, W. 1996. When Work DisujJpears: The 11'O,./d ojthe new urban poor. New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf. 
Wittenberg, M. 2004. The Mystery or South Africa's Ghost Workers in 1996: Measurement and 
Mismeasurement in the Manufacturing Census, Population Census and October Household Surveys. 












Coloureds: A Race Apart 
The concept of the Coloured people of South Africa is a problematic one as no other country in the 
world has such a population group or system of classification. 39 Coloured people are generally 
considered to have mulatto origins though, having resulted from the interbreeding of European 
colonialists. indigenous population groups and imported slaves (Cilliers. 1971: PickeL 1997). 
While some argue that the concept of "Coloured" was non-existent in the Cape before the 1900's, 
others hold that already within the first two decades of colonial rule, a hierarchical system of racial 
differentiation had been established in which the group of people who would later be known as 
Coloureds held an intermediate position. The formation of a Coloured identity in the Cape was 
partly due to racist ideology and social Darwinism. i.e. Coloureds. having hoth European and native 
origins were not on the same level as Whites. but were, on the other hand. "better" than Bantus 
(Africans). There was an active drive by the colonial authorities to create this distinction between 
Coloureds and Africans. As the Cape colony grew, so too did the African and Coloured 
populations. Therefore, throughout the 18th and 19th centuries, the colonial government practised 
policies of preference towards Coloureds to prevent them from uniting with the Bantus and forming 
one large group of dispossessed and disenfranchised that could oppose the government. Some also 
argue that skilled Coloureds helped create this identity to keep their position in relation to Africans 
and motivate continued preferential treatment. Prior to the early 1900's, the term "coloured" had 
referred to any non-European. By 1904 though, the term had been reconstituted basically to exclude 
Africans. 
From 1904 to the early 1930's, preferential treatment of Coloureds led to the continued 
improvement of the position of Coloured workers at the expense of Africans. Coloureds were also 
spared the gross imposition of influx control measures and residential segregation in the Western 
Cape. This served to further increase the racial divide between Africans and Coloureds and 
heighten racial identification amongst Coloureds and Africans. However. although the government 
)9 Unless otherwise indicated. the information discLlssed in this section is taken from Goldin. I. 1984. Coloured 
preference policies and the making of Col allred political identity in the Western Cape regi()n oj,r..;()1I1h Africa, with 











used its preference policy to attempt to incorporate them, the position of Coloured people actually 
declined in this period. The Civilised Labour Policy caused Coloureds to be increasingly at a 
disadvantage to White workers during the 1920's in the Western Cape. especially those of the 
Coloured artisan class, who were being employed more as cheap labour. For example. the Coloured 
share of private manufacturing employment dropped from 50% in 1924 to 43% in 1932 Whereas 
Whites constituted only 35% of the workforce in private manufacturing in 1924. they had surpassed 
Coloureds by 1932 to hold 44% of these jobs. The Great Depression also acted to further erode the 
position of Coloured and African workers. 
Coloured political power too decreased dramatically in this period. Despite having the right to vote 
in the Cape before 1910, Coloureds were not truly able to exercise this right. With the introduction 
of the South Africa Act in 1909, any chance of Coloureds representing themselves in government 
was lost in any case, as the act stated that all parliamentary candidates had to be British subjects of 
White origin. Coloured people's rights in South Africa were gradually eroded from this point 
onwards. The Coloured share of the vote was even halved between 1929 and 1930. 
Influx control measures were even more strictly enforced against Africans between 1935 and 1948 
and preference continued to be shown towards Coloureds. thereby further dividing Africans and 
Coloureds and reinforcing the advantages of being identified as part of the Coloured race. Although 
the political power of Coloureds had been seriously eroded by this time. Coloureds were still on the 
common voters' roll and represented on the Cape Town City Council. Economically though, 
Coloured men had been forced from most skilled positions and Coloureds in general "'had been 
reduced to an unskilled proletariat" (Goldin, 1984: 162). The government tried to further entrench 
Coloured identity by establishing the Coloured Affairs Department and the Coloured Affairs 
Council. However, this move backfired in that it led to increased resistance to the government. 
The reconstitution of Coloured identity was one or the main objectives or the Apartheid government 
of the National Party after it came into power in 1948. It \vas fairly easy for \\ealthier, skilled 
Coloureds to pass for White until the turn of the century. Some estimates suggest that as much as 
38% of the population of the Cape Province that had been classified as White by 1936 was in fact of 
"'mixed descent". Therefore. in order to establish a White "volk" (nation). the government realised 











population, while the Coloured middle-class had to be prevented from becoming assimilated into the 
White population too. The practice of "passing for white" had allowed Coloureds to tap into White 
political power and evade the discriminatory practices enacted against them up until 1950. In that 
year though, several pieces of legislation were passed that cut off this avenue of escape for many 
Coloureds, e.g. the Population Registration Act, the Immorality Amendment Act and the Group 
Areas Act (Note: Coloureds were arguably most atlected by the Group Areas Act vvith one in 6 
coloured families being moved and relocated during the time the act was enforced [Centre for 
Intergroup Studies, 1983; Pickel, 1997]). This legislation sought to limit the interaction of 
Coloureds and Whites and stop any miscegenation (Centre for Intergroup Studies. 1983. Goldin, 
1987). Thus, the Nationalists reasoned that by forcing the Coloured middle-class to develop 
independently of the White middle-class, a goal would be provided to which the Coloured working-
class could aspire, instead of looking to improve their position in the Apartheid system. Considering 
how slim their victory had been in the 1948 polls. the Nationalists saw fit to remove Coloureds from 
the common voters' roll with the introduction of the Separate Representation of Voters Act in 
1951(eventually passed, after much perseverance on the part of the Nationalists. in 1956 [Curry, 
1972]), thereby eliminating what the party saw as a decisive vote and serious threat to the survival 
of the government. 
Many Nationalists worried though that this further disenfranchisement of Coloureds would lead to 
increased support of resistance to the government. Added to this was the continued concern of a 
unified non-European resistance of Coloureds and Africans (Goldin. 1984: Marais. 1984; Pickel, 
1997). Again the idea that Coloureds should see themselves as separate from Africans and have 
their own identity came to the fore. In 1951, 35% of Coloureds were estimated to live in the 
Western Cape. Thus. the Western Cape was viewed as the "natural homeland" of the Coloureds, 
and therefore, any attempt at establishing an integrated Coloured identity would have to be focused 
in this area (Goldin, 1984; Marais, 1984; PickeL 1997). Therefore, government introduced the 
Coloured Labour Preference Policy (CLPP) in 1955 (Marais, 1984; PickeL 1997). One of the main 
aims of this policy was to eventually replace all African labour in the Western Cape with Coloured 
labour (Cilliers, 1971; Goldin, 1984; Marais, 1984; Pickel, 1997). In this way. the Apartheid goal of 
denying Africans residence and work in the Western Cape would be achieved as well as the co-
opting of Coloureds into the apartheid system and the further alienation of Coloureds and Africans 











Various government initiatives like development programmes and the CLPP were designed to 
improve the standard of living of Coloureds (Pickel. 1997). In comparison to Africans. Coloureds 
were relatively better off in terms of education. housing. sport and health t~lcilities. freedom of 
movement and occupational mobility (Pickel, 1997). But while many Coloureds fared better in the 
labour market than Africans as a result of the protection offered by the CLPP in terms of jobs and 
skills availability, Coloureds were still kept out of many of the better positions and jobs reserved for 
Whites. Thus. even though the CLPP was designed to improve the position of Coloured people in 
general, in reality, only a small group of skilled, educated Coloureds truly benefited. Most 
Coloureds were no better off in fact. National census data for 1970 showed that over 50% of both 
Coloured men and women earned below the poverty datum line. Also. despite the bct that one of 
the main intended effects of the CLPP was to foster feelings of unity amongst Coloureds, these 
economic and residential divisions actually served to reinforce class divisions between the large 
pool of poor Coloureds, the emerging Coloured middle-class and the Coloured elite (Goldin, 1984; 
Pickel, 1997). 
That approximately halfofthose killed in the Western Cape in protests in the wake ufthe Soweto 
riots of the 16th of June 1976 were Africans and half were Coloureds. \vas testimony to the fact that 
the various economic and political mechanisms the government had used in its attempts to foster a 
separate identity amongst Coloureds had failed to prevent a united African-Coloured resistance to 
the Apartheid (Goldin, 1984; Pickel, 1997). In addition to this. all the measures put in place had 
also failed to prevent African influx into the Western Cape. Thus, the scrapping of the policy was 












Coloured and African Labour in Cape Town 
The Cape colony at the turn of the century 
Up until the late 1800's, the Coloured population was the main source oflabour in the Cape colony. 
With the long-standing dispute between management and workers in the Table Bay docks 
culminating in a potentially devastating strike in 1880 though, management hired 200 African 
workers from the Transkei and fired the striking "Cape Boys". The recruitment or Africans worked 
so well in quelling worker resistance in the docks that other employers in the Cape decided to adopt 
the same strategy. Thus, by 1899, African men from outside the Western Cape occupied most of the 
lowest paid, unskilled, manual labour jobs.40 
Between the late 1800's and early 1900's, the number of Coloureds in industry and commerce 
increased markedly, especially amongst educated and skilled Coloureds in retail as well as 
carpenters, joiners and stonemasons. This raised expectations amongst Coloureds of advancement. 
White immigrant craftsmen, using their knowledge of trade unionism in Europe. started forming 
closed White trade unions around the 1900's though, seeking to exclude Coloured craftsmen from 
certain jobs and industries like bricklaying and plastering. These immigrants also preferred to hire 
young European apprentices. Thus, by the turn of the century, it was mainly this group of 
immigrants that possessed the new skills needed in the growing manufacturing and mining 
industries of South Africa. 
Increasing numbers of unskilled Coloureds lost their jobs to lower-paid Africans between 1900 and 
1919. Skilled and semi-skilled Coloured men were also kept out of certain occupations in 
manufacturing and industry, which were dominated by White men. Very fe\\ Coloureds were 
white-collar professionals (under 1 %) or held other higher status jobs in sectors like retail and 
commerce in 1921 (Jess than 3%). Amongst Coloured men. 15% worked in semi-skilled or skilled 
occupations, including apprentices and artisans (who were being squeezed out by White unions). 
40 Unless otherwise indicated, the information discLlssed in this section is taken from Goldin. I. 1987. Making Race: 










Less than 5% of Coloured women had skilled and semi-skilled occupations though. Over 90% of 
Coloured women were classified as unskilled. and 87% as domestic servants. 
The Civilised Labour Policy and the Great Depression 
97 
Massive changes in the sexual and racial division of labour in the Western Cape occurred in the 
1920's. The Apprenticeship Act and the Civilised Labour Policy Act put even more pressure on 
skilled and semi-skilled Coloureds in the 1920's. The Apprenticeship Act required apprentices to 
have a level of education practically unattainable by Coloureds as a result of the segregated, inferior 
education they received. Thus Coloureds were further restricted from entering apprenticeships and 
skilled work. even in trades where they had previously been dominant. The Industrial Conciliation 
Act of 1924 and the Wage Act of 1925 (both part of the Civilised Labour Policy) "legitimised the 
closed shop practices of White craftsmen" and ensured that employers could no longer hire Africans 
and Coloureds at lower wages than they would have paid Whites (the assumption being that White 
employers. as they were going to be paying the same wages anyway. v,:ould rather hire workers of 
their own race) (Goldin, 1987:42). 
Even though most of this restructuring was aimed at Africans, Coloureds \vere also greatly affected. 
From 1924 onwards, African and Coloured public service workers were replaced by Whites. While 
Coloureds held 44% of government jobs in the Western Cape in 1924. their numbers had dropped to 
30% by 1932. The drop in the proportion of Africans in government employment was no less 
dramatic; with 12% of these jobs held by Africans in 1924. but only 2% in 1932. Whites. in 
contrast, increased their share of government employment from 44% in 1924 to 68% in 1932. A 
similar process happened in private industry as welL with the numbers of Coloured and African 
workers in manufacturing decreasing while the number of Whites increased bdween 1924 and 1932. 
The number of Whites in manufacturing even overtook the number of Coloureds by 1932 (44% 
versus 43% of manufacturing jobs). 
Thus the Civilised Labour Policy put Coloureds at a greater disadvantage to White workers and 
seriously undermined the economic base of the Coloured artisan class. The labour restructuring 
process that began with the Civilised Labour Policy intensified during the Great Depression. Job 
fragmentation and mass-production saw women replacing men, and Whites replacing African and 











position of Coloured male artisans was further eroded between 1929 and 1933. During this time, 
more skilled Coloured workers were forced out of the crafts they had traditionally occupied, as well 
as being prevented from entering the new electrical, machine and metallurgical crafts through 
apprenticeship barriers and prejudice. Throughout the 1920's and 1930's. employers increasingly 
hired White men to replace skilled Coloured men. Both White and Coloured women were 
substituted for semi-skilled Coloured men. Africans were still preferred oyer Coloured men for 
unskilled work, as Africans were prepared to work for lower wages under \\orse conditions than 
Coloureds. 
Coloured women advanced substantially during this period. In the greater Cape Town area in 1921, 
over 85% of Coloured women were employed as domestic workers. This proportion had fallen to 
66% by 1936. with increasing numbers of Coloured women securing semi-skilled work (from only 
4% of Coloured women in 1921 to over 19% in 1936). This change is due mainly to the expansion 
of the garment industry in South Africa. Clothing manufacturers in the Cape preferred Coloured 
women because of the low wages they could pay them, on the grounds that most of them lived with 
their parents or that they were merely supplementing their husband' s income. 
Economic recovery 
Between 1935 and 1948, the African population of the Western Cape gre\\ rapidly. partly in 
response to the growth of manufacturing and restructuring of the racial di\ision of labour. The 
manufacturing sector recovered very quickly after the Depression. and had. by 1948. overtaken the 
primary and tertiary sectors in the Western Cape and the rest of South Africa. The growth in 
industrial employment resulted in Africans occupying 24% of the industrial labour jobs in 1949, up 
from only 14% in 1935. The share of Coloured workers increased by only 2% (to 46%), while that 
of Whites dropped to 27%. While the growth in industrial employment for Africans was confined 
mainly to African men. the number of Coloured women in industry in the \Vestern Cape increased 
by 132% between 1933 and 1949. African men also benefited more than Coloured men from the 
construction boom as a result of the economic recovery of the 1930's and the need for defences and 
stores during World War II. Coloured men had historically dominated the construction industry. By 
1949 though, most workers in the building industry were African. African men were confined to 
unskilled labour in construction and manufacturing though where they replaced unskilled Coloured 











Thus, by 1948, a definite hierarchy had been established in the labour force or the Western Cape. 
While as many as 90% of Africans were employed as unskilled workers in the Cape Peninsula (i.e. 
men in manual labour and women in domestic service), only 30% of Coloureds were classed as 
such. Semi-skilled workers constituted 48% of the Coloured labour force. but only 8% of African 
workers. By contrast, only 1 % and 6% of Whites workers were classified as unskilled and semi-
skilled respectively. By far the majority of Whites were skilled (93%). while only \ 5% of 
Coloureds and a mere 2% of Africans fell into this category. 
The changing relationship between employers and the government 
Employers in the Western Cape had supported influx control since the start of the \900's on the 
proviso that they be allowed to hire and fire Africans at '>vilL and that no system be introduced by 
government that would inhibit them in this regard. These employers argued that they needed a pool 
of unemployed Africans in order to compel them to work for low wages, provide a stable workforce, 
and be able to lay off workers when the economy slackened or there was industrial unrest. Cape 
employers had even originally demanded that influx controls be instituted and had worked with the 
government to implement them. The period 1937 to 1945 found the relationship between employers 
and the Department of Native Affairs taking considerable strain though. as the manufacturing 
industry and the labour demands of the wartime economy required more African workers, and 
therefore less co-operation from employers in maintaining influx controls. Employers had a 
renewed commitment to stricter enforcement of influx controls after 1945 though. and the 
relationship between government and employers was restored during the first live years of 
Nationalist Party rule. 
This relationship started to sour with the introduction of the Coloured Labour Preference Policy 
(CLPP) in the mid-1950's. The eventual goal of the elimination of Africans ll'om the Western Cape 
was met with great consternation by employers, as African labour was viem.?d as vital to the survival 
of certain industries in the Cape. Influx controls were implemented far more strictly in the Western 
Cape than anywhere else in the country as a result of this policy, and employers were soon 
hampered in recruiting migrant labourers. By 1957. the Cape Chamber of Industries (CCI) was 
complaining that "as a result of the tightening of Native influx control. there is no longer an 











CCI announced that there was no longer a pool of African labour available in the Western Cape. 
Despite employers bitter opposition to the stricter enforcement of intlux controls against Africans 
and being forced to hire what they viewed as lazy, unwilling and less able Coloured labourers 
instead under the CLPP, these measures continued to be implemented (Cilliers, 1971; Goldin, 1987). 
Note though that this could not have happened without the support of the Rembrandt and Sanlam 
corporations, two powerful Afrikaner enterprises that made little use of the unskilled African labour 
so desperately needed by other employers in the Cape. 
Occupational mobility amongst Coloureds 
The Western Cape's relative contribution to manufacturing had been ilwersely related to 
manufacturing growth in the rest of South Africa for over a century. By 1961. the Western Cape 
provided less than 21 % of industrial jobs and contributed just over 22% to net output. These shares 
had fallen to 12.1 % and 11.2% respectively by 1967. Despite a nationwide manufacturing boom 
between 1967 and 1976, the Western Cape's share of national industrial employment dropped to 
11.3% and it accounted for only 9.6% of national industrial output by 1976. 
Coloureds accounted for 51 % of the manufacturing workforce in the Western Cape in 1960 (30% 
men and 21% women). 41 In the same year. White workers represented only 30(% of manufacturing 
employees (23% men and 7% women), while Africans constituted 19% or the manufacturing 
workforce in the Western Cape (virtually all men). Tcn years later. Coloureds had increased their 
share to 62% (32% men. 30% women), while that of Whites and Africans had fallen to 22% and 
15% respectively. 
This increased share of Coloured employment in manufacturing in the 196(), s is indicative of the 
upward mobility of the Coloured working class at the time. The labour demands of the post-war 
economy and the increased mechanisation of industry necessitated state supported skills training of 
Coloureds, as the skilled White workforce was too small (Cilliers. 1971: bans, 1985). Thus, 
apprenticeships were increasingly opened to Coloureds in the Westcrn Cape in the 1960's; so much 
so that by 1974,90% of apprentices in the building trade were Coloureds. \\hile 9WYO and 79% of 
41 Goldin does not give the source of these figures. The figures 1 have Llsed from the pupulation censLises give slightly 
different values. However. I have focused on specific areas of the Western Cape in an attempt to emulate the 
magisterial districts that now make up the City of Cape Town. \vhereas Goldin refi:rs tothe entire Western Cape (see 











apprentices in the furniture, and jewellery and goldsmith trades respecti\'t~ly. \\ere Coloured (Evans, 
1985, Goldin, 1987). 
From the 1960's onwards. many Coloureds also moved to clerical and sales positions. and an 
increasing number took up professional and technical positions (Evans. 1985). This was due to 
improved Coloured education under the CLPP and therefore their imprO\cd ahility to compete in the 
white-collar job market. which was also facilitated by the CLPP (Evans. 1985). As a result of the 
rapid growth of white-collar employment in the 1960's. increasing numbers of Coloured men moved 
into clerical, sales and supervisory occupations. But there was hardly any increase in the proportion 
of Coloured male white-collar workers between 1970 and 1980. Coloured women. as a result of 
increased employment in mainly clerical and sales jobs. had greatly increased their share of white-
collar work by 1980. The proportion of Coloured male professionals remained stable between 1960 
and 1980. The coloured female share of professional work on the other hane!. as a result of rapid 
growth in the teaching and nursing professions. increased substantially in this time. Approximately 
80% of Coloured professionals were employed by the government though. 
Thus. the biggest change amongst the Coloured population was the increase in clerical and service 
employment coupled with a decrease in unskilled and lower manual work. especially in the Western 
Cape. The proportions of both unskilled Coloured men and women fell between 1960 and 1973 
from 52% to 43%. and 62% to 45% respectively. The proportion of skilled and semi-skilled 
Coloureds also increased between 1960 and 1970 (see table below). During the 1970's. there was 
barely any growth in the proportion of skilled and semi-skilled Coloured men. Rapid development 
in the 1970's saw semi-skilled and unskilled Coloureds move into white-collar and skilled jobs far 
more readily than Africans though. Mechanisation and automation also led to the proliferation of 
differentiated job-opportunities and specialisation. increasing opportunities especially for semi-
skilled female operators (Cilliers. 1971). Coloured women increasingly mo\ed out of domestic 
service and agriculture and into semi-skilled manufacturing and sales and clerical work in the 
1970's and early 1980's. As Coloured semi-skilled \\'omen were paid less than Coloured men. they 
were even preferred for this kind of work. In 1970. 40% of Coloured \\omen were domestic 
servants. By 1980, the number had fallen to only 29%. with the place of Coloured female domestic 
workers in the Western Cape being filled by illegally employed African women and Coloured 
youths. This is not surprising as domestic work was practically the only work African women in 











Coloured occupational mobility, Cape Town, 1960-1980 
Percentage of group employed in occupational category in year 
1960 1970 1980 
Blue collar (semi-&/skilled) 25% 35% -
Coloured men White collar 3% 10% 11 % 
I 
~ 
Pro fe ss i onal 2% - I 2% 
I 
I 
Blue collar (semi-&/skilled) I 21% 26U/c) I 39% 
I I 




- I 9% 
I 
----~--
Source: Author's analYSIS of data 111 Goldll1 (1987). 
Employers continued to rely on African workers for unskilled labour though. Despite the various 
acts and laws, the Department of Labour made certain concessions to employers and tolerated their 
preference for African unskilled labour to a degree. Coloured unskilled workers suffered therefore, 
as employers preferred to hire African workers, either legally or illegally. who would accept certain 
working conditions that many unskilled Coloured workers would not and also because of certain 
stereotypes about Africans being better suited to heavy manual labour and better workers in general 
(Cilliers, 1971; Goldin, 1987). It was in the support of unskilled Coloured labour that the CLPP 
failed miserably. For example, the proportion of unemployed Coloured males increased from just 
under 14% to 27% during the 1970's, mainly due to the loss of unskilled work to African men in 
manufacturing and construction. and the loss of agriculture employment as a result of increased 
mechanisation and the contraction of the deciduous fruit industry. In 1976. the Theron Commission 
concluded that "the employment prospects for the bottom 30% [of the Coloured population], in 
terms of education and social status, are very unfavourable" (South Africa, 1976 cited in Goldin, 
1987). 
This same commission found that employment opportunities for skilled Coloureds were very good 
though. Even though Whites were protected by the Department of Labour and continued to have the 
upper hand in the labour market, the CLPP improved the employment opportunities of skilled 
Coloured workers in relation to Africans. As Africans were generally kept out of training and 
apprenticeships, skilled Coloureds were protected from having to compete with them for skilled and 











unskilled to semi-skilled and white-collar employment is misleading though, as very little improved 
in terms of the real earnings or employment status of Coloureds (Cilliers, 1971; Goldin, 1987). 
Coloured workers were not given supervisory and skilled work at the expense of White workers. 
Generally speaking, Coloureds could also not supervise Whites in the workplace either (Van der 
Horst, 1964; Goldin, 1987). Coloured unemployment and underemployment also increased quickly 
between 1961 and 1976. 
Beyond unskilled labour 
Survey of employers in the metropolitan area of the Cape Peninsula, 1981 
Occupation type Africans I Coloureds Whites 









Total 100% I 100% 100% 
I J , 
Source: Author S analYSIS of data III GoldIn (1987). 
In 198 L no White people were employed in unskilled labour (Goldin, 1984). Over half of the 
unskilled labour force (54%) was African, with Coloureds making up the remaining 46%. As can be 
seen in the table (above), the majority of Africans (87%) were still relegated to unskilled labour in 
the Cape Peninsula in 1981, while the majority of Coloureds (72%) occupied skilled and semi-
skilled jobs. Whites were still over-represented in the better paying professional jobs (45% of 
Whites held managerial or administrative jobs compared to only 3% of Coloureds and no Africans). 
African unskilled workers were still concentrated in construction, while Coloured semi-skilled 
workers were concentrated in the garment, service and retail sectors. While the construction 
industry was able to maintain its recruitment of a steady supply of African unskilled labour despite 
the CLPP, it was experiencing problems with the supply of skilled labour in the Western Cape. 
However, this lack of skilled labour was not unique to the construction industry. By 1977, skilled 











During the 1960's employers in the Western Cape had opposed CLPP out of concern for the 
unskilled African labour supply. In the 1970's and early 1980's though, the focus had shifted to 
shortages of skilled workers in the Western Cape. Employers argued that the CLPP had limited the 
training of Africans and given Coloured workers a monopoly over skilled work. In the late 1970's, 
the upswing in the economy had resulted in more skilled workers being required for the growing 
manufacturing and construction sectors than could be supplied by the Coloured labour force. 
Skilled Coloureds could, as a result of the demand, be more discerning about types of job and pay. 
Western Cape employers were not prepared to compete with the higher paying jobs in the Transvaal, 
and so, many skilled Coloured workers migrated to the Witwatersrand, causing a shortage of skilled 
labour in the region. Employers therefore petitioned the government to allow Africans already 
resident in the Cape to be trained and employed in skilled work. The Cape Chambers of Commerce 
and Industry and the Cape Employer's Association even had the backing of large businesses like the 
Sanlam and Rembrandt corporations and others this time in pushing for a "better deal" for skilled 
Africans permanently resident in the Western Cape (e.g. they should be exempt from inf1ux controls, 
allowed to buy/rent their own houses and compete on equal footing with Coloureds for the better 
jobs). Initially, the government barely budged on these issues though, once again placing serious 
strain on the relationship between Western Cape employers and the state. 
The announcement of the scrapping of the CLPP in 1984 heralded the beginning of the end of the 
government's attempts to promote Coloured interests in employment and residence at the expense of 
Africans. That being said, there were still many controls in place over the employment and housing 












A Brief Histon' of Cape Town 
The early years 
Cape Town was originally founded only as a temporary re i'reshment station in 1652 for the Dutch 
East India's Ships doing trade with the Far Last (Wilkinsl l l1. 2000). IIowever. by 1658, land had 
been granted to the "free burghers" and by 167-1-. a stone i'prt had been built Utilizing slave labour 
imported from West and East Africa, Madagascar and thL' I:ast Indies, as well as indigenous Khoi 
people stripped of their stock, grazing land and access to \\ater, the colony grew, albeit slowly. By 
1805, the population of Cape Town had reached 17,000. Once the British took over the colony 
(181411815), Cape Town profited from preferential trade agreements with the UK., as well as 
expanding British interests in India, south east Asia and till' Antipodes. A British mercantile and 
professional class gradually arose alongside the already L'stablished Dutch and German retailer and 
farmer class in the 19th century. Although Cape Town's economy was still dominated by trade, 
agriculture and fishing, small-scale industries competing \\ ith or complementing the activities 
undertaken by skilled Muslim artisans emanci pated rrom sla\ery in 1834 also emerged. By 1865, 
Cape Town municipality had grown to 28.400 people. 15.100 of whom were "White", 12,400 
"Other" and the rest, "Hottentots" or "Kalirs". Along \\ith the development of Cape Town's 
infrastructure and increased linkages with the interior 0 r the country (diamonds were discovered in 
Kimberley in 1867) and the Witwatersrand (where gold \\as discovered in 1886), the population of 
the city and its surrounding suburbs had grovvn to 67.000 by 1891. By 1905, despite the recession 
associated with the end of the South African \A'ar in 1902. Cape Town's population had reached 
171,000 (Wilkinson, 2000). 
African migration at the start of the centurv 
As African people flocked to Cape Town in the early Il)()(l"s to take advantage of the burgeoning 
employment opportunities. so African settlements appe(lJ"ed on the periphery of the White 
settlements (Dewar, Rosmarin and Watson. 1901). ,\Ithough this land was "less desirable", it was 











and Watson, 1991: 13). As a result of bubonic plagu~. \\ hie-h \\as especially prevalent in these 
densely populated working-class inner-city arl'as. and the rcsultant demands from the White 
residents for greater segregation. the first orJicial act of segregation of Cape Town's "Native" 
population occurred in 1901 (Dewar. Rosl1larin and Watsol1. 1991; Wilkinson. 2000). Thus Ndabeni 
(initially Uitvlugt) became the first separate location on thl' l'dge of the city for Africans forcibly 
removed from their original places of residence in Cape To\\n (Dewar. Rosmarin and Watson. 1991; 
Horner, 1983). The Housing Act of 1920. which made pro\ision for segregated urban locations, 
was consolidated into the Natives (Urban Areas) Act of I ():23 (Pinnock, 1981). Under this 
legislation, local authorities were obliged to provide separllte. segregated housing as the compulsory 
abode oflegally resident Africans in urban locations in "\\h i te" cities (Pinnock, 1981; Saunders, 
1978; Pose!, 1991). Thus. these areas could be e011lrollcd ~ll1d the flow of Africans from "white" 
farms and the reserves to the towns regulated (Centre for Intergroup Studies, 1983). This Act was 
applied to Cape Town in stages (Saunders. 1978). The 1'1 lIl' ApriL 1926, saw the area brought 
under section 5, meaning that all Africans (e\cept those e.\cmpted) had to live in a location. Section 
12 of the Act was only implemented in June or the same :- l'ar. Africans entering the city now 
required a document granting them no more thlln 1-1- days to stay there and look for work. If they 
could not find ajob in this time they could be deported (Saunders. 1978). 
The interwar years 
After the Act of Union in 1910. vvhen the former British c( ll()nies Natal and Cape Town became 
linked to the Boer republics in the Transvaal and Orangl' I rl'e State. Johannesburg became South 
Africa's largest city during the 1920·s. with thl' Witwaterc.ral1ll as its core (Wilkinson. 2(00). While 
Johannesburg had an urban-industrial eCOllom) though. Clpe Town became an important 
administrative, cultural and service centre. Mal1ul~lcturing played a significant role in Cape Town's 
economy during the First World War (especially in the clothing. textile, paper and printing, food, 
beverages, and light engineering sectors). and also contribLited to diversification and expansion 
during the inter-war years. Ever-increasing numbers of people moved from the rural areas to Cape 
Town. especially during the depression years (193(),s). and the population ballooned to 307,000 by 
1921 (Centre for Intergroup Studies. 1983: Wilkinson. 20()()). To escape state control and other 
aspects of the Act. many Africans chose to liVe' outside thl' l11unicipal boundaries, rather than in the 
locations. Thus the problem of squatting in Cape TO\m Gill h~ traced back to the inter-war years, 











whom no provision had been made in Langa - the "model ~ative village" established at Langa in 
1927 (Wilkinson, 2000) - and who had no desire to be suhject to the rigorous state control or high 
transport and rental costs associated with living in a location (Kinkhead-Weekes, 1983). With this 
rapidly increasing urbanisation, the Depression. and the sluggish growth in public-housing stock, 
many Coloureds and even Whites in Cape r(m n had no accommodation (Kinkhead-Weekes, 1983). 
Thus, while the late 1920's saw the initiation or public hOllsing developments on the Cape Flats for 
Coloured working-class families. and the \\ealthier suburh." remained segregated, many people lived 
in mixed areas in Cape Town. including informal shack sl'llicments (Kinkhead-Weekes. 1983: 
Wilkinson, 2000). 
In addition to the growth in the manufacturing sector in Clpe Town during the First World War and 
the inter-war years, the Western Cape's manuLlcturing industry also developed during the Second 
World War, mainly because of the protection arforded it by the war's artificial import barriers (Van 
der Horst, 1964; Cole, 1984). During this time. many labourers were also needed for erecting 
defence works and building the Duncan Docks in order to taise capacity to accommodate the extra 
shipping at Cape Town. Therefore. despite increasingly strict legislation. during the latel930's and 
early 1940's, large informal settlements or squdtter camps gre\\ in and around the major cities. 
largely as a result of increased urbanisation (especially A I rican urbanisation) "stimulated by the 
labour demands of the war-time economy" (Wilkinson. 2(1()(): 197: Pinnock, 1981). 
The Nationalists and redoubled efforts to excilide i\frican~ 
As a result of the increase in squatter camps and the gro\\ ing number of inner-city poor. an ever 
more anxious White population voted the National Party ('\P) into government in 1948 (Pinnock, 
1981: Wilkinson, 2000). The NP government restructured ~lI1d greatly intensified the controls over 
the African labour market (Posel. 1991). The Idbour bure~llt:\ system increasingly limited the 
movements of Africans. as well as their OCCUlxltional choil'l's (Van der Horst, 1964: Pose!. 1991). 
Numerous bills were passed that enabled an e\\.'11 more rm dicient system of racial domination than 
had existed before (Posel. 1991). The N P gm nnment' s jll lPlt 1ation Registration Act (no. 30 of 
1950) was passed in 1950. by which time ('apl' 1'0\\ n had .1 population of 742.400. consisting of 
361.000 Coloureds. 307.000 Whites and n.1 ()() Africans ((\'ntre for Intergroup Studies. 1983; 
Wilkinson, 2000). Other legislation designed to achieve the NP's goal of "total apartheid" included 











1953), which extended the same principle of rigid segregclt!()n of Africans to Coloureds and Indians 
(Centre for Intergroup Studies, 1983: Pose!. 1 ql) I: Wilkilb( In. 2000). Thus, after 1948, much 
legislation was passed in South Africa vvith tIll' aim ofachil..'\ing two goals, namely (a) preventing 
the numbers of Africans in the cities from e:\cl'eding tIll' lkm,tIld for their labour, and (h) keeping 
Africans in the city separated from other racial groups (Dl..'\\ Clr. Rosmarin and Watson, 1(91). The 
government also sought to crush organised African opposition. a goal it had effectively achieved by 
the 1960's (Posel, 1991). The state then em harked on "an ambitious and ruthless programme of 
social engineering" in the 1960's that depriveclmost South ,\!'ricans of their citizenship and lead to 
the forced removal of over 3 and half million pl'opic 11'0111 Ill'\\l)' created White areas to the ethnic 
"homelands" (Pose!. 1991: I). 
Cape Town was one of the most socially integrated cities III South Africa prior to the Group Areas 
Act (Centre for Intergroup Studics. 1(83). Thl' first step III implementing this act was the separation 
of Coloureds and Africans. particularly ill the "l]ualler arl'ch. 111lts began the removal of Africans 
from so-called "black spots" (which then becll11e ColoLlrl',i :-.uburhs) to emergency camps. from 
which they could be expelled tl'om the Peninsula (Centre !()J'lntergroup Studies, 1983). Cape 
Town's southern suburbs were declared White group areas in 1961, and the large Coloured working-
class population living there was instructed to mO\e to thl' Cape Flats (Pinnock, 1981). The 
implementation of the Group Areas Act in Cape TO\vn led to the dislocation of communities and the 
forced removal of thousands ofpeop\e to ne\\ public hou"illg developments or "townships" on the 
Cape Flats (Wilkinson. 20(0). One of the most importal1t le')uits of this policy was to relocate 
Coloured residential areas to the periphery or the city or ')~'Jl,ll'ate them from established urban areas 
by buffer zones, railway lines and distance (Centre for Inll'rgroup Studies, 1983). One of the most 
infamous examples of this process was the ckstruction oi"'hl' inner-city working-class area of 
District Six on the basis of slum clearance. and the remm .Ii (Ii" it's residents to far-Hung council 
housing estates, only for it to be declared a White group dll'Cl later (Centre for Intergroup Studies, 
1983; Wilkinson, 2000). Thus. thousands of )ll'Ople sutlCl"ed due to the loss of their houses, 
livelihoods and businesses, cheap and easy access to work. ,tIld shopping and recreation facilities 
(Centre for Intergroup Studies, 1983). Such e\ents changl'Li the face of Cape Town irrevocably in 
the 1960's and 1970's (Wilkinson. 2(00). 
While the struggle of Africans against the stall' i 11 terms (): lIrhan land and housing occupation 











Effective influx control in Cape To\vn only bec(lme a real I ty at the end of 1952 with the 
implementation of the Natives (Urban Areas) Consolidation ,\ct in the city, thereby allowing 
authorities to expel Africans who remained ill their areas longer than 72 hours (Van der Horst, 1964; 
Kinkhead-Weekes, 1983). From 1953. police raids on sqll~ltter camps to find illegally resident 
Africans became weekly events. the prim(lry go,il or \\hiC;1 \\ ,IS to flush out illegally resident 
squatters and African women (Kinkhead- \Veekl's. 1983: ( (lie. 1(84). Originally. African women 
could be expelled by a local authority if they could not pr, 1\ l' they had accommodation (Kinkhead-
Weekes, 1983). After 1946 though, An'ican \\ ()1l1en COUll l Illltjoin their husbands in the Western 
Cape unless they had permits from the authorities in the d:l'd tll \\hich they were travelling. In 1955, 
it was announced that the amended pass l,\\\s \\ ould alst) h~' made applicable to African \vomen, and 
increasing numbers of illegally resident AJricCill \\omen \\ l're "rounded up" and threatened with 
prosecution if they did not leave. The 1957 Nati\es (Urb,1l1 /\reas) Amendment Act came into effect 
in Cape Town in February 1958, thereby introducing e\en stricter conditions for Africans to remain 
in urban areas legally. Administrative structures \\ere als! I erected that facilitated the removal of 
"surplus" Africans from the cities (Kinkhe(ld- \\eekes. 19~~). From the early 1960's to the late 
1970's, the government tried to keep a tight rl'in 011 the 11l\ \\ l'1l1ents of Africans in and out of the 
cities across the whole of the country (Cole. 1\)89). As tiL' \\estern Cape was a Coloured 
preferential area (Coloured Labour PreICrel1cc Policy or I q.:;.+). influx control was more rigorously 
applied in Cape Town than elsewhere in the C(lulltr: (\\·il:,lllson. 2000). In addition. An-ican women 
in Cape Town were victimised disproportion(llcly ill orck: 1(1 prevent families from settling here 
(Van der Horst, 1964; Ramphele. 1993). l3et\\ een 1959 dlld 1962. 19.000 African men and 7,300 to 
9,000 African women were reported to have bcen remO\l',! li'om Cape Town and '"relocated" to the 
Native Reserves of the Transkei and the Ciskei (I [orner. 1 ()78). An estimated 17 million Africans 
were prosecuted in South Africa under these Lms hct\\eell 1916 and 1986, when the Abolition of 
Influx Control Act came into being in June (Rd1l1phele. 1 !)()~). 
New townships were constructed during the IlJ5()'s and e"rl: 1960's at Gugulethu (originally 
Nyanga-West) and Nyanga to accommodate kg,illy resilLlll Africans and separate them from those 
living illegally in the post-\\ar squatter camps (\\,ilkinso\ =()O(): Kinkhead-Weekes, 19X3). 
Although it grew slowly frol11 its creatioll ill I \q~. peojlk \\ lTe being moved from squatter areas in 
four local authorities into the controlled Gll11jl ,It \JYllngll i'\ 1953 (Kinkhead-Weekes. 1983). As it 
was looking for the cheapest way to hOllse Ai'ric(lns. thl' ( il\ CounciL despite its previolls 











families to Nyanga and bachelors. \\'ho \\l'rl' 1ll~linl: li\ilL illegally with their families in squatter 
camps. to Langa. This paved the way for the 1~lrge-seale c,!!ldtter clearance operation of the next 5 
years (Kinkhead-Weekes. 1983). 
Failed state control and renewed resistance 
The government's forceful attempts to red uce l he n um bel' (1/" African labourers in Cape Town had 
only limited success though (Cole. 1984; Goldin. 1984). Ikt\\'een 1960 and 1965. the number of 
employed African contract workers dropped b\ 37%. 11011 l'\er. there was a steady increase in the 
proportion of those employed between 1968 alld 197-J.. \\: i il (me estimate of an increase of 56.3% in 
migrant workers between 1970 and 1973 ( Cole. 1 98-J.: (j( dill. 1984). The Riekert Commission too 
estimated an increase in the African populdli(l11 ill the ell < Peninsula of 69% between 1960 and 
1970 (Fast, 1995). Therefore. due to the slate's inilhilil: i" ,Idequately restrict African urbanisation 
and the failure of the public housing system tll keep paee .\ Ilh demand (the construction of houses 
for Africans in Cape Town was halted in I96Cl ~lI1d only rl'slimed in the mid-1980's with the 
establishment of Khayelitsha l Centre for 1 )c\'eIOjll11l'nt S\lldies. 1989]). squatter settlements again 
sprang up on Cape Town's periphery in the early 197Crs. {lilly this time on a greater scale than 
before (Wilkinson, 2000). The Cape Peninsula had apprn'\imately 37 squatter camps by the time of 
the onset of the worldwide economic recession in 1973 ((, lie. 1984). By 1980, the population of 
Cape Town numbered 1.9 million people (:'i73.()()O Whik,. ')l)5.600 Coloureds and 315.700 
Africans), with most Coloured and African households li\ 1l1g in informal settlements or impossibly 
overcrowded conditions in existing tOv'vnships (Wilkinsot:. _~(JOO). As a result of these kinds of 
conditions. the township revolt started in S()\\L'\O in 197Cl I',lickl), spread to Cape Tov'vn (Wilkinson, 
2000). 
The resurgence of Cape Town squatter camp resist,lI1ce ii, Ille mid- 1970's led to the bulldozing of 
the shacks of25,000 Xhosa-speaking residents of the can~:v.; of Modderdam, Unibel and Werkgenot 
in 1977 and early 1978 (Kinkhead-Weekes. 1(83). After: his. there was a series of violent police 
raids on the remaining squatter camp at Crossroads (repri~'\ ed in 1979). followed by the deportation 
of illegal Africans in their thousands 1'1'0111 the l'sig<lI1geni L':lmp at Nyanga East in 1981 (Kinkhead-
Weekes, 1983). Groups of squatters started occup: ing Lli 'Ii <ldjacent to Crossroads in the early 
1980's, and were eventually granted land in :\Y~lllg(\ F\lL'~'I(ln (Dewar. Rosmarin and Watson. 











finally conceded the need to allocate more land for ACriell1 residential areas and set aside 
Khayelitsha for this purpose (a measure which v\as met \\ itll strong disapproval from the African 
population of Cape ToV',n. as this land \vas on the urban 11l'!'i phery). Those Africans living in 
squatter settlements were the first pressuril.ed to n1ll\e to < Iwyelitsha. Between "internal power 
struggles, political unrest and attempts b) the stall' to el'Il', I removals". widespread violence erupted 
in Cape Town's townships in the mid-19~W's (Ik\\ ~lr. R\l ll1arin and Watson, 1991: 19). This 
insurrection led to the state adopting a ne\\ polie\ (Cok. '!Sl)). With the Abolition oC lntlux 
Control Act (1986) and the impiementatiull oi'tllL' "orderi Ilrbanisation" strategy. the gmernment 
became less concerned with the removal () i' .'\ rric~lI1s Croll ': rhan areas. but provision was made for 
more control over where they settled in the metropolitan ~ rL'as. e.g. attempts to channel all squatters 
(both legal and illegal) to a controlled settlement like Klw:. L'litsha and the continued demolishing of 
illegal informal settlements. especially those erected ncar \\hite areas (Dewar. Rosmarin and 
Watson, 1991; Cole, 1989; Fast 19(5). 
Events like the displacement of 70.000 people i'rom Cn)';" ,ads (May . ./une. 1986) resulted in new 
squatter settlements emerging in and arollllli Nyanga ami Illgulethu townships (Devvar. Rosmarin 
and Watson, 1991; Cole. 1989). In addition. despill' the ~'.ile·s attempts to limit its growth, the 
African population of Cape Town increased by all estinw' ,\ I 109% between 1980 and 19X8: as the 
population stood at more than 700.000. thLTl' \\as a hOllsi: c' shortage around the 100 (JOO mark 
(Dewar, Rosmarin and Watson. 1(91). (;i \en tilL' spall' ( , ~'\ictions and continued arri \al of 
migrants in Cape Town. it is not surprising that illi'\lrm~t\ <ltlements grew once again. although 
these were smaller and developed in a more dispersed natlll"L' in comparison to the large shantytowns 
of the 1970's (Fast 1995). Into the 1990·s. the Ai'rican p(I],lIlation of Cape Town continued to 
increase, thereby exacerbating the extremel) O\'CIUO\\"lb i ulnditions already experienced in the 
townships (Saff, 1998). This led to the est~lhlisllll1L'llt 01', cn more informal settlements and the 
number of backyard shacks gre\\ in Corm,t\ t\l\\llships. S\ utting on land previously designated for 












Migration to Cape Town 
The Migrant Labour System in South Africa 
South Africa's labour migration system is long-lived (M0ller, 1984). This system was already well-
established in the 1920's when the state's approach was one of allowing Africans into White areas 
as long as their labour was needed, and removing them from the cities to the reserves if they and 
their families became "redundant" and "superfluous" (Kane-Berman, 1972). After 1948 though, the 
system became even more entrenched in South Africa and the Nationalist government developed it 
into a more "sophisticated and all-embracing method of labour allocation and control" (Platzky and 
Walker. 1985: 1 07). Labour bureaus functioned to select African workers, direct them to the sectors 
where labour was most needed, then eject them when their work was done. Thus African migrants 
basically had no control over where and how long they could work, or even the type of work they 
could do. This policy originally only applied to rural workers. However, all African workers 
(permanent residents as well as migrants) in urban areas became subject to this system in 1964 
(Platzky and Walker, 1985). In 1968, the government announced its intention to develop South 
Africa's economy using migrant labour (Kane-Berman, 1972). That year, labour bureaus were 
established in the Bantustans (previously reserves), thereby preventing Africans fromlcaving the 
rural areas for towns without being allocated a job first (Platzky and Walker, 1985). From this point 
onwards, migrant workers also had to return to their "place of origin" annually, compelling them to 
maintain their legal and personal ties with the Bantustans (Platzky and Walker, 1985). Therefore, 
between int1ux control in the urban areas and communal tenure in the rural areas, rural-urban 
migration was lessened and the movements of Africans (as well as their permanent settling in urban 
areas) strictly controlled (M011er, 1984). 
Migrant labour \vas a mainstay of several sectors of the South African economy for many years. 
I mportant industries like mining and construction needed the large pool of unskilled workers, while 
many smaller manufacturers relied on the system to keep their labour costs as low as possible and 
thereby stay in business (Platzky and Walker, 1985). In addition to cheap labour, limiting African 











families, health costs, or political rights (Platzky and Walker, 1985; Moller, 1984). The South 
African migrant labour system was a particularly flexible one, where employers could adjust the size 
of their workforce to suit the market (M011er, 1984). Thus, employers could simply reduce their 
labour component vvhen the economy was experiencing a downturn without ever having to bear the 
costs of workers' social needs, which were supposedly met in their rural area of origin. The 
minimal wages and poor living conditions typical of migrant labourers were viewed as adequate for 
them (although, there was such a high turnover of contract workers that there was a regular supply 
to replace anyone \vho had suffered the effects of the low standard of living and poor working 
conditions) (Moller, 1984). 
By its very nature, the contract labour system also did not allow for job mobility in urban industries 
(]'vloller. 1984). Migrants were generally employed for a year to 18 months. If they lost their job, 
they had to return to their homeland, where they would be "re-recruited" (although many workers 
\\cre able to circumvent this and most other aspects of migrant policy to a certain extent). Whereas 
they had been able to qualify for urban rights by serving with one employer or living at the same 
urban address for a "sufficient" amount of time previously, rural migrant workers could only enter 
urban areas as contract workers after 1968 (Moller, 1984). Initially these contracts were renewable 
annually (Moller. 1984). However, to limit the inconvenience to industry, a system was developed 
that allowed \vorkers to be sent back to the same job if their employers wanted them (Platzky and 
Walker, 1985). Not all employees found the migrant labour system agreeable though. Certain 
manufacturing industries were already calling for a permanently urbanised labour force in the early 
1940' s, and continued to oppose the system in the 1950' s. These sectors wanted a better-skilled, 
more stable \vorkforce, as well as the elimination of the bureaucracy around finding and hiring 
migrant labour (Platzky and Walker, 1985). 
Needles to say, the problems associated with the migrant labour system in South Africa were many 
and varied. Workers were not allowed to bring their families with them to the cities (Moller, 1984); 
therefore, neither wives could live with their husbands, nor children with their parents (Kane-
Berman, 1972). Social problems like "prostitution, adultery, illegitimacy, venereal diseases, 
juvenile delinquency [and] drunkenness" were often associated with migrant labourers (Kane-
Berman, 1972:2). Because of the constant oscillation between the cities and the rural areas, many 
employers did not train migrant workers past a certain level of proficiency as the employee would 











training him. Therefore. in many cases, migrant workers could not stay in a job long enough to 
become suitably qualified at anyone type of work. Without this industry training, poverty amongst 
migrant workers became even more entrenched. As the population grew in the reserves, so they 
became even poorer and more people left to find work in the urban areas. But this loss of income-
earning workers left the reserves even poorer. Africans were poorly trained and earned very low 
\vages, thereby providing a large pool of cheap labour. This enabled industries to expand, and 
\Vhite owners accumulated wealth at their African workers' expense. The average White income 
\\as 12 times that of an average African in 1946, and nearly 14 times the amount in 1967 (Kane-
Berman, 1972). 
Migrants in Cape Town 
E\cn though they were denied urban status and therefore generally 'not counted', resulting in the 
statistics of the size and growth of the African population being notoriously inexact with estimates 
varying widely. the most rapidly growing population group in Cape Town in 1991 was Africans 
(Dewar. Rosmarin and Watson, 1991). In their research, Dewar, Rosmarin and Watson (1991) tried 
to understand the complex patterns of movement of the African population to and within Cape Town 
using a variety of sources (e.g. local surveys, advice office records, and interviews with those 
\vorking within the African communities). 
The t\\/O main reasons Africans migrated to Cape Town were economic and familial (Dewar, 
Rosmarin and Watson. 1991). Economic conditions in the homelands were very poor, where many 
hUllilies did not have access to land for farming, levels of unemployment were high, and even those 
\\ho were employed tended to earn very little. Unfortunately, favourable perceptions of the city 
seemed to be misguided, with stable employment being very difficult to secure in the short term due 
to a lack of education. necessary skills and language dit1iculties. In terms of familial links, women 
and children tended to follow the men to the cities. Poor health care facilities in other areas also 
encouraged people to migrate to Cape Town. On the other hand, the political upheaval in the city's 
education system caused people to send their children back to the homelands for their schooling. 
Many African people in Cape Town maintained links with the rural areas not simply because their 
children still stayed there, but also to maintain land and close personal contacts in the homelands. 
At the time of their report, Dewar, Rosmarin and Watson (1991) also found that there was a lot of 










occurred in an attempt to find more secure and stable housing, or housing better located in terms of 
employment opportunities (in the formal or informal sector). Some were forced to move (e.g. 
generally in terms of the Illegal Squatting Act of 1951 or to escape political violence), while others 
moved voluntarily in the hope of finding better living conditions and services (e.g. during the 
Crossroads upgrade project) (Dewar, Rosmarin and Watson, 1991). 
In June 1988, a survey was conducted in four shack areas of Khayelitsha (Seekings, Graaf and 
Joubert, 1990). The households surveyed tended to consist of four and a half people on average, 
t\\O of whom were children. However, as many as 23 % of the households consisted of 6 or more 
people. The respondents were generally young, with the majority aged 15 years or younger (42%), 
21 % aged between 16 and 25 years, and only 11 % of the sample aged 41 years or older. Low levels 
of education were the general trend, with 25% not having even passed standard three, and only a 
quarter progressing past standard 6. Incomes were generally low and unemployment rife among the 
respondents. Only 11 % of these respondents were born in the Western Cape. Of those not hailing 
from the Western Cape, 71 % came from the Transkei, 12% from the Ciskei and 13 % from the 
Eastern Cape (Seekings, Graaf and Joubert, 1990). 
Nearly two-thirds of the respondents arrived in Khayelitsha before or during 1985, i.e. before the 
abolition of influx control (Seekings, Graaf and Joubert, 1990). About 25% of the migrants arrived 
before 1985, the majority during that year (41 %) and just over a third after 1985. In terms of ties 
with areas outside of Western Cape, 40% of respondents had children living or schooling in the 
Transkei. One third of respondents owned land in a "homeland", mainly in the Transkei (79%), 
where two-thirds of them kept livestock. Most indicated that they kept land for their retirement 
(42%) or because relatives lived there (34%). Money was sent "home" by about 75% of the 
respondents. Most respondents visited the Transkei or Ciskei occasionally (Seekings, Graaf and 
Joubert, 1990). 
Although the authors warned that the responses to questions about employment and income should 
be viewed with caution, they did report that nearly one third of the respondents were unemployed 
(Seekings, Graaf and Joubert, 1990). A substantially higher proportion of those unemployed were 
\\omen (overall, 48% of women reported being unemployed, versus 17% of men). There was more 
unemployment amongst respondents born elsewhere (36%) versus those born in the Western Cape 











those born in the Western Cape. Men generally earned significantly more than women (e.g. low 
wages were especially prevalent in domestic work, a field dominated by women) (Seekings, Graaf 
and Joubert, 1990). 
Cross, Bekker and Eva (1999) also conducted a survey of migration into the Cape Metropolitan 
Area (CMA). Approximately 7% of the sample of Africans had no education. A startling 41 % of 
heads of African households were functionally illiterate with a standard six level of education. In 
terms of their region of origin, those from the former Transkei (i.e. the vast majority of respondents) 
had the least education. More than half of the migrant population was considered to be functionally 
illiterate. Therefore, the authors concluded, too many Africans were competing for a finite number 
of unskilled jobs (which was all they were really suitable for in terms of their education) and 
running a very high risk of being unemployed. Only 13% of heads had matric or a higher 
qualification. There was quite a difference between the formal and informal townships here though. 
Those respondents from formal areas like Langa, Gugulethu and Nyanga, where people who were 
born in Cape Town lived, or where those who had stayed in Cape Town longer versus those in the 
informal settlements lived, had a wider range of education levels than those in the informal 
settlements. A full 25% of formal township residents had matric or a higher qualification versus a 
mere 5% of informal township residents. Hostel residents were "better educated" than informal 
settlement residents, with a functional literacy rate of 75%, versus 54% for informal areas and even 
64% in formal townships. Approximately 18% of hostel inhabitants claimed to have obtained 
matric or a higher education qualification (which may be due to the high proportion of younger 
males in the hostels and could help explain the good employment levels for this group) (Cross, 
Bekker and Eva, 1999). 
According to the survey, 60% of Africans in the sample were employed (Cross, Bekker and Eva, 
1999). Unemployment levels of 10% in the formal townships, 22% in the informal areas and only 
8% in the hostels were reported. The authors did not seem to think the difference in education 
between the formal and informal townships alone accounted for the big difference in unemployment 
levels. Rather they pointed out that those in the formal townships potentially had access to better 
networks of people and information (Cross, Bekker and Eva, 1999). 
or the entire sample of African migrants, 21 % fell into the lowest income quintile, with only 8% in 











lovvest income category, along with 48% of hostel residents and 54% of informal settlement 
residents. Only 6% of the informal areas' residents earned in the high-income bracket. A third of 
African households reported earning less than R200/month, while 70% earned less than 
R500/month, despite the relatively high proportion employed and levels of education mentioned 
above. The low-income levels were partly explained by the youth of respondents. The authors also 
contended that poor job quality and relatively high unemployment are associated with the continuing 
t10w of migrants into Cape Town who did not have the experience in the urban setting, or the 
information and personal networks to get the higher paying, better jobs available to established 
residents who did have access to these resources. While a significant proportion of the population of 
the formal townships is poor, those in the informal areas (where there are more migrants) are 
overwhelmingly so (Cross, Bekker and Eva, 1999). 
Of the total African sample, 75% were born in a rural area, with 10% being born in an urban area 
outside of the CMA (Cross, Bekker and Eva, 1999). Almost a third of the formal township residents 
were born in the CMA, versus 6% of informal area and 8% of hostel residents. While the majority 
of formal township residents hailed from the Eastern Cape (63 %), an even greater proportion of 
informal area and hostel populations came from there (85% each). By far the main source of 
migrants into the CMA was the former Transkei (77% of formal township, 68% of informal area and 
59% of hostel residents). The table below gives the arrival sequence of the rural-born African 
sample population in the CMA (Cross, Bekker and Eva, 1999): 
African migration to Cape Town, 1970-1998 
Year Percentage of the African population 





1996 and after 14% 











As can be seen from the table, the most recent increase in migration from rural Africans areas has 
occurred in the early 1990's, when controls over their movements in the urban areas were reduced 
(Cross, Bekker and Eva, 1999). 
In light of the characteristics mentioned above and the fact that education levels in Cape Town are 
relatively better than many other areas in South Africa, it is not surprising that those who migrated 
to the CMA from elsewhere in the Western Cape had higher employment levels than migrants from 
urban Eastern Cape areas and the locally born CMA African group (Cross, Bekker and Eva, 1999). 
Those who migrated from the Transkei were nearly 25% worse off in terms of employment than 
those who migrated from somewhere in the Western Cape and the CMA-born population 
respectively (this and unemployment trends also followed education levels). Lower than average 
incomes were earned by those Africans who migrated from the rural areas of the Eastern Cape and 
former homelands (Cross, Bekker and Eva, 1999). 
While nearly half of the African migrants stated that they intended to return to the rural areas on 
retirement, the authors felt that, given the uncertainty of the responses, only a minority would 
probably do so (Cross, Bekker and Eva, 1999). It also seemed unlikely that any of their offspring 
born and/or raised in Cape Town would return to the rural areas, leaving a young population with a 
potentially high rate of natural increase in the CMA (Cross, Bekker and Eva, 1999). 
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